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DISSENT

RICHARD LOWENTHAL

THE PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISTIC COMMUNISM

A Major Study on the International Breakup of the Totalitarian World

MICHAEL RUSTIN and MICHAEL WALZER

LABOR IN BRITAIN

BEN B. SELIGMAN

AUTOMATION AND THE UNIONS

LEWIS COSER

CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE INTELLECTUALS

LEWIS S. FEUER

MEETING THE SOVIET PHILOSOPHERS

THOMAS R. BROOKS

THE NEGRO MOVEMENT

Irving Howe, Otis L. Graham Jr., William Spinrad: On the Elections

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AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Otis L. Graham, Jr., who teaches history in Washington, D.C., is writing a book on the intellectual origins of the New Deal. . . . William Spinrad is Associate Professor of Social Science at Patterson State College, and has published in the *American Sociological Review, Public Opinion Quarterly,* and other journals. . . . Thomas R. Brooks, free lance writer, is author of *Toil and Trouble* (Delacorte Press), which will be reviewed in our next issue. . . . Michael Rustin lectures in Sociology at West Ham College of Technology (London). He was formerly on editorial board of *New Left Review,* and is now on the editorial committee of *Views.* . . . Michael Walzer, on the political science faculty at Princeton, is an editor of and frequent contributor to DISSENT; he is at present in England, completing a book. . . . Lewis S. Feuer is Professor of Philosophy and Social Science at the University of California, Berkeley, and author, among other works, of *The Scientific Intellectual,* published last year. He spent the semester of February-June, 1963, as an Exchange Scholar from the American Council of Learned Societies to the Soviet Academy of Science in Moscow, Tashkent, Leningrad, and Tbilisi. . . . Hal Draper is on the editorial board of *New Politics.* . . . Otto Kirchheimer is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. . . . Herman Benson is editor of *Union Democracy in Action,* from which the review in this issue is adapted. . . . Richard Lowenthal teaches at the Free University in West Berlin. A distinguished political commentator, his latest book is *World Communism* (Oxford).

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With Pleasure

we announce that, as of December 10, before all the returns are in, our bi-annual fund drive seems to be a distinct success. We are now at the $7,000 mark—somewhat more than the goal we set ourselves. The sole disappointment, which time may remove, is that the number of contributors is a trifle smaller than two years ago.

Almost all of this money passes through our fingers and ends with the printer. We therefore hope that some readers who've not yet chipped in, will do so. It's the "margin" that matters—the extra thousand or two we can use for promotion, getting articles, etc.

What we received so far was survival money. If you help now, it'll be for capital growth. And who wouldn't want to contribute to capital growth?

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COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

Irving Howe

'Twas A Famous Victory—But Who Won What?

DECEMBER 10, 1964

Well, the nation has saved itself from the disgrace of Goldwaterism. Mostly, it seems, because the fear of atomic war proved to be decisive: it's one thing to rant and rumble about getting tough with the Commies, quite another to put a man in the White House who might act out his fantasy. Complain as you like about the American electorate: charge it with complacence, selfishness, ignorance and backlash. But at least it cannot be accused of wanting to blow up the world. And in an era of sparse blessings, that is something for which to be grateful.

To suppose, however, that the Goldwater impulse is exhausted, or that its spokesmen will simply be swept out of the Republican Party by an aroused Eastern establishment, seems a mistake. As an electoral machine, Goldwaterism suffered a rout; as an ideological-political movement, it did extremely well. Silly though it may be for the Right to claim all 26 million Republican votes, there can be no doubt that it has grown in power and influence. I see no reason to conclude that it has reached the limit of its strength—except insofar as the nature of American society may, at some undetermined point, place a check upon *any* political-ideological movement. But at the moment, the Goldwater tendency controls the national apparatus of the Republican Party, and even if in January it loses that control, it will still remain *the* party in many states. It has thrived organizationally; it issues a large volume of printed matter; it operates a wide network of radio programs. Above all, it can expect that the kind of malaise induced by the transitions and failures of the welfare state—the malaise upon which it feeds—will continue to afflict millions of Americans and make them receptive to its appeal. Those right-wing ideologues who have some long-range perspective are not discouraged, and from their point of view, are correct not to be.

Within the Republican Party, the Goldwater tendency retains a great deal of bargaining power. If the Nixon-Scranton-Lodge alliance (assuming such a union of humpty-dumpties) tries to remove the right-wingers from control, it risks a split that in a good many states would virtually destroy the party. Embittered antagonists as the two wings may be, neither alone

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can soon rebuild the Republican Party into a formidable opposition to President Johnson.

At the moment, the United States has the kind of one-and-a-half party system which seemed likely to be—but was not—established in Europe during the 1950's, when the Christian Democratic and other center-bourgeois parties seemed totally secure in office and the Social Democrats permanently confined to an ineffectual opposition. Here, in the U.S., the Republicans have been reduced to a shambles. Their hold on office is broken; reapportionment threatens further losses; inside their ranks fester murderous hostilities. Their one symbol of success—victory in the deep South—is actually a portent of disaster, since it foreshadows isolation as a bitter-end racist minority. To this process of disintegration Lyndon Johnson will undoubtedly contribute by offering posts to a number of "moderate" Republicans, thereby speeding up the migration of conservative sentiment and money from Republicans to Democrats. No, for some time ahead the GOP cannot be expected to provide an effective opposition to the Johnson administration, and it remains an open question whether it can reconstitute itself as a coherent force capable of dislodging the Democrats from either the Presidency or the Congress.

Thus, the two-party system is endangered, and not, as establishment liberals now claim, because there has been an influx of ideological politics from the right, but more fundamentally, because, with the left disabled and the center brilliantly preempted by Johnson, there is no serious basis for a resurgent Republican Party except as *some kind* of voice for the Right.

II

Now, in an authoritarian state—that is, one retaining the governmental structure of totalitarianism but without active terror—whatever political life is possible gets squeezed into the single ruling party. In Poland, for instance, a considerable range of political views struggles for expression through the constricting agency and muddling vocabulary of the Communist Party. Today in America a somewhat parallel development seems to be taking place, not because of legal restrictions on political activities, but because of the inanition of the democratic process and the moral-social paralysis of a stalled welfare state. All pressure groups and interests crowd toward the center; everything consequently becomes smarmed over (the latest and smarmiest catchword being "moderation"); and even when solutions are proposed for urgent problems, what all too often happens is that the *names* of the solution (anti-poverty, etc.) are appropriated while the substance is neglected.

One clever reporter, Ted Lewis of the New York *Daily News,* calls the Democratic Party of Lyndon Johnson a party of "the tent and the table." At the head of the big table in a very big tent sits an affable and lording Big Daddy who passes out slices of the barbecue with a sharp eye toward the number of votes and amount of pressure each can summon. No doubt, certain desirable steps will follow: Medicare, even if in a poor version, will be passed; some relief provided for Appalachia; and funds devoted to educa-

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tion, even if the increasing distortion of value and purpose within the American educational system makes federal aid far less of a blessing than it once seemed.

Most of the present signs suggest that the Johnson administration, freed from any precise political indebtedness by the enormous margin of its victory, will gravitate toward a liberal-conservative Center. That is where Mr. Johnson feels most comfortable; that is where the pendulum of American sentiment seemingly comes to rest; and that is where an astute politician can most readily play the role of the broker mediating among a variety of interests. There are portents already. The President has begun to woo the Southern "loyalists" like Senators Russell and Talmadge, in part to maintain a check against liberal pressure; he has not rebuked the vulgar outbreaks of J. Edgar Hoover (whose immediate dismissal could well be the first step in a program of national welfare).

Meanwhile, the social problems of this country, some blatant and others insidiously subtle, continue to accumulate and fester. They fall under two rough headings: those for which an answer is *more* (social and welfare measures) and those for which an answer is *new* (social restructurings caused by automation, the allocation of national resources, etc.). This first kind of problem indicates a need to extend the welfare state, the second to move beyond its increasingly constricted limits. In a thoughtful post-election piece Carey McWilliams lists both kinds of problems, and his catalogue is worth noticing if only to remind ourselves of the urgency of the obvious:

> Is a "great society" one that, on an ever larger scale, continues to despoil the environment? Are present budget priorities really designed to produce a "great society" or a caricature of one? Can we continue to guide our foreign policy with compulsive slogans: "anti-communism," "containment," "the free world," etc.? How is the scale of the military budget to be determined? How is a policy of reconversion to be brought about? How should resources be allocated? Should we plan and for what? How do we propose to cope with the consequences of the scientific-technological revolution?

Now there is a certain gesture or pretense of coping with these problems, but increasingly these efforts tend to muck up the issues and to discredit the very idea that there can be significant ways of confronting common needs. What happens, more often than not, has been pungently described by Paul Goodman:

> "Education" means subsidizing schools to train National Science Foundation grade-getters for higher status and salaries in Research and Development, and as professional institutional personnel. "Urban Reconstruction" is the cabal of Washington, city party-bosses, real-estate promoters, and automobile manufacturers to destroy neighborhoods and communities. . . . "Agriculture" is the underwriting of chain-grocers and *latifundiae*, pesticides, the eradication of farmers, and the enclosure of the countryside for motels. . . . "Political Economy" is the galloping Gross National Product, stepping up TV advertising, the unchecked aggrandizing of the broadcasting networks (including the bartering away of Telstar), and more highways when there are already too many cars. "Social Welfare" is the proliferation of social engineers and the reduction of

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> whole populations to being permanent clients, and the establishment of isolation-camps for dropouts and deviants. . . . "Peace" is the continued accumulation of hardened missile-sites, contracts for new bombers, billions for moon shots.
>
> In an economy whose structure is already badly distorted, somehow all the remedial measures of the Liberals — whether the tax-cut or the campaign against dropouts— tend to increase the take of the suburban middle-class, the diplomates, the school-monks. . . .
>
> I am not being unfair. In the teeth of this magnitude of bucks, one cannot seriously point to the minimum wage of $1.25 (excluding many categories) or 10,000 in the Peace Corps (after three years and $300 million) or the anti-discrimination housing order (applied to a minority of cases). Indeed a good synonym for Liberalism is Tokenism. But where are good neighborhoods, or clean rivers, or rural reconstruction, or liberating education, or an effort to improve the quality of the standard of living, to countervail regimenting and brainwashing, to broaden rather than narrow civil liberties? It is insulting to hear these people talk of a Great Society.

III

These notes are being written at a somewhat disadvantageous time, before President Johnson has delivered his messages to Congress announcing his program. Considering his gift for absorbing whatever attractive rhetoric is at hand, as well as his sense that the health of the nation requires meeting certain pressures and needs, one can anticipate a flurry of socio-economic programs. It would be foolish to take them at face value, equally foolish to dismiss them as mere deception. For in the present fluid situation, what happens in Washington depends to a considerable extent on what is done *to* Washington—done by that loose labor-liberal-Negro coalition which delivered so large a portion of the Johnson vote.

If we are indeed to have a politics of "the tent and the table," then let those who speak for the needy and the poor, the oppressed and the neglected, crowd into the tent and press around the table, even if this means some jostling of elbows. What will now happen is that the divergent group and class interests which have hurtled themselves into the political Center will, after a brief reign of Big Daddy's harmony, begin to struggle over the disposition of politics and economics. Why not? That is what politics and economics are partly about.

What seems depressing right now is that even for so limited a conflict, the labor, liberal and Negro groups are not well prepared. Those problems that can be attacked within the framework of welfarism, they do confront, more or less; but concerning the problems which require a breakthrough beyond the political economy of *more*, they have almost nothing to say.

And here the experience of the 'thirties seems relevant. One reason important social legislation was passed in the New Deal era was that for some decades earlier the labor and radical movements had been agitating for specific measures such as unemployment insurance and laws enabling union organization. The ground had been prepared; we knew what we wanted; and what we wanted could be intensely dramatized. Today, however, there is not nearly enough effort at programmatic thinking in the labor and Negro,

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nor in the liberal, communities. There is a strong inclination to depend on Washington, and an even stronger inclination not to venture beyond the well-marked and well-worn limits of the familiar. More and more, this means *defeat in advance*—that is, the failure of passing a watered-down version of the legislation that might have been adequate twenty years ago but no longer is today. We badly need a schedule of socio-economic legislation: let us give it a pompous name, A Charter for America. Such a program, which might not explicitly go beyond the limits of the *status quo* but if serious would be bound implicitly to challenge those limits, should obviously begin with the idea of democratizing the U.S. Congress and go ahead to the proposals advanced in the Triple Revolution statement. These are beginnings.

Which brings us, finally, to the topic of "political realignment." When Barry Goldwater suggested a division into liberal and conservative parties, he was attacked by the Republican "moderates" as, in effect, un-American. That Nixon and Lodge should object is understandable: they thrive on murk. But when a variety of liberal writers claim that there is some inherent genius in the American character which precludes ideological politics (a notion that distorts the nation's past: was Jacksonianism not ideological? and the struggle between FDR and the Liberty League?) and then proceed to suggest that ideological politics would destroy democracy (why? does it not strengthen democracy in England?), than one can only conclude that too large a portion of American political thought consists in providing unsolicited blessings for whatever happens to exist. You would think that intellectuals, if no one else, would try to see beyond the limits of the moment, the horizons of the narrowly empirical.

In any case, realignment does not mean that at the stroke of midnight the country would divide itself, like boys choosing up a game of stickball, into rigidly opposing camps. Political realignment is a process that has been going on for decades and continues now: it bears something of the inexorable. Mr. Frank Meyer in *The National Review*, not exactly our favorite magazine, writes nevertheless with simple accuracy:

> A change has been in the making in the mechanics of American politics for a number of years. It first affected the Democratic Party, as the old-style precinct workers were more and more replaced by motivated workers from the unions and from Liberal circles. This year the same process has come to a head in the Republican Party, with the emergence of a powerful force of committed conservatives as the decisive section of Republican campaign workers.

The remarkable changes in Southern voting are another instance of this process, as is the equally remarkable shift in Negro voting. This sort of realignment, very far from completed, may not satisfy those whose conception of politics comes from textbooks, Marxist, pseudo-Marxist or otherwise. It is slow, torturous and often frustrating as hell; but it continues. If we want at all to be involved in American politics, we must try to guide and speed this process so that the labor-lib-

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eral-Negro coalition will become stronger, more articulate, more programmatic, and more combative. At least for now there is no other way.

O. L. Graham, Jr.

Letter to a Right-Wing Friend: Post Mortem

Dear ——,

In this first letter after the election you doubtless expect us to gloat over the margin, or ride you about the decline of your party, to say that it serves you right, and "that settles that." Of course something was settled, we have retired the Great Dismantler from Arizona, but neither the absurd campaign nor the decisiveness of November 3 have clarified for me a great puzzle: What were you doing there?

You always insisted that you were a "conservative." But Goldwater wasn't a man of conservative temperament, being given to rigid abstractions such as "free enterprise" and "the Free World" without a glance at changing circumstances (Burke would have shunned him as an ideologue), and being further given to impulsive action. He was devoted to a "radical" program, while Johnson defends the status quo. He sought conflict with "international Communism," while Johnson, timidly and half ashamed, pursues the path of accommodation and compromise. It is rather clear who the conservatives were, don't you think? They were the cautious citizens who turned down the invitation to go on the Great Crusade, and the Presidential candidate who practiced the lower arts of compromise, steadiness, pragmatism, patience, realism, adult control over the emotional yearnings for simpler days.

In his hell-for-leather way Goldwater may have been conserving something, but let's call it by its name: conserving the dwindling liberty of businessmen to deal with consumers any way they please, conserving the liberty of the racists to deal with the Negro any way they please, the lost privilege of the United States to treat small Caribbean nations as she pleases. I can see the appeal of all this to a businessman or a racist—but to you and to me? Count me, under these circumstances, as a dedicated conservative, hanging on tightly to my freedom from economic insecurity (such as it is), from adulterated and over-priced drugs and food (here again, I would prefer to extend this freedom, but one must defend until the initiative passes), and especially my freedom from the suicidal hanker-

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ings of manichaean patriots for the relief of a nuclear showdown.

In certain moods you went ahead and called yourself a reactionary, and I have tried to use that to account for your enlistment with Barry. But you are not one of these physically comfortable but psychologically miserable insurance salesmen, realtors, brokers, the recently arrived upper-middle class white Americans of the Goldwater movement. You are a poor boy and something of an intellectual; why should you be joining them in their splenetic counter-attack in the general direction of those forces that seem to be threatening the ease, income, and suburban enjoyment of recent acquisition? The principle of recruitment of the average right-winger includes outright economic selfishness, status problems, the mental torment of adjusting to a world without certainties, racial bigotry—how did you get over there? I can only guess that your language provides a clue. Words like "confinement," "limitation," "regimentation," and "coercion" sprinkle your conversation. Let me put the best face on it I can. You must have come to your reactionary persuasion out of a sense of being cramped in a world so cluttered with the ambiguous and the threatening; and in some way you reasoned that an attack upon the Federal Government would bring the life-giving draught of liberty again. Your motivation in standing with Goldwater, I must assume, is that of a sensitive soul who prefers privacy in a world that presses in with its crowds, its limitations of space, its confinement of spontaneity, its forms for filing, ranks for standing, lines for waiting, its diminished horizons for heroism and greatness of spirit. But I had thought it obvious that a man who wanted to restore the excitement and untrammeled sense of opportunity we presumably had in this country not too long ago would recognize that to have lined up with Goldwater was to line up with those who fundamentally misunderstand the dynamics of American life.

You are not the first to have felt stifled, to have suspected that this country is following the entire western world into some sort of disaster, who felt frustrated in some important center of his being by the littleness of individual men in an age when everything seems to threaten them. But by what reasoning did you arrive, by way of cure, at an attack upon government? The pessimism we feel, the collapse of old certainties, the world wars, the interminable waits for one inch of action, these things have very little to do with Franklin D. Roosevelt. It is hard to believe that you seriously have concluded that most of your frustrations stem from government, that you do not recognize them as the fellow travellers of the growth of the corporation, the sheer numbers of us, and the intimate interconnection of all the parts of our ponderous, relentless system. What is throttling your spirit is not our modest welfare government, but the daily jostling of others against you in this vast economic web we are in. What regiments you is not some bureaucrat from Washington but the necessary arrangements of the ant heap, where so many millions must get to their places at the wheel and home every day and where, without rules, all would be trampled.

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To battle for Barry, as you did, was to join those who attack in the wrong direction. You want to go "back" to "freedom"? But little help is to be expected through diminishing the size of government, for were there no government at all, you would still be nicely hemmed in by the monster corporation, by the rules of cities, and by the self-doubt of the twentieth century. Literally, to regain the sort of freedom you mourn requires a really radical revolt, one which addresses itself to economic bigness and population growth. You think your right-wing activities are admirable in part because they are unpopular, marking you as an independent thinker. Try being seriously for anti-trust activity and birth control, and learn what it is to be unpopular, i.e., really radical! It is hard to be an honest reactionary, for it requires in the end an attack upon our true Santa Claus, industrialism.

You can't get there from here, that is the sad reality. You can't gain back the old oaken bucket, the Old South, your docile old Negro maid so blissfully ignorant of the minimum wage, the clean unspoiled beaches of pre-tourist, pre-beer can America. And you have your villains wrong. Henry Ford regimented more Americans than Franklin Roosevelt; television and asphalt roads and cities have taught the young to skip church, forget to say "Yes, Sir," and occasionally tear up Fort Lauderdale, and all this without any help from "morally depraved leftists" of the Stevenson/Bowles/ Humphrey variety. There was only one way for you to have learned that, and it costs too much.

You could have learned it only through victory. What will defeat, what will having carried only six states, teach William Buckley and the other true believers? But had the Senator *won,* you would have gathered in a few short years a great burden of lessons.

The first, that this country is conservative (that is, on dead center) and no radical, of right or left, has much chance to carry through fundamental reforms. Once Barry tackled that Democratic Congress, this lesson—borne in so harshly on John Kennedy—would have been assimilated. But even assuming, after a Goldwater victory, that his favorite measures were to be successful, a more important lesson would be forthcoming. Very little real freedom, very little decrease in the annoying limitations on personal eccentricity and initiative would be the result of throwing the rascals out and cutting down their cherry tree. It is the giant corporation that has devoured the spaces where a man can become his own economic baron ("entrepreneurial bravura," Richard Hofstadter calls it). The freedom that our 19th-century ancestors revelled in was reduced by population and combination and war, and you are not going to restore it by repealing the New Deal. The success you can never have, either at the polls or, should you someday have it there, through really surgical legislation, would demonstrate as only history can the superficial nature of your reforms.

A man like yourself, dedicated to an enlargement of personal freedom and some sort of fundamental reversal of the direction of modern life, never belonged in the Goldwater camp. It was perhaps a fit place for those whose successes are cribbed in some small way

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by federal efforts to spread them to the less fortunate (we call this rather puny, good-hearted effort "liberalism"), and who are not willing to allow this sort of humanitarian meddling. It was not a fit place for a thoughtful man.

What made me most unhappy about this long siege we were under was the absurdity of having to endure it in the 1960's. Precisely at the time when we ought to have been deciding between the centrism of Lyndon and a candidate further left, we were fighting the old campaign of 1936 over again. Going *back*, in a merely political sense, was the wrong issue in the wrong country at the wrong time. The 19th century is irretrievable, for we will not repudiate the industrialism that took it away from us. What we must now decide—and we have been prevented by the trial just finished from even discussing it—is just what further controls are necessary to preserve our resources, purify our air and water, harness our population explosion, defend our essential values against the benevolent threat of a workless day, insure minority rights, and prevent nuclear war. If you are not ready to join in that effort, surely it is not too much to expect that you withhold your aid from reactionary brigades of the Goldwater type, the armies of the selfish and the confused.

William Spinrad

A "Return" to Politics in America?

At first the 1964 election seemed to promise a new politicized atmosphere, but these expectations were hardly fulfilled. The results were less a mandate for a program than an overwhelming rejection of Goldwater madness. Democratic campaign propaganda either appealed to fears of the opponent or asserted folksy generalities, of which Johnson's speeches were the worst specimens. Yet in its ramifications the campaign signified a return to some genuine political controversy. There may now be a revival of the political public to which radicals have directed their messages in the past thirty years—the New Deal-type liberals.

Few of them ever accepted radical answers. Still, they represented a fairly large group to whom one could talk in a more or less common language. Although the radical's "internal" strength, their confidence in what they had to offer, was badly weakened in the postwar period, it could still be maintained as long as there was something valuable to say to a possible audience. But even this possibility was dissipated as the liberals them-

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selves lost their political elan and their own larger audience in the early 1950s.

Explanations are plentiful—the Cold War impasse, the ravages of McCarthyism, the political passivity of the organization man, the power of Madison Avenue mass manipulation, the generally continuing prosperity, the emphasis on private rather than public concerns. All of these unquestionably flattened the political psyches of many Americans, including the liberals, with the result that political debate became trivialized. Public discussions, including election campaigns, were rarely of a kind that would encourage political ideas or passions.

Meaningful politics need not be "ideological"; but, especially for liberals, it must include some comprehensible ideas about policy, some notions of what governments ought to do. And in recent America these have been generally absent. Only one set of issues now seems available for direct translation into easily grasped and relevant programs, the presumably "settled" problems associated with the Welfare State.

Whatever recent "political movements" have appeared are all limited in impact because they have had other emphases. The peace movement concerns itself with *ultimate* questions; radicals are involved and have made efforts to politicize it, as through the ideas of Seymour Melman; but it seems inherently a nonpolitical phenomenon. At most, it can help prevent world destruction so that there may be an opportunity for politics.

Matters of foreign policy can, at best, play a usefully negative role in American political life: as in the sensible fear millions of Americans had before the prospect of Goldwater making decisions about atom bombs. But it seems unlikely, at the moment, that any large American public will be politicized by the inherently complex and often ambiguous problems of foreign policy.

Civil rights have, of course, provided the most dramatic political issue of the day. But, by itself, this issue is not enough for re-creating a vigorous liberal movement. First, there is the sad fact that so much of the wider public to whom liberals must appeal is, at least for the moment, on the wrong side of the fence. Secondly, the Negro struggle will flounder unless tied in with other programs of a welfare type, especially answers to the dilemma of poverty and unemployment in the midst of prosperity.

Only welfare issues, and the related question of government regulation of the economy, represent the kind of problems which can stimulate a large public around policy proposals. That in recent times they have failed to arouse more people is not, as some imply, because they are neither pertinent nor pressing. The continued prosperity, albeit with frequent recessions, only accentuates the unmet needs, daily discovered and rediscovered; and these can be met only by expanding the public sector of the economy and the government's role in checking the private corporation. The "war on poverty" is the most publicized recent example. A public medical program for the aged has been a fighting issue for several years. The idea of a comprehensive government medical insurance plan for all, pro-

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posed by Truman in 1949, is waiting for revival. The list can be extended with ease: urban decay and suburban sprawl, mass transportation, physical and mental health—these and others are *political* questions that should bother many people directly and that can be answered programmatically.

Thus far an active political public has not, with rare exceptions, been mobilized around such issues. The general apathy had something to do with it. A failure in communications is also apparent.

One reason for this communications blockage is that it is difficult to put across a program without evidence of concrete achievements. Despite the cries of the Goldwaters, government welfare policy has ground to a standstill during the last decade. The last comprehensive welfare legislation was the Housing Act of 1949. Very little has been added until recently. Some programs were further elaborated, while others, like public housing, were actually curtailed. The 87th Congress, elected in 1958 with an overwhelming Democratic majority, did enact an extensive public works program over Eisenhower's veto.

The New Frontier administration promised much more and achieved a few aims, such as Federal aid for construction of educational and mental health institutions, and area redevelopment. With so few successes to proclaim, there was little incentive to push new welfare measures. When the liberals did become excited about welfare issues, it was usually "defensive" —worrying about diminution of long-established programs rather than fighting for innovations.

Thwarted by the apolitical mood, the liberals tended to concentrate their energies on contriving public heroes and, in some cases, attempts at organizational reform. The liberals found their first major idol in Adlai Stevenson, whose air of humane and somewhat weary cultivation fitted very neatly the post-war mood of disenchantment.

John Kennedy's tragic martyrdom should not interfere with a sober appraisal of his political role. As a Senator, though his voting record was up to liberal standards, he was rather passive, neither the author of any significant legislation nor an active leader in any legislative battle. His speeches during the 1960 primaries were politically vacuous, despite their literate tone. After his election, he began very moderately to substantiate his promise of a New Frontier with concrete proposals. But he was neither an exponent of genuine programmatic politics nor a successful politician who could get what he wanted in government. He was admired primarily for his style, his academic entourage, his White House salon.

Attempts at reforming the major political organizations, exemplified by the Democratic Clubs in California and the Reform Democrats in New York City, were the other substitute for programmatic politics. Some of their spokesmen, like Congressman Ryan of New York, are among the most "political" figures in contemporary American politics. But what has been the general result?

The reformers have rediscovered what many have surmised for a long time: the "machine's" supposed hold

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over the electorate is exaggerated, a De Sapio or a Buckley can be beaten in his own district, and in some places the very existence of a "machine" is pure mythology. But victories bring only more headaches. The reformers can elevate the parties above the patronage level only by "capturing" them on all levels, a task for which there are hardly sufficient resources, even if there were the ambition. Caught up in organizational disputes, the reformers find little time for programmatic politics.

Nevertheless, the American electorate has retained an essential loyalty to the tradition of New Deal liberalism, however vaguely understood. The voting alignment first created in the 'thirties has largely persisted into our own day. When, for example, in 1958 fear of economic crisis became intense, the Democrats won as decisive a victory as in the 'thirties, even though it was cast largely in defensive terms.

All this has been a portrayal of the difficulties of the past. Our current tentative hope appears as an epilogue. To phrase it very crudely: something may finally have begun to happen that could produce meaningful politics for a large public. It may have started with the New Frontier administration, but the important achievements are more recent. The Johnson Administration, led by an opportunistic politician who plays the game successfully, has produced several legislative victories. Though scarcely an adequate answer to the country's needs, what has been done represents a renewal of welfarism—the Civil Rights Act, anti-poverty, aid to mass transportation, near passage of Medicare. The overwhelming Democratic election victory should bring more. It may again be possible to engage in political arguments which have real substance. Above all, liberals can again feel that their efforts are worthwhile, and radicals may again have a political public of which they can become a sensible "left wing."

Perhaps these hopes are misplaced. The inanities of the Goldwaterites permitted a very easy answer without invoking much of an advance in liberal thought. The campaign propaganda emphasized continued prosperity, tax cuts, fear of international adventurism, instead of unmet social needs and the fragmentariness of the measures thus far passed. Too many liberals were still thinking of synthetic heroes instead of program. Johnson was presented as a half-baked Kennedy instead of a man who finally got some of their domestic proposals enacted into law. The 1964 election was the most political election since 1948, but the presentation of a liberal program was not its dominant feature.

A change may come next year. The decisive electoral victory and the reality of the new programs could rally liberals into pushing for much more. Party reform and realignment may be part of the method, but not the principal direction. The approach should be towards a form of pressure group politics, which can include electoral participation. This will insure programmatic politics rather than absorption in the complexities of organizational maneuvering. And radicals had better be prepared to offer their own guidance to the newly invigorated political movement that may now arise.

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Thomas R. Brooks

The Negro Movement: Beyond Demonstrations?

"It is the Negroes who are in motion . . ."—BAYARD RUSTIN

For radicals, it is good news. The civil rights movement is undergoing a change; the grit of protest is becoming a political pearl, as predicted by those who see the movement as a potential catalyst for broad social change. CORE has set up a political action department. Martin Luther King has announced plans for demonstrations in Alabama and Mississippi "based around the right to vote." Roy Wilkins has declared, "What we [the NAACP] are looking for now is political activity, flexibility." Bayard Rustin has pointed to a "tremendous power in the Negro community that can be used politically, though it can't be used exclusively. It must be joined with others determined to wipe out poverty." A. Philip Randolph has called for a "coalition of conscience" of civil rights, church and labor organizations. "The Negro," declared Randolph, "has developed a new sense of his political power. He must use that power as does labor—to defeat his enemies and elect the friends of justice."

This almost universal response on the part of the established Negro leadership has been evoked by the powerful Negro political thrust in last fall's elections. Voter registration drives among Negroes were eminently successful both in increasing registrants —two million were added in the South alone—and in upping the turnout of Negro voters. In many contests, the Negro vote was crucial. Without it, the Democrats would have lost four more Southern states—Tennessee, Virginia, Florida and Arkansas. Many liberal Congressmen were also helped —Weltner and McKay of Georgia and Grider of Tennessee, for example. Two Negroes were elected to the state senate in Georgia and one to the state legislature in Tennessee. CORE points with pride to the election of Archibald Hill, chairman of its Oklahoma City chapter, to the state legislature. There was a decisive shift to the Democratic Party. In 1960, 60 percent of the Negro vote was Republican; in 1964, 90 percent went Democratic. This, plus the Southern defection to Goldwater Republicanism, could permanently change the American political profile.

Yet a large turnout at the polls does not necessarily signify a *movement* of people. It isn't comparable, for example, with the mass unionization of workers in the 1930's. There is, moreover, the hard question as to whether or not the political groundswell among Negroes can be sustained through the 1966 Congressional elections. Goldwater and the Civil Rights Act are not likely to be present with the same

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force two years hence, and that may serve against continuation of Negro—and liberal—voter interest and passion. James Baldwin vehemently insists that the Negro vote was "anti-Goldwater, not pro-Johnson." If so, we can expect a sharp drop in Negro voting in 1966, a crucial election in which the new liberal Congress will be at stake.

But this is to take a somewhat dim view of the large and growing Negro vote. Of course, it was anti-Goldwater but it was also *for* Johnson. That, after all, was the lever most Americans tripped. And the very size of the Negro vote indicates something more than mere negativism. It certainly would not have been so large had not President Johnson pushed the Civil Rights Act through Congress. At least some Negroes seem to share the myth that it takes a Southerner to handle Southerners on the race question. Negroes, one suspects, responded to the mixture of the New Deal touch and cornpone in Johnson's political style. Finally, the Negro vote seems to me a rejection of black nationalism and its cousin, super-militancy. The attempt at fielding an all-Negro Party scarcely got off the ground.

I stress all this out of a belief that the overwhelming Negro vote for Johnson indicates that the kind of leadership represented by Jesse Gray and the Reverend Milton Galamison is on the wane, at least for the time being. This is true not solely because their political advice, such as it was, went unheeded, but also because of their insistence on demonstrations regardless of their relevance, value or costs. Galamison has been quoted as being willing to see the public school system destroyed unless it is immediately integrated. But in a city where Galamison —and the civil rights forces—have been out-demonstrated by the Parents and Taxpayers groups, this position hardly makes sense. The Board of Education, ineffectual as it may be on integration matters, tends to be on the right side; at least it is anti-PAT. In this situation, mass boycotts aimed at the Board would probably not succeed in rallying large numbers of Negroes and might well serve both to stiffen white resistance and isolate the more militant segments of the Negro population (In fairness, it should be added that Galamison is apparently beginning to recognize this. His present plans are for selective boycotts which could well be useful in pointing up specific wrongs in specific places.)

The very size of the Negro vote on the Democratic line offers one clue to the mood of "in-betweenness" among the civil rights organizations just before and after the election. The moratorium on demonstrations suppressed no eager masses straining to pour into the streets. CORE abstained from signing the moratorium, but could in effect do little but abide by it. In retrospect, it seems to have been a very successful political bluff at a time when the demonstrations had begun to run their course and would in any case have tapered off. The Southern Regional Council reported only 25 demonstrations around the country during the period of moratorium, as against 100 in the equivalent time a year before. And as for last summer's Harlem riots, they involved only a minority of Negroes; the police reaction was entirely out of proportion, reflecting hatred and panic. Attempts by super-nationalist or

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Maoist sects to spread the riots or turn them into "revolutionary" street actions, simply failed. As Rochelle Horowitz pointed out in *New America,* Jesse Gray failed to get his "hundred revolutionaries willing to die," while Bayard Rustin did gets his volunteers for positive, non-violent action. Rustin's experiences in the streets of Harlem during the riots are much more revealing than the "revolutionary" play-acting of political sects trying to break into Harlem.

When the moratorium ended on election day, no great rush into the streets followed. Both Gray and Galamison, who are inclined to cry havoc, have had to postpone Armageddon because of "apathy." Right now the Negro, like his brothers among the working class and unemployed, is waiting to see what Lyndon will do. He wants to see how much will come to him from "the Great Society." If Sargeant Shriver's anti-poverty program is any indication, it will be precious little—but we had also better remember how little it takes in this country to buy off discontent.

The Negro vote, a willingness to wait for a while, and the impasse brought on by unfocussed demonstrations—all these explain the current turn to politics on the part of the civil rights cadre and Negro leadership. In Cleveland, for instance, Negro groups, who sought school integration through demonstrations, are now trying to elect a new school board. The election merely confirmed a trend set in motion by the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the subsequent peter-ing-out of demonstrations. Bayard Rustin argues that the change began when the civil rights revolution moved from public accommodations and symbolic school integration to the problems of slums and unemployment. Negroes, he says, "are not basically revolutionaries." But they act as a catalyst, become revolutionaries in effect, because "what the Negro wants can't be given him unless we have basic change." During the earlier phase of the civil rights struggle, Rustin points out, demonstrations did two things: they called attention to the evil of segregated facilities and cured it by integrating restaurants. "Today, however, in the attempt to deal with jobs, schools and housing, the Negro can't do both. To achieve our basic objective, you've got to go to the legislatures."

By and large, the debate over demonstrations qua demonstrations is fading away. All Negro spokesmen properly qualify their new-found politics with the phrase, "demonstrations are still needed." Obviously, demonstrations, perhaps not necessarily mass demonstrations, will be needed to test the provisions and enforcement procedures of the new Civil Rights Act. Also, demonstrations, as the unions showed in the past, can be a useful corollary to political action. In stressing the essential role of CORE as a non-violent, direct action organization, its Community Relations Director Marvin Rich told me, "We'll go into politics our own way. We'll lobby, negotiate but also we'll chain ourselves to the court house. We will continue to look for the dramatic and personal."

Even though there probably will be continuing debate within—and among

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—civil rights organizations over the value of this or that demonstration, or more pertinently, over what makes for an effective demonstration, the key question would now seem to be: what kind of politics? A politics of protest? Ethnic politics? Or, is it, as Bayard Rustin believes, possible to preserve the alliance that achieved the Civil Rights Act as a new political coalition?

One immediate problem presents itself. Behind the usual generalities about the need for jobs, etc., there is really a lack of program. The basic deal, so to speak, that brought together the civil rights organizations, the churches, liberals and trade unions was consummated when the Act became law. "It's up to us," a CORE spokesman told me, "to prove specific needs in order for them [the coalition] to go beyond their original commitment. We've got to find the economic and social issues, not directly civil rights, that have an impact on the Negro community." This difficulty, in part, is illustrated by CORE's minimal political program. "Expulsion of Goldwaterite Albert Watson (South Carolina) and John Bells Williams (Mississippi) from the Democratic caucus. Effective action by the Federal government to protect our people in Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama. The tax laws should not be modified to provide lump sum grants to the states. Such a plan would decisively weaken the impact of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. This is the Title which would forbid Federal programs which are discriminatory." Such a program, I think, calls for effective lobbying rather than political action. "We must," says James Farmer, "also continue to develop the muscle to back up our lobbying; we must continue to register tens of thousands of Negroes, Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans." But this is only a beginning.

The question of how and where effective lobbying veers off into effective political action needs investigation. Special interest groups—e.g., the prohibitionists, suffragettes and the unions —have all been successful in achieving many of their demands through lobbying. Can Negroes do the same? If so, do they need allies? Is the kind of alliance that is frequently struck on Capitol Hill — and among logrolling Congressmen—the kind of alliance, say, that Bayard Rustin and A. Philip Randolph envisage?

When it comes to a new political development among civil rights groups, the South, it seems to me, has the advantage. The defection of the extreme segregationists to the Republican Party forces the Democrats to regroup. The Negro voter registration drive creates— as in Mississippi — or fills — as in Georgia—a vessel for constructive action in much the same sense that in the 1930's the workers in mass production industries created and filled the new industrial unions.

There is an opportunity now for rebuilding in the South a Democratic Party in the national rather than the sectional image. This is the significance of the victory achieved at the Atlantic City convention by the Mississippi Freedom Party. The monolith of the South was cracked and what remains is to drive home the wedge.

However, it will be a great temptation for President Johnson and the Democratic National Committee to woo back the Dixiecrats or at least

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some of them. Who gets what is going to be the crucial question as Federal patronage begins to flow South. The burgeoning registration and vote of Negroes in the South will, no doubt, influence that flow. Since, however, this vote and its political organization is still modest, its pull may not be as strong as that of the entrenched Southern machines. Should the Administration make the wrong decision, a protest from the North, where Negroes and their allies do have votes and power, could prove significant.

This reliance on support from the North is not, however, enough to sustain political action on a national scale. It might be sufficient to sustain the "coalition of conscience," but without propelling it into political action. Each member of that coalition has its own set of priorities. And while some may overlap—like Medicare—they are not all in the same order. The unions, as an example, have already made a head count of the new Congress and determined that they can get the Taft-Hartley Act amended to do away with the states' right-to-work laws, a matter of only indirect concern for Negroes or, say, the churches.

There are other, tougher problems. Black nationalism is one; the present politics of the ghettos another. Negro politics in the North are fragmentized beyond belief. The Negro is not in politics, for example, in the same way in the three major Negro centers—Chicago, Detroit and New York. Registering Negroes to vote in the South fills a vacuum; the same job in the North is apt to strengthen existing political set-ups. The present politics of the ghetto dooms alike—at least for now—Randolph's "coalition of conscience" and Jesse Gray's bid for a black voting bloc. "We hope to see this movement [the rent strikes]," Gray has said, "turn into a political movement by summer." He and his associates plan to place a ticket in the 1965 mayoralty and city council races. "While we can base a party in the ghetto," he explains, "we can bring in the mass of the people of unrest, progressives with no place to go, and people like Malcolm X who have expressed interest in independent political action." Gray hopes to pick up 100,000 to 200,000 votes. "Then we have some room to bargain." But, if recent history is any guide, it's the Adam Clayton Powells who are more likely to win the ghetto vote.

In the North at any rate, the new political consciousness may turn out to be ephemeral. CORE's "new down-to-earth" approach, on examination, turns out to contain a good deal more social work than politics. Louis Smith, a field secretary in CORE's northeast office, has explained what is happening: "In the past, CORE has been primarily a demonstrating group. A lot of sympathetic people did not work for us because they were just not for things like picket lines. In the past these people were cut out of the civil rights movement. We sort of looked down on them as social-work types; we were the *doers*. We just let those people drop out of chapters. Well, that phase of CORE's existence is over."

Today, in the North, CORE chapters undertake such things as remedial reading programs and attempt to stimulate community organization around such issues as a needed stop-light or a play street. Obviously there is nothing

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wrong with this, but it clearly won't do to confuse such worthy measures with political activity. Nor will it do to assume that success at one will lead to success at the other.

For one thing, no one has yet stuck to it long enough. Last spring I had the opportunity to observe a CORE try-out in East Harlem, very much along present lines of social work cum community organization. After watching this particular group of youngsters —they were so very young and the slum so very old—I wrote: "Because they are so young, mobile and intellectual, they will some day leave Spanish Harlem. Along with them, they will take away some invaluable experience — for themselves and for whatever causes they choose to serve in life. But for East Harlem—and possibly for all the "Other" Americas, the real question is: what will they leave behind? Can the poor be organized to help themselves?"

The group broke up sooner than I expected, decimated by factionalism and possibly devastated by East Harlem. But my question has still to be answered.

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Michael Rustin and Michael Walzer

LABOR IN BRITAIN: VICTORY AND BEYOND

LONDON

Five years ago it was widely believed that the British Labor Party had become a permanent minority. Unable to compete with Tory affluence, burdened with an "old-fashioned" ideology, dependent on a working class doomed to long-term numerical decline, the party looked—even (or especially) to its own leaders—like a political anachronism. Some of the Gaitskellites on the right of the BLP dreamed of a new "people's party" free of socialist commitments and trade union connections. And for the left, Richard Crossman talked of decades of principled opposition. Today, by the narrowest of margins and the best of luck, there is a Labor government. The electoral victory of last October doesn't settle any of the questions raised at the time of the '59 defeat; Wilson received no more votes than did Gaitskell. But power, however it comes, is opportunity: it offers the chance to reshape British society and establish a foundation for future socialist victories.

I

Faced with a major economic crisis and hampered by its narrow parliamentary margin, the Labor government in these first months has adopted policies which clearly reveal only its short-term intentions. First and most important is the attainment of an increased annual rate of economic growth. This is the key to immediate electoral success (though not necessarily, as we'll argue later on, to that long string of successes required by a Party committed to social transformation). The Tories have no effective growth policy—during the campaign Lord Home pretended there was no such thing as an economy—and this was one of the reasons for their defeat. Had they managed to secure Britain's entry into the Common Market, then the competitive stimulus, larger markets, and above all, weakened position of the trade unions, might have brought economic success—a success in the French style. Any other course would have required the active cooperation of the unions, and this the Tories couldn't get because they couldn't—or wouldn't—meet the unions' de-

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mands for restraint of profits and salaries as well as of wages. Labor's first commitment is to satisfy these demands; its second is to avoid the periodic deflation and unemployment with which, in the absence of stable growth, the Tories placated foreign holders of sterling. The trade union connection is here made the basis of economic policy.

All the government's decisions thus far can be understood in these terms. The pension increase, rent control, the income tax hike (affecting only higher incomes), the proposed corporation and capital gains taxes: these redistributive measures—the first undertaken in Britain in 15 years—are part of the essential bargain with the unions. Of course, they are only minor measures, which will have only minor effects—at most, perhaps, stopping the drift towards greater inequality made possible by "Conservative freedom." The immediate goal is not any significant equalization of incomes, but the establishment of an *incomes policy* which includes salaries, dividends, rents and profits as well as wages, and guarantees to the unions a voice at least as loud as any other in national planning. That sounds like a minimal goal for a socialist party; but it has not been reached in any European country outside Scandinavia.

If these short-term policies are successful—if the government can claim to have avoided deflation and insured faster growth, and done both in an atmosphere of greater social justice—then Wilson will probably go quickly to the country, asking for a majority in the House of Commons large enough to carry his whole program. This might happen as early as the spring or autumn of 1965.

II

Compared with Gaitskell's proposals of 1959, Labor's current program, cautious as it undoubtedly is, represents a significant shift to the left. This new radicalism is, in part, an almost automatic response to the accumulating failures of Tory free enterprise. In part it is due to Wilson's leadership. He is far less deferential toward British traditions than the Labor leaders of the 1940s: it is just not possible to imagine him saying to the Queen, as Herbert Morrison said to the King in 1945, that he "had learnt a great deal from the Conservatives on how to govern." And he is far more deeply antagonistic toward Tory selfishness and arrogance (and toward all the "flimflam" of Tory prosperity) than the leaders of the '50s. More than this, he is the first skillful and exciting socialist *politician* in British history. This very flair seems likely to drive him leftwards, away from the dullness of right-wing leadership.

But in another sense, the new radicalism predates the collapse of "MacWonder's" economic miracle and the arrival of Wilson. It stems from a new analysis of British society and a new Labor strategy, both

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first proposed in Morgan Phillip's policy statement *Labor in the Sixties* and adopted at the 1960 Party Conference. This analysis and strategy Wilson has made his own. In speech after speech, sometimes with schoolmasterish precision, sometimes with a kind of puritanical passion, he has expounded and elaborated them. Following upon years of defensive "revisionism," they have helped enormously to restore the spirit and self-confidence of the Party.

In the immediate future, wrote Phillips, "a vast growth will occur in professional and technical occupations, especially engineers, scientists and technicians. Among the manual workers, the need for skilled craftsmen will increase, but the number of unskilled jobs will stay about the same, continuing their long-term relative decline." In the 1950s the already growing class of administrative, scientific and technical personnel had been imagined by Labor leaders, with an assist perhaps from American sociologists, as a mass of "floating voters"—without social or political loyalties, but caught up in the Tory ethos of individual advance and private affluence. These voters Labor now sought anxiously to woo. It *was* a nervous business, almost a paralyzing task for a working class party, and the strain of the effort generated Gaitskell's determination to alter the Party's image and transform its internal structure, radically reducing the authority of the union-dominated annual Party Conference.

Wilson's new strategy is rooted in the belief that the technical middle class *as a class* can be incorporated into a socialist base—even unionized and brought directly into the TUC and the Party. It aims at making the traditional Labor claim to represent "workers by hand and by brain" a reality at last. Many of the new "workers by brain," as Phillips argued, are the products of Labor homes; it was a Labor government which pushed through the legislation which made possible their new positions. And, most important of all, "their occupational experiences frequently reinforce their socialist convictions." This new confidence that major social changes might in the long run be made favorable to the Labor Party, and that the Party might be speaking for emergent social groups as well as for declining ones, marks the fundamental contrast in temper between the Labor leadership of the fifties and that of the sixties.

Scientists and engineers, teachers and architects, managers and administrators, have been rediscovered as "producers" and so drawn—at least in Labor Party rhetoric—into close connection with the old working class. In a sense, this proposes the reappearance of an ancient coalition: the union of classes which made possible the great bourgeois revolutions. And Wilson often sounds like a hero of 1789, rallying the entire nation against an aristocracy as corrupt as it is incompetent. "The

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high command of too large a sector of Britain's industry is manned either dynastically, or on the basis of a family, school or social network.... Tory society is a closed society, in which birth and wealth have priority, in which the master-and-servant, landlord-and-peasant mentality is predominant." Even economic growth is closely linked to the "career open to talents"—as in the current Party policy statement *Signposts for the Sixties*: "If the deadwood were cut out of Britain's boardrooms and replaced by the keen young executives, production engineers and scientists who are at present denied their legitimate prospects of promotion, our production and export problems would be much more manageable."

This sort of thing has annoyed many socialists, and with some reason. But in a society as scarred by hierarchy and deference as Britain remains even today, a savage attack upon hereditary privilege is necessary. The old middle classes never launched such an attack; it has been made possible only by the educational and social advance of working class sons. Begun in the mid-fifties by the "angry young men" and the New Left, the systematic assault upon deferential reflexes in culture and society has at last found a political reflection in Wilson's radicalism.

Like "economic growth," the "career open to talents" is a neutral phrase. What matters are the sorts of careers which in fact are opened up. For this reason, it is enormously significant that the principles of '89 are being enunciated by socialists. In his pre-election speeches Wilson evoked the "bourgeois spirit" of rationality and equality of opportunity, but he placed it in a new social context, entirely different from the entrepreneurial society of the nineteenth century and the speculators' world of the past fifteen years. Wilson was not offering careers in accumulation and consumption; he made few concessions to that extraordinary love of commodities thought typical of affluent man in the fifties. Instead he offered careers in public service and "social production." He appealed to the constructive spirit and the sense of vocation among new technologists and described the excitement of creative and highly skilled work. In doing so, he went beyond the liberal, bourgeois challenge to aristocratic hauteur and amateurism which certain "modern" Tories would also like to attempt. Drawing upon old traditions of working class solidarity and non-conformist radicalism, he challenged the very quality of life in Tory Britain, "a commercialized society in which everything has its price."

Thomas Balogh, now a Downing Street economic advisor, recently described British capitalism as "a mixture between stereotyped respectable mediocrity and the squalid vulgarity of the speculator." Wilson, in the name of youthful innovation and a technically-oriented dissent-

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ing tradition of socially useful work, implicitly attacks *both* these prevailing social styles. The argument that the Tory economy has subordinated "hard center industry to soft center finance" is, in this tradition of industriousness and communal activity, a moral as well as a hard practical criticism of Conservative economic management.

This sort of criticism opens up a whole new world of social discontent and aspiration into which the Labor Party has ventured, up until now, only in a disorganized fashion. The new aspirations are different from the more narrowly economic demands of the trade unions; they may be traced to newer groups in the society and were often introduced into British socialist thought through the efforts of the New Left. Urban planning and redevelopment, transport provision and traffic control, extension of the educational system, public support for cultural activity, control over the mass media: these are the demands of an "affluent" society, but they are given immediate political relevance by the Labor Party's effort to create links between the older working class movement and the new middle classes. The crucial intellectual link is the common explanation in *socialist terms* of, first, economic conflict, experienced collectively "at the point of production" and articulated through the unions, and, second, social impoverishment, experienced individually "at the point of consumption" and until now hardly articulated at all. Both working class deprivation and the new social poverty of unplanned cities, jammed highways and overcrowded schools, are produced, Wilson argues, by the capitalist economy and its political control in the interests of private owners. Modernization, whatever else it may be, is first of all a call for collective effort, not only to raise wages and welfare payments, but also to renew the ruined social capital, dating back to the nineteenth century, of Britain's cities and towns.

All this made possible a far more forthright and self-confident demand for public intervention in economic life than was ever heard from the Gaitskellites. In an extraordinary reversal of the terms of political debate, Wilson succeeded during the fall campaign in characterizing Tory defenders of the free market as dogmatic and doctrinaire, incapable of adopting obvious remedies to pressing social evils. His own arguments for economic planning and public control (always vigorously put, but highly ambiguous as to the precise nature and extent of the intervention) have consistently aimed at pulling together the older working class defense of nationalization with the new consumer demands for public provision and social service.

This then is Labor's strategy. It fastens on the logic of contemporary technological and administrative changes to provide a program

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for emerging social groups. It seeks to engage a desire for usefulness and participation among salaried employees formed in a working class culture, but at present out of touch with the Labor Party. The strategy establishes a coherent framework for political activity, such as Labor has not had in years. But the theory upon which it rests has still to be tested in action.

III

"It should be our main task," wrote Phillips, "to forge new links between them [the new middle class] and us . . ." The attempt cannot yet be called successful. In October Wilson apparently lost working class support and picked up just enough middle class votes to squeak by. The defection of many workers was probably due to the immigration issue: there was more "white backlash" in Britain than in the U.S. But there must also have been many working class Labor supporters who were put off by an election campaign summed up in Wilson's boast: "We are told that we have replaced the cloth cap with the white laboratory coat as the symbol of British Labor." Nor can voters be replaced as easily as symbols: the surprising size of the Liberal poll suggests that many members of the new middle class, disgusted with the Tories, are still not ready to vote socialist. In practice, the grand alliance of "workers by hand" and "workers by brain" poses all sorts of difficulties.

These difficulties are likely to be even more apparent in the next five or ten years. Wilson seems to count on economic growth and increased social spending to give the government a manageable majority in a 1965 or 1966 election. But over the years this will not be sufficient. Insuring any sort of consistent growth is likely to be far more difficult than most Labor supporters now realize and so the margins for public expenditure, short of really radical nationalization, will be very thin. And at the same time Labor's program includes steel nationalization, comprehensive schools, public ownership of land values—all potentially divisive issues on which a weakening government could well lose whatever middle-class support it has. For the sake of that support, and in order to win cooperation from the business community, Wilson will be tempted to go slowly and do little. Yet to maintain momentum, central to his conception of leadership, and hold the Party united behind his left-of-center policy, he must deliver some socialist goods.

The crucial problem can be summed up very simply: the links between the working class and the technological middle class, producers all, do not yet exist. They have to be created. The new strategy is not in any simple sense an electoral, but a total political strategy; it requires activity at every social level. The links have to be worked out in trade

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unions and constituency parties, and in local committees. If they are not worked out, then Labor's socialist policies will only alienate its middle class supporters, while any adjustment of the Party to the *existing* interests of the middle class will call into question its socialist commitments and alienate its working class base.

The Labor Party *can make* sociological trends work in its favor—the crucial words here are the verbs. Clearly, a mere increase in the numbers of technologists and white collar employees is not going to help. Working in large bureaucratic companies; caught up in a paternalistic atmosphere of company benefits, pensions and social life; accepting the ideological conventions about status and individual promotion—they are not likely recruits for socialism. A skillful politician like Wilson may pick up some of their votes at this or that election, but he can hardly build his hopes for long-term power on such a social base.

Unionization is the key to the consciousness of the new middle classes. Unin membership and activity can go a long way towards transforming the ideas of white coat and white collar workers about their firms, their colleagues on the job, their own careers. In this way, the present division in industry between the technical and clerical staff, closely associated with management, and the manual working force, in conflict with management, might be restructured. At present, the discontents of technicians and clerks often take an anti-union, even a Poujadist form—the basis, perhaps, of some Liberal support. Expressed through their unions, however, the demands of these same men for better pay or a share in industrial decision-making could bring them into close alliance with the working class. Then, among "workers by brain" as already among "workers by hand," union membership would lead to Labor loyalty.

It has been estimated that a determined recruiting drive among white coat and white collar workers could increase TUC membership by some two millions (the present membership is around 8½ million). If this is so, it would provide the permanent "sociological" majority that Labor last dreamed of in 1945. The fullscale participation of white collar unions in the Labor Party (a few are there already and tend to support the left-wing) would sharply increase the pace of politicization among the new technical classes. And more, these new unionists, with their articulateness and administrative skills, might be important in winning a larger role for organized labor in national and regional planning —and ultimately for workers and technicians in factory democracy.

All this will urgently require government help, and there is so far no sign that the Party has even considered the political importance of

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such changes. Employers, on the other hand, are clearly aware of the dangers of white collar unionization and show signs of stiffening resistance against it. Resistance is not difficult, for there are at present no legal procedures for union recognition. One white collar union leader has recently demanded that such procedures be established as part of the incomes policy bargain. There are other things also that a Labor government ought to do: as a large employer, through ministries, it could greatly further the trends on which its own long-term prospects may depend.

The political parallel to unionization is the re-establishment of the Labor Party as a *movement,* a focus of intense loyalty, sparking activity both locally and nationally. Today, membership remains healthy, but in every other way, the Party as a mass organization shows signs of sclerosis. It is gradually being transformed into an electoral machine, stressing efficiency in getting out the vote and better use of the mass media, above all its other functions. The domination of local parties by oligarchic councillors and appointed agents concerned mainly with canvass returns, and the narrowness of internal political discussion with no echo in the community outside, have driven many young activists out of the Party and into such movements as CND. For the same reasons, consumers' associations, societies for state education, local campaigns for public transport, housing associations, etc., have all grown up outside of and out of touch with the Party, claiming a nonpartisanship which Labor should dispute. For the members of these groups are precisely the people with whom Wilson needs to be in touch, not just at election time *via* the mass media, but between elections, day after day, organizationally. Class linkages depend upon local cooperation, the discovery of shared interests, the working out of common solutions. All this was suggested in *Labor in the Sixties.* It is alarming that nothing has been heard of it since.

IV

Wilson has warned that economic expansion is his first priority and that any major improvements in social provision or extensions of public ownership may be postponed until after increases in exports and investment have been secured. There are some good reasons for this priority—in the short run. But expansion, based on the existing consumer economy, will create its own environment unless it is quickly brought under control and directed toward socialist goals. By increasing the flow of money into the private sector, it will reinforce the social relationships of corporate business. By allocating resources to things like cars and high-priced housing rather than to urban redevelopment and public

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building, it will set the new occupational groups on a firmly "individualist" course.

There is no way in which a Labor government can escape the necessity of first enclosing and then dismantling the private sector of the economy. For the Party is committed *both* to economic growth and to radical changes in social priorities, and that means that the wealth produced by growth must be publicly controlled. Balogh has put this argument most forcefully: attacking the Gaitskellite alternative of fiscal manipulation, he insists that *increased social spending requires a growing public sector.* If this is so, then there is a good case, in terms of the Party's new strategy, for pressing ahead with nationalization, whatever the short-term risks.

Labor's present program envisages three major inroads into the private sector. The renationalization of steel, which, after the prolonged controversies of the fifties, has no immediate political charge, and the public ownership of land values, are the two direct measures. Thirdly, there is what the Party calls "selective intervention"—the removal of existing restrictions on the commercial and manufacturing activities of nationalized concerns, the setting up of state factories in depressed regions and new public "growth industries" in areas of rapid technological advance. These latter measures could be more important than direct nationalization as a way of increasing both the government's control and its economic resources. But there is as yet no sign of how far they will be pressed or how they will be publicly defended. The indications are that Labor wants to avoid the general issue of public ownership, to proceed when and where sectional advances can be made.

Here then is another crucial difficulty: without a growing public sector and its financial surpluses, no large diversion of resources to public spending, no income redistribution, no weakening of the social power of capital will be possible. All these are essentials of structural change —and essential also for creating an alliance which will want and work for structural change. To attack the private sector, however, the government needs not only a power of initiative, which for the moment it has, but also active and enthusiastic public support, which it does not have and can only win by publicly explaining its policies and its strategy. There is a price to pay for ten years of equivocation and timidity: best to pay it quickly.

V

The public sector is an indispensable instrument for directing resources towards social spending. This is not only a question of better

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amenities. If labor is to create a common identification among its new middle class and working class supporters, its social programs have a crucial role. The provision of community housing on a scale and at a standard which encourages multi-class occupation; the creation of a comprehensive educational system in which hierarchical and deferential attitudes might finally be challenged; the development of a social security program which would provide common services at a high standard—all these have much more than economic significance.

In the field of social security, Labor is committed to a scheme which would end poverty in old age. It involves a minimum guarantee of incomes in the short-run and, in the long-run, the provision of benefits at the rate of one-half weekly earnings. The Party's intentions as to the Health Service are also fairly clear. NHS has recently become a center of controversy between conservatives attempting to whittle away its comprehensive basis and introduce payment "by those who can afford it," and radicals who want to increase its comprehensiveness by ending all existing charges and extending services into such fields as preventive medicine and domiciliary care. If it remains long in office, a Labor government would probably undertake changes along these latter lines (prescription charges have already been dropped).

Such changes would reverse the trend in recent years towards dual standards—middle and working class standards—in social security and health. The public system has been relatively neglected by the Tories and a private system has grown up alongside it: corporation pension arrangements (subsidized by large tax reliefs), private payment for medical care, etc. Making the social services a focus of improvement and innovation, providing services so good that there is no incentive to seek special treatment—this would in itself be an expression of socialism in action. But once again, any improvement that is more than marginal depends upon the willingness of the government to attack the private sector. Insurance companies and industrial pension funds have a vested interest in private pension provision. Similarly, the elaborate structure of company benefits specifically designed to generate loyalty to the firm (and made possible by a tax structure which almost seems designed for the same purpose) stands squarely in the way of a comprehensive system of public services.

Similar considerations hold in the field of housing. The proportion of building by public authorities fell steeply in the years after 1951. With great success, Wilson made the Tory predilection for luxury flats and London offices a major campaign issue. Now the visible setting of alternative priorities by a Labor government—and the enforcement of

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high architectural standards—can go a long way toward breaking the almost automatic link currently made between prosperity and individual consumption. Especially when planning is regional or local, new schools and town centers, urban redevelopment and public housing, all serve to generate that lively social spirit and grass-roots political activism upon which Wilson must depend.

Education is perhaps the most significant field of all, particularly since the role of the school in determining careers continues to grow. Here Labor is committed to the "comprehensive principle"—which means, first of all, the abolition of selection for grammar schools and therefore higher education at the age of eleven. (The "eleven plus" exam has for years consigned the vast majority of working class children to the secondary modern schools, roughly equivalent to vocational high schools in the U.S.) Already in Liverpool and Bristol, a political battle of major proportions is raging over the establishment of comprehensive schools. Local Labor councils—insufficiently supported, it should be said, by constituency parties no longer organized for agitational activity—are opposed by parents and teachers who fear the swamping of the existing grammar schools by working class children and who reject the egalitarian values upon which the comprehensive principle is based. The battle here is specifically for class integration and it must be won if the Labor strategy of class alliance is to make any sense.

The ambiguities of Labor's position are nowhere more evident than in its educational program. Its new middle class supporters are *at present* committed to equality of opportunity for their children and want a system guaranteeing access to all the available occupational ladders. And in the *present* political and social climate, it is equality of opportunity—the principle of '89 with no socialist glosses—which has dominated the educational discussion. But the comprehensive schools *could be used* to break down the class assumptions which underlie this discussion. If the same distinctions are not allowed to develop within the schools, and between the schools of different neighborhoods, as exist today between grammar and secondary modern schools; if programs intended for the majority are not sacrificed to the "output of graduates" —then the educational system could become something more than the conveyor belt of a class society. Once again, in education as in social service, if the whole population depends on the state system, and a high enough priority is given to raising standards, positive identification with the community might begin to replace a complacent or desperate reliance on oneself. Socialism would then be creating its own environment.

November 30, 1964

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Henry Pachter

IN PRAISE OF 1984

I envy the Russians. They destroy their discarded leaders. If a Khrushchev has to be deposed, he is utterly done in, made into an unperson, prevented from speaking in his own behalf, rendered incapable of hurling accusations against former associates and present successors, changed into a hasbeen from whom no dog will take a bone, and so discredited that no citizen will believe him should he try to spill any beans. By contrast, look at us. We would like to get rid of J. Edgar Hoover—but can we? Not as long as he has the goods on every politician.

His retirement is overdue. He has reached the age limit, and his hand has lost both its touch and its grip. A President is murdered, and his organization not only had neglected to take the most obvious precautions; after the deed it also failed to interview important witnesses and to collect useful information. Having received a slight rap on the wrists from the Warren Commission, Hoover showed his irritation and broke precedent to make public statements, some of them with the effect of a shotgun. But no one dares tell him that he has reached the age disqualifying the civil servant. Not him; he not only is indispensable, he also seems endowed with eternal youth. He is assured that he may stay on as long as he wishes. Mark that: not as long as *we* need him, but as long as *he* likes it.

Why does Mr. Hoover enjoy this privilege of untouchability? Not because there is no constitutional proviso for his disposal, but solely because whoever dismisses him must fear him more afterwards than if he remains in office. In the United States it is hard to make a person into an unperson. A dismissed director of the FBI is dangerous, as apparently a dismissed Premier of the Soviet Union is not. Therefore I praise the Russians who need not fear their obsolete men.

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Ben B. Seligman

AUTOMATION AND THE UNIONS

In the first quarter of the 19th century, secret societies of English working men banded together to defend themselves against the machine. Determined to destroy the looms that were displacing them, they roamed through West Riding and Lancashire and Nottingham hammering into junk the frames and gigs that had disrupted a settled way of life. But so to violate the sacrosanct principles of private property merely brought on an outlaw existence and eventually the gallows. In the end, the angry outbursts were to little avail, for the 200,000 hand loom weavers were reduced to almost half their number within three decades. Moreover, they did not go to work in the factories, for as the new system spread, the hand loom weaver was left to rot in misery. "History discloses no tragedy more horrible," says Marx, "than the gradual extinction of the English hand loom weaver, an extinction that was spread over several decades. . . ."

Last July *Life* magazine, suddenly excited by the phenomenon of automation, told the story of Walter Peterson of San Diego, California. The previous February Peterson had received a 20-year service pin from his employer, General Dynamics. At the same time he was told that his tool-and-die making skills were no longer needed because automatic machinery now made jigs and templates with sharper tolerances than he could ever hope to achieve. At the age of 45, with a family, two cars, and a house on a hill above the Pacific, he had been enveloped by an impersonal, nameless trouble. As he walked through the front door he told his wife: "Well, you're now looking at an unemployed husband."

Enough has been written by now to demonstrate that automation destroys jobs. Just two years ago, the Department of Labor told an Arden House conference that 200,000 manufacturing jobs a year would be lost

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by 1972 because of the advanced technology brought on by the computer. From 1953 to 1959, a short span of six years, 80 per cent of the decline in factory openings could be traced to automation. Ewan Clague, Commissioner of Labor Statistics, observed in connection with this study, that most unions are to be found precisely in those industries where technology has hit the hardest and where offsetting employment increases are the least. Little wonder that unionists speak so feelingly about automation. Jobs evaporate under them, while new ones, like miracles, are in the future and elsewhere. Moreover, the government's report said nothing about those file clerks and accountants whose positions evaporate every time a piece of data processing equipment is installed in an office. Some private observers are even gloomier—estimates ranging up to 40,000 lost jobs a week, or two million a year, are offered as the tribute exacted by the computer. At this rate, the work force would be completely abolished by 1999. A vision of empty idleness haunts us all.

Yet there are those who are so enamored of contemporary affluence and its conventional wisdoms that they seriously believe the fear of automation to be ill-founded. Edward Neilan of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce deplores the Luddite panic of labor leaders and Keynesian economists. Henry Ford II asserts that those who blame job loss on automation speak dangerous nonsense. And Yale Brozen, an economics professor who writes for the American Enterprise Association, sees seven million more civilians at work in 1961 than in 1950 and concludes that automation is a blessing. Evidently he is unaware that virtually all of these jobs were provided by Federal, State and Local governments and non-profit institutions, either directly or through "procurement programs." For as Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz reported in his latest manpower study, of the over four million new jobs created between 1957 and 1963, *only five per cent were full time jobs generated by private demand.* This hardly suggests that private industry is able to meet the challenge of the new technology.

Let us try to estimate automation's final impact on jobs, even conservatively. If one assumes frictional unemployment of two per cent, as used to be done (one wonders where and when the Council of Economic Advisers' 4 per cent figure got into the discussion), then with a work force of 72 million and total unemployment of over 4 million there would appear to be almost 2¾ million persons out of work for reasons other than ordinary economic adjustment. Such a presumption is sustained by the fact that unemployment jumped 78 per cent in the 16 years from 1947 to 1963 as contrasted with a 20 per

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cent increase in the work force. To be sure, some of the loss above frictional levels may be attributed to what Walter Heller calls inadequate effective demand. But since one guess is apt to be as good as another, I should think that structural distortions in the economy account for perhaps half of the "non-frictional" unemployment. This assumes, after the fashion of Leon Keyserling, that "true" unemployment should include more than the official figures—short-time workers (essentially disguised unemployment) and those who have simply given up. The unemployed coal miner who no longer looks for a job is indeed a victim of structural change even though he may not be counted by Labor Department enumerators. By this reckoning there may be almost as many structurally "disemployed" as there are those who are without jobs because of inadequate demand. If that is the case, then almost 12,000 jobs a month have been destroyed: the figure, modest as it is, suggests the magnitude of automation's *net* impact—after all upgrading, new hires and rehires. In a decade, a million and a half jobs irrevocably lost.

The situation may become still more critical than these crude estimates would suggest, for long-term unemployment is quite severe. Those out of work for more than six months total over 500,000, or 12 per cent of the unemployed: the number of persons unemployed for 15 weeks to 26 weeks is even greater—1.2 million or 26 per cent of the jobless. All told, at the start of 1964, those out of work for 10 weeks or more represented a third of the unemployed. Long-term unemployment of 27 weeks or more increased as a proportion of total joblessness from 6 per cent in 1949 to 19 per cent in 1961. And one must still add to the official figures at least 1½ million of the "invisibles," those forced out of the labor market a long time ago because they had become too discouraged even to search for jobs.

How did this condition come about? The fact is that the computer is increasingly being attached to machines in factories to convert manufacturing into automatic processes requiring no human hands. As the Research Institute of America remarked in one of its recent reports, automation has just begun to bite. The fact is that with computers and feedbacks the work of an entire industrial complex can be controlled automatically. The fact is that with multiple purpose devices to lend flexibility, automation need not be limited solely to mass production. The techniques employed range from ordinary drive and speed regulation, to be found in three-fourths or more of the nation's plants, to automatic measuring, process sensing, tape and punched card controls and complete computer installations. The latter, while applied in a minority of plants

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as yet, more than doubled between 1959 and 1963. It is estimated that the somewhat more than 400 factory computer control systems will swell to 4000 by 1970. As experience is gained in converting discrete operations into flows, and in measuring, it becomes easier to introduce the computer.

Numerical control in the machine shop is an excellent example of the way single unit production can be automated. This metalworking technique replaces both human control and energy. By using the computer with its fantastic mathematical capacities, the engineer can direct the machine to automatically drill, mill, grind, bend, punch, form, and cut metals. The machine is fed the necessary instructions on direction, speed, distance, depth of cut and when to turn on the coolant or change tools. Data are stored in the computer's memory as numerical symbols which are then translated by the circuitry into directions for machine operations. The latter may be controlled by point-to-point positioning or by having the tool move in a continuous path for two or more axes. In this manner, numerical control does away with templates, jigs and fixtures, and reduces set-up and work time. The product does not vary, the tolerances are more exact, and there is less likelihood that human errors will build up the scrap pile.

The method has been spreading rapidly. Half the numerical control units now on factory floors were delivered in 1961, by which time nearly 40 instrument makers and 50 machine tool builders had entered a business that reached a $75 million annual level. Developed at MIT, numerical control had been initially sponsored by the Air Force to save time in the manufacture of airframes and aircraft engines (one more case of technology serving war). By 1962, numerically controlled machine tools could be found in plants making pumps, kitchenware, turbines and jet engines. While still a small part of the machine tool market, it is expected that numerical control methods will dominate the industry by 1967.

But the Machinists' Union is as yet merely apprehensive, enough at least to establish a joint study project with U.S. Industries; other unions are fully awake to the decimation of their ranks by the onslaught of automation. Steel employment, covering both maintenance and production workers, dropped from a high of 568,000 in 1951 to about 400,000 in 1962 or about 28 per cent. The decline in man-hours was even more precipitate—34 per cent. As a direct result of automation, over 80,000 fewer production workers could produce as much steel at the end of the eleven-year period as at the start. In 1963, a ton of finished steel incorporated 10.6 man-hours (production and maintenance); in

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1952, the number had been 15 man-hours per ton. To maintain roughly the same number of jobs in 1970 as were available when the fifties had run out would require an expansion of output by almost half—an unlikely prospect. Auto workers produced a million more trucks and cars in 1963 than they did in 1953 with 20 per cent fewer workers; in recent years there has been a loss of some 200,000 jobs in that industry. In Flint, Michigan, the UAW local membership dropped from about 28,000 in 1956 to 13,000 in 1962 and the men still produced the same number of cars.

The Packinghouse Workers Union, operating in an industry that invented the automatic assembly line, is continually confronted by plants that have closed down and been replaced by up-to-date abbatoirs, usually built elsewhere by the meat packing companies. Since 1955, Swift, Cudahy and Armour have shifted their operations to small towns, often in the South, leaving most of their workers to fend for themselves. Packinghouse jobs dropped from about 200,000 in 1955 to less than 160,000 in 1962. Membership in the Union is now less than 100,000! Armour alone closed down 17 plants in that period, stranding over 12,000 workers. The industry no longer needs people with talents for stuffing and tying hot dogs, for an electronically controlled machine can take a meat mixture and make a frankfurter ready for cooking.

The prospect for many workers appears quite grim, and the companies, with rare exceptions, do little about it. In fact, computer engineers can sell their hardware because they promise to eliminate people. Lockheed Electronics enthusiastically advertises the first computer controlled oil field to operate 180 oil wells in the Poso Creek oil field from a central office located seven miles away. Equipment and flow variations are reported instantaneously, well production data computed, and the transfer of oil from field to pipelines controlled—all by electronic devices. The photograph accompanying the advertisement shows computers and wells, but no people. A final touch of unwitting irony is provided by the slogan: "An equal opportunity employer."

Reducing the number of workers can be accomplished in any industry. It is merely necessary to convert discrete production into a flow, add feedbacks and servomechanisms, attach the computer, and the task is done. Consider the steel industry: within the last 25 years it has witnessed the development of the oxygen furnace, continuous casting, computer control of mills, continuous galvanizing, electronic measurement of sheet thickness, continuous welding and continuous annealing. The U.S. Steel Corporation proudly displays its computer op-

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erated structural steel mill in South Chicago which rolls uniform standard and wide-flanged shapes. The McLouth Steel Corporation plant near Detroit has a continuous casting operation in its rolling mill complete with computers. National Steel touts its computerized 80 inch hot mill at River Rouge as the fastest and most highly automated strip mill in the business. An Armco mill in Houston, replete with computers, produces steel slabs from 70,000 pound ingots and can be converted quickly to the production of finished steel plates up to 144 inches wide and 60 feet long. The need for skilled workers is considerably lessened when the computer dumps the right amount of raw materials into the furnace at just the right moment and is then able to shape the beam and plate for a new office building or for an atomic submarine.

These are relatively new developments and the unions are puzzled and stunned. But in the printing trades, the struggle for job security and the effort to deal with technology's impact is of long duration, dating back at least to Mergenthaler's linotype machine in the 1880's. Yet the frustration of the newer labor organizations would be compounded if they were to look to the printing crafts for solutions. The latter's only answer thus far has been reproduction or "bogus work," a form of non-work that the printer dislikes intensely as an insult to his pride of craft and to be traded off sooner or later for another coffee break. Still, when a newspaper publisher joyfully exclaims: "I can visualize a composing room of the future that will automatically compose a page in the newspaper starting from a typewriter page to a finished page without any human hands touching it until it is finished and ready for the press,"—the printer has ample reason to worry.

This is no fantasy: The Palm Beach *Post-Times* uses electronic computers to set type, eliminating the skilled human typesetter; linecasting machines are operated by perforated tape punched by a teletypesetter; and display advertising is set by a photographic typesetter fed by paper tapes from a computer. Central to these advances is the replacement of hot metal in printing by other ways of forming type as well as the use of the computer to juggle type to make it fit into the proper places on the page. One computer supplies near perfect hyphenation as well as automatic justification by storing rules of English and 10,000 exceptions in its memory unit. Such a machine, developed by IBM in 1963, was gobbled up by the New York *Daily News,* the Washington *Star* and the South Bend *Tribune.* The Oklahoma *City Times* sets 12,000 lines of editorial and classified ad matter with an IBM 1620 computer. And in Corning, N.Y., the same tape is automatically relayed

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to eight other papers, serving the entire Southern New York tier. Potentially, we can have the same newspaper in every town at the same time.

The publishers are quite delighted with the new technology, to judge by the 1963 meeting of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. The conversion to computers takes place most rapidly in companies with which the International Typographical Union has no contracts—the Palm Beach *Post-Times,* the Los Angeles *Times* and the Newhouse chain. No union, no inhibitions. Thus printing is becoming an industry rather than a craft, and the story of the English hand loom weavers may be retold.

Even materials handling, once thought to be the most intractable of industrial operations, has been automated. Nowhere is this more evident than on the docks and in the ships that berth alongside. Last January, President Johnson pressed a button in the White House to start a welding machine at the Avondale shipyards in New Orleans. The machine joined two plates for the keel of a Lykes Line freighter that was to be the first of eight semi-automated 14,000 ton ships, each to be operated by a crew of 32 men instead of the 46 needed on conventional vessels of the same size. Such ships may have computers on board to calculate bearings and provide data on speed, course and time of arrival. The device, about the size of a couple of shoe boxes, takes over the work of the men on the bridge. The Japanese have gone even further: their *Mississippi Maru* has more pushbuttons than men. Mooring is handled by automatic hawser winches at the bow and stern that allow resin fiber hawsers to be reeled in or pulled out by a pedal on the deck. A TV camera scans the water directly ahead of the ship. The control room, with its numerous switches and gauges, resembles a scientific laboratory more than it does a ship's bridge.

It will not be difficult now for the ship operators to cut their crews. Last October the West Coast mariners' unions were asked by the Pacific Maritime Association, which bargains for the shipowners in western ports, to reduce their manning requirements by 50 per cent for the automated ships now under construction. PMA was encouraged to make the request by the Federal Maritime Subsidy Board, which is willing to pay for half the cost of the new ships. In effect, the Board told the owners that to qualify for operating subsidies—which since the war have amounted to $1.6 billion—they would have to "centralize" engine room and bridge controls. All the unions were able to do was to ask for "some sort of compensation for the loss of jobs."

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Meanwhile, the operators were looking avidly to the day when they would sail forth with substantially less than half the men they used to have. PMA, with its longshoreman's contract in mind, magnanimously said that it was ". . . prepared to provide the necessary funds . . . over a five-year period to permit a reduction of the total work force to induce earlier retirement, severance arrangements, or other programs that may be negotiated, as well as by attrition." The Sailor's Union of the Pacific wanted to know how the total number of men might be reduced without injury to those registered on its books and "without ultimately destroying the union." And this, of course, is the nub of the problem.

The unions are paralyzed—with frustration, anguish and nameless fear. Last August, the National Maritime Union, headed by Joseph Curran, agreed to cuts in crew sizes on automated ships and shortly after another of the sea unions, the Marine Engineers, had to follow suit. But these were subsidized ships; the agreement, in part, was Curran's way of hitting back at his rival, Paul Hall, whose members work mainly on non-subsidy vessels. The operators, in turn, were to establish an "employment security fund" for the Curran organization based on 25 cents per man-day to retrain land-locked seamen. They also acceded to 20-year retirement regardless of age.

The owners are not averse to utilizing automation as an excuse to speed-up those who remain on board. In the protracted bargaining session with the NMU, the employers suggested that two men instead of three be stationed on deck as lookouts after sunset. Usually, three seamen rotate a night watch, with one out for a coffee break: the companies thought that two men and a thermos bottle would be sufficient. The NMU wondered whether this too was automation. Harvey Swados, who talked to union officials, workers and employers on the West Coast docks, reports that after PMA's "historic" agreement with Harry Bridges' longshoremen, which gave the green light to automation on the docks, work was converted into a continuous, almost oppressive stream. At one time, the union had insisted that no more than 2100 pounds in a single load could be lifted in or out of a ship. Now, much larger loads, glued or strapped together, flow smoothly from truck to hold. The employers have complete freedom to mechanize and assign jobs. The union in return got a $29 million fund to provide voluntary retirement at age 62 or a $7,900 bonus at age 65, plus a guaranteed 35-hour week for its élite, the so-called "A" member. But the employers obtained enough extra work for each labor dollar to absorb without strain a 20 per cent increase in cost. The agreement, of course, with its handsome settlement

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and pension, is intended to encourage retirement and it has worked well enough to cut the "A" list from about 14,000 a few years ago to about 10,500 in 1963. However, the "B" men and the casuals—the unregistered and those waiting for regular jobs—have not fared nearly as well; their frustration is expressed by fruitless picketing of Bridges' headquarters.

The West Coast experience worries the longshoremen in the East. They have an inescapable feeling that they are next on automation's agenda. It was this fear of the future that really underpinned the strike last year in the East and Gulf ports, the settlement of which contained a proviso for the Labor Department to study work conditions on the docks. The Washington grapevine says that the report will be most pleasing to the employers: it will reveal that featherbedding plagues the waterfront. The ILA knows what is to come: it is prepared to hold down wage demands in return for some guaranty of job security.

It is all too easy for a union to cut away from the larger part of its work force, as did Bridges' organization or John L. Lewis' United Mine Workers. Lewis decided a long time ago not to worry about the unemployed at the pits and to help the mine operators become "more competitive." He argued that it was "better to have a half million men working in the industry at good wages . . . than to have a million men working in the industry in poverty and degradation." Lewis agreed to let the operators mechanize and automate, presumably to meet the competition of rival fuels, and the payoff is to be seen in the several hundred thousand idle miners in Pennsylvania and West Virginia and a current employed work force of about 125,000. To be sure, coal mining is once again a profitable business, so much so that the business men who used to curse Lewis now call him a "labor statesman." They know he has been their savior. Meanwhile, a fair number of miners in desperation went to work in non-union shafts—only to find Lewis and the modernized operators arrayed against them.

Perhaps it has been the virtual civil war in such towns as Hazard, Kentucky, that has impelled the present UMW leadership to have a few second thoughts. In any case, W. A. Boyle, the union's new president, tried to obtain a job freeze in his recent negotiations with the Northern bituminous coal industry. He contended that automation had cut the work force as low as it could safely go, but the operators insisted that even more advanced equipment was necessary if they were to stay in business. For the first time in the memory of our generation, the Miners' union was seemingly worried about job security rather than money.

No doubt the rebellion in the union's ranks had something to do with the change in the top officers' attitudes. Dissidents in Western

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Pennsylvania and the northern sections of West Virginia have said: "A wage increase is not justified. We make enough money. But we do want fringe benefits, job security and safety." This, at least, was the sentiment expressed by Henry Knight, Secretary-Treasurer of UMW Local 6330 in Waynesburg, Pa., and John Mayo, District 4 president in Uniontown, Pa. Boyle did obtain some gains unique for the UMW—mine-wide seniority to protect older workers facing layoff, higher overtime rates, more vacation and more safety protection—but many of the locals were dissatisfied and they struck, for they had no guarantee of even the present level of employment. But they were striking against the International Union, not the employers; Boyle's claim of better seniority, holidays and control of crew size seemed to them vastly exaggerated once they read the fine print in the contract. The union officials were still "lovebirds with the coal operators." Meanwhile, the operators continue to introduce automatic machinery and to set the size of work crews: these are "management prerogatives" deemed to be inalienable. The 125,000 men who worked last year mined about 450,000 tons of coal, compared to the 293,000 men needed to produce about the same amount a decade ago. Last year's output rose 13 per cent from 1961 levels, but employment dropped 12 per cent and it is expected to go down still more this year. Moreover, there is little the union can do for the unemployed, and it is still irritated by those who dig non-union coal, for this means no welfare royalty. The men, however, want to eat.

One union trying desperately to think of all its members is the International Association of Machinists. That it cannot succeed in saving jobs in the machine shops and aerospace plants is obviously not its fault. With 64 per cent of the country's machine tools more than ten years old, the situation is ripe for automation. Developments in such techniques as high energy rate forming, electrochemical and torqueless machining plus numerical control, suggest what may be in store for the skilled machinist in the next five years or so. Automated milling and tape-programmed riveting illustrate what can be done to an ancient craft. Conventional riveting of stiffeners for aircraft wings once required 20 to 25 riveters: the automated operation needs but one man to watch the machine. Not only the skilled worker, but the educated engineer has his worries, so rapidly does the technology advance. Computers design motors and decide on the best shapes for drying kilns. They work out solutions for variations in standard product lines in a half-hour as compared with six days required by a man with a slide rule. Automatic drafting machines draw aircraft wings and lay out circuits in

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electronics. Electrical engineers retrain themselves for aeronautics and unless they learn all about lasers, masers and bio-engineering, they are apt to discover themselves jobless. Marine engineering was once a relatively simple matter, but with nuclear reactors and other advances a new field has been opened. However, the skilled or semi-skilled worker has a good deal less prospect for retraining than the engineer. He must depend on his union and his union has been immobilized by the force of technology.

Several years ago the Machinists recommended certain collective bargaining demands to their local lodges for dealing with automation. These urged advance notice, transfer rights, moving allowances, retraining at full pay, severance pay, early retirement and "equitable distribution of the gains resulting from greater productivity through general wage increases." All of these are standard, but in the absence of action by the whole society they remain palliatives, at best delaying the arrival of Doomsday. At any rate, the Machinists' Union is willing to think about automation and it has—together with U.S. Industries, a manufacturer of automated machinery. The latter, headed by John I. Snyder, agreed a few years ago to set up the American Foundation on Automation and Employment. Some studies have been sponsored, conferences held, proceedings published. Of course, this is all to the good, since it helps "arouse" people. But like a puppy discovering its tail, the discussion goes round and round and no one knows what to do. And beyond that the Machinists have done nothing.

Will Walter Reuther break the circle of frustration? That too remains to be seen: the UAW has prepared no public material on automation since its first pronouncements in 1955. The best the UAW has come up with is its 1961 "progress sharing" plan with American Motors. But this is profit sharing and it has little to do with meeting the problem of automation. The auto worker himself does not think much of the scheme. UAW's American Motors Council members admit that it isn't popular in the shop: two-thirds of the profit sharing fund pays for such fringes as pensions and medical care; the other third is used to purchase company stock to be distributed this fall. However, the market value of the stock has dropped by over a fifth since the plan was initiated, costing the workers at least a cent an hour per share.

The union, too, is sponsoring a retraining program for its members under the Federal manpower act, perhaps the first under such auspices, with mechanical drafting, clay modelling of new cars and other white collar skills the main courses. Whether this will meet the needs of the

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displaced auto worker depends on conditions far beyond the union's control, but at any rate it is one small way of meeting a difficult situation. More important, it signifies a change in the thinking of the UAW hierarchy. Not too long ago, Reuther and his very capable brain trust put all their faith in raising the level of aggregate demand as the only way of halting the erosion of jobs. They were reluctant to believe that changes in technology would leave permanent gaps in auto's labor force. The structural argument—that economic strata shift and can threaten an earthquake—was for them just another Jeremiad. Now, evidently, pressures from the men in the shops have impelled them to alter their positions. As a consequence, the most recent bargaining demands include such items as advance notice of automation; retraining to be paid by the companies; transfer, where possible, of blue collar workers to white-collar jobs; relocation allowances; better severance pay; and above all, "income security," meaning an annual salary for line workers. But what these might do for a man already out of work is not clear: this question is beyond the present practice of collective bargaining. No one has yet come up with the idea of "bargaining" for those outside the gates.

The auto workers have had their share of turmoil stemming from a variety of changes in the plant, mainly as a result of automation. Semi-annual and annual model changes, plus shifts in demand for cars have led to all sorts of job splits and reshuffling. The pace of the work is still controlled by the machine and frequently is so intense that workers have had to resort to wildcat strikes, especially in Chrysler, to enforce relief. Additional problems have been created by the movement of assembly plants closer to markets, and with this tendency workers and whole communities have been stranded. When Ford closed its Buffalo assembly plant in 1958, only a third of the 1100 hourly employees went to Lorain, Ohio. Another 22 per cent were shifted to the Buffalo stamping plant. What happened to the remaining 45 per cent is unknown. When the Somerville, Massachusetts assembly plant closed, only 15 per cent of the workers moved over to other Ford operations.

Detroit automation is an old story. The latest wrinkle is "flexible" automation which makes it possible to produce any number of items on the same line. The product mix is easily altered and a great variety of bodies, roofs, lids, hoods, bumpers, transmissions, axles and engines roll off the automated belt. The profusion of car models is almost infinite. At Ford's Cleveland plant the line can supply a couple of thousand Galaxie hoods, a thousand different ones for the Falcon and throw in five hundred or so for the Comet, shifting back and forth in a few hours. In effect, the line runs continuously, with standardized machine tools

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doing the milling, drilling, turning, boring, tapping, and grinding operations automatically. With such flexibility, little wonder that Ford can turn out over 40 models each year.

The men who are still on the line are ready to explode and they made their sentiments known at the last UAW convention in unmistakable ways. But they were mainly preoccupied with retirement schemes. So well do they love their jobs that they want to escape from the monotony and mindlessness of the computer-controlled assembly plant. They want an end to speed up, they want more coffee breaks to relieve fatigue, and they want a halt to TV monitoring of toilets—but above all they want early retirement, they want release from the filth and dirt of making insolent chariots. What this suggests, of course, is an utter loss of hope of ever creating a work process with human meaning. Knowing in his bones that man serves the machine, the auto worker wants to get to that fishing rod just as soon as he can.

However, as A. H. Raskin has shrewdly observed, early retirement on improved pensions and profit-sharing and sharing in cost savings protect only the worker who is in; they do little for the worker who has been shunted aside and even less for the younger worker who wants to get in. What happens to those pushed out by automation is revealed in the experience of the displaced meat packer. In 1959 Armour closed a number of plants in the midwest so suddenly that the workers had no time to think about what they might do. Granted the plants were obsolete, yet the burden of the change was simply dumped into the laps of the employees and the social service agencies of Oklahoma City, East St. Louis, West Fargo and Columbus, Ohio. After a year almost half the displaced in two of these cities had not yet found jobs. Three years after the shutdowns 30 per cent of the East St. Louis Armour workers were still unemployed. Some later received training through the Armour Automation Fund set up in 1959, but the value of the program seems to have been quite limited. By November 1963, only 220 of some 2500 eligible workers had been "retrained." And in virtually every case, the "new" skills brought a lower-rated job with less pay than had been earned at the old Armour packing house. A retraining program in Fort Worth gave to those who secured new jobs $1.61 an hour on the average as compared to the Armour average of $2.60 an hour. Severance pay? R. Wilcock and W. Franke, two University of Illinois economists who studied the Armour situation, report that most of the severance allowances went to pay off company credit union loans which were called in immediately after the shutdowns.

Little wonder that Ralph Helstein, president of the Packinghouse

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Workers' Union, described the Automation Fund some time ago as nothing more than a "publicity gimmick" for the company and a cloak for "a ruthless program of mass termination." Since the Fund was established Armour has closed at least one plant a year, leaving almost 4000 workers to shift for themselves. According to Helstein, the company has built replacement plants in complete secrecy, and often in Southern towns not notably hospitable to the union organizer. Whenever the union has discovered new construction and insisted on transfer rights, the company has refused. Helstein recited cases of employees moving their families to new locations, only to find themselves laid off virtually upon arrival. The Armour Automation Committee, which administers the Fund, was hailed as a pioneer effort to deal in a statesmanlike manner with the effects of a changing technology, but its behavior is odd to say the least. Payments into the Fund were halted in 1963; of the $500,000 which had been accumulated $300,000 was still lying idle, unused.

Presumably a more responsible tack has been developed in steel. The situation in this industry, particularly in the U.S. Steel Corporation, for a long time has been quite complicated, with technology exerting its impersonal pressures on available jobs and established work standards. Complex local work rules, chiefly to forestall speedup, were part of the collective bargaining agreements ever since Benjamin Fairless and Philip Murray signed the first contract in 1937. Yet this in no way solved the problem, for there were frequent disputes between local unions and lower echelon management over crew sizes, seniority, layoffs, incentive payments and lunch hours. Finally, in 1960 a settlement provided for setting up a Human Relations Committee to deal with the exacerbating issues stemming from the changing character of work in the mills. Subcommittees meet, discussions are amicable, yet the observer must wonder at the lack of accomplishment. Steel company representatives hesitate to commit themselves for fear that their statements will return to haunt them at the bargaining table. Further, the arrangement in no way inhibits U.S. Steel in introducing new equipment and new techniques, as witness the arrival of the oxygen furnace, continuous casting and the computer. Job attrition in steel goes on without abatement. Severance pay and supplemental unemployment benefits do not give the protection that in better times it was thought they would. The union must necessarily employ its local work rules embodied in the original contract's section 2B, a set of practices that makes management howl, "Featherbedding!" Yet it is clear that without 2B, job destruction would be even

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more rapid. The union is engaged in a holding action; it is hard to predict how long it can maintain its desperate grip.

Sooner or later the grasp will be loosened, even as in the railroad industry where some of the nation's most powerful unions are caving in before technology and politics. Data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics reveal an occupational upheaval on the railroads of enormous proportions. Total employment dropped from 1,400,000 in 1947 to 800,000 in 1960. A year later it was down to 730,000. The 13-year decline almost equalled the loss that occurred between 1920, the peak year for railroad jobs, and 1947. Most of the loss has been attributed to technological change—there is little argument among the experts on this. The elimination of steam by Diesel locomotives, which do not need as much servicing, has reduced maintenance jobs. Repair facilities are combined and some even closed down. Diesels haul longer trains, dispensing with men for operating crews. Between 1948 and 1952 three thousand Diesels replaced four thousand locomotives each year. Today about 28,000 Diesels and 1,000 old steamers with their picturesque cowcatchers do all the work. To be sure, there was a slight increase in some railroading jobs—shop electrical work and signal operations—but the age of automation now threatens these too.

New York's subway riders have their automated train between Grand Central and Times Square. Railroad bridges move up and down, wheels are oiled and mail bags handled, all automatically. In West Labrador four crewless shuttles carry iron ore over a six-mile run at a constant speed of a quarter a mile an hour. One man controls the entire operation: eighteen would be needed for a conventional road system. While crewless engines thus far have been used for shuttling, equipment makers are promising crewless inter-city trains.

All these, of course, are computerized operations. In the new style freight yard, for example, of which some 45 have been built in the last decade, the number of incoming cars is scanned on a closed circuit TV to obtain a quick reading of car numbers. The information is then checked against waybills and the cars automatically sorted. A computer calculates the car's proper speed from trackside devices, while radar records the actual speed. Automatic retarders make the cars conform to the computer's reckoning. The computer also figures how much energy it takes to haul a loaded freight train up a given grade. Moreover, the work of different yards can be coordinated, so that one master need not load up another: the computer advises them which cars to switch and which to hold. Naturally, the number of engines required for the system is reduced, as is the number of work crews. At the Pennsylvania Rail-

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road's Conway yards, which was computerized at a cost of $34 million, freight can be moved with some 13,000 fewer cars, saving the company $100 million in rolling stock. The labor saved in moving the same quantity of freight amounted to 200 men, adding perhaps another million dollars or more to the net savings in equipment. Moreover, the computer supplies the railroad chieftain with a command and control technique of unparalleled efficiency.

But the men who know only railroading are left standing at trackside biting their lips in quiet desperation. In 1959 the railroad companies wanted to lay off all firemen working on Diesel locomotives in freight and yard service and insisted on an unrestricted right to set crew sizes. This would have meant the abolition of almost 60,000 jobs. The five on-train operators' unions immediately threatened strike if the work-rules changes were carried out, for they insisted that not only was train safety involved, but that firemen posts provided training for future engineers. The companies screamed "featherbedding" in full-page newspaper ads throughout the land. Few listened to the plaints of the workers or their unions.

In October, 1960, a Presidential Railroad Commission was created which produced several immense volumes of statistics that sounded the death knell of the firemen. The few who might remain were to be rewarded with a two per cent wage increase. Needless to say, the unions rejected the Commission's proposals. An emergency board under the Railway Labor Act then proposed retraining, special allowances for redundant workers and arbitration of displacements disputed by the union. The operators were ready, but the unions once again stalled: they were biding their time to hit the railroads the only way they knew how—the strike. But, as usual, President Kennedy understood full well what was in their minds, and armed with the Council of Economic Advisers' prediction that 6 million workers would be out of jobs one month after a rail strike and that the ensuing depression would endanger the national security, he asked the Congress in July, 1963, to forbid railroad strikes for two years and to compel the operators and Brotherhoods to keep talking to each other. Congress, however, went further and imposed compulsory arbitration—which the President accepted. It was one of the few bills that moved over the Hill to the White House that year with more than deliberate speed. On November 26, the arbitration panel established by the statute ruled that up to 90 per cent of the contested firemen positions could be eliminated—a crushing blow to labor that few noticed in the agony of the President's death. When the Supreme Court refused to question the constitutionality of compulsory arbitration,

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another nail was driven into the automated coffin carrying the Brotherhoods to their doom. The railroad operators immediately announced the layoffs: as many as 15,000 jobs will be eliminated before the arbitration law expires in January, 1966. Firemen with low seniority and those working irregularly are to go first; those with two to ten years' seniority will be offered "comparable" jobs elsewhere. The one saving grace is that a fireman in the senior group may receive up to $8,000 in severance pay if he chooses to leave.

As an old Russian writer once asked: What Is To Be Done? Perhaps the Kaiser Fontana plan offers a partial answer. In March, 1963, the Steelworkers' Union and the Kaiser Steel Corporation, a maverick among manufacturers, agreed to "share the progress" at the latter's plant in Fontana, California. The scheme includes a guarantee that no worker will lose his job—at least for one year—because a machine has taken his place. If there is no other job available, he goes into a reserve pool and is assured of his income even if he is placed in a lower rated position. Further, all the workers can share in any cost saving achieved through greater efficiency. These may come from anything that helps reduce the cost of steel—elimination of waste, working harder, or finding a new way to turn a dial on the control panel itself. During the first year, workers submitted over 900 cost-cutting ideas, 80 per cent of which were good enough to be adopted. Roughly one-third of the savings goes to the workers, a formula derived from the proportion of labor cost to total cost. The scheme is plant-wide, so that everyone has a share in making the pie bigger. In the first year the monthly bonuses averaged about $65 per man. Kaiser, of course, is not playing philanthropist, for with each dollar of the bonus, it saves two. The workers began to think of the company's money as if it were their own. Cable lengths used by overhead cranes which used to be junked when they snapped were retrieved and cut into smaller pieces for smaller cranes. Old nuts and bolts were hoarded like a housewife saving twine.

Yet all this has not halted the advance of automation in the Fontana plant. An automatic scarfer, a machine that burns blemishes off unfinished steel, will replace not only the workers who used to do the job with oxyacetylene torches, but the cranemen, hookers and inspectors as well. The displaced go into the labor reserve pool: at one time there were several dozen men in the pool awaiting reassignment; fortunately, they had been reabsorbed by the end of the year. While the bonus has gone as high as 66 cents an hour, for the last seven months of the plan's initial year it dropped steadily, until in May, 1964, it hit but $14 for each of the 5000 workers participating in it. As a result, enthusiasm

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for the scheme has declined sharply: the incentive workers who used to average $50 to $60 a month in bonuses above their base pay, are particularly bitter. Part of the reason for the drop, according to some observers, stems from the company's installation of certain cost-cutting operations at the mine, displacing work formerly done in the plant, and since the sharing applies only to Fontana, the workers have lost out. Not without reason, they have charged the company with chiseling. The company, on the other hand, counters that raw materials prices have gone up and that improved fringe benefits—the cost of which is charged to the saving fund—have eaten into the amounts the men might have otherwise received. In addition, the company now feels that the union ought to relax its stubborn grip on Section 2B, the work rules clause.

The fact is that the Fontana plant is now able to operate at full capacity with 1400 fewer workers than it did a few years ago. The real test will come when a high-speed automated production line is installed in 1965 in the tin mill. Kaiser thinks that the normal 8 per cent work force turnover will keep down the number of bodies gathering in the reserve pool: union leaders are not so sure, but they hope it will. Since a key problem in automation is not so much the one fired, although that is troublesome enough, but the one not hired, the Kaiser plan, interesting as it is, offers no answer to the questions raised by the 1½ million young people who enter the job market each year. Can the social effects of automation and large-scale unemployment indeed be handled via the ritual of collective bargaining?

Essentially, it is necessary to develop a smaller active work force, or as Robert Heilbroner puts it, to shift the supply curve of labor to the left: that is, reduce the number of workers. In fact, this is precisely what has been happening ever since the National Origins Act cut off our foreign labor supply in 1921. Social Security further reduced the work force by telling men that they did not have to work up to the very moment they dropped dead. At the other end of the age scale, compulsory education laws have helped keep youngsters out of the work force. Hence, curtailing the supply of labor does have historical precedent. There is nothing irrational about this, for with present-day technology the population-work force pyramid can be readily inverted. Up to now, a broad base of actively employed had supported a narrow apex: today this can be turned around—in fact, it must be turned around if the society we know is not to founder. Not many years ago, certainly within our memory today, an automobile engine block came from the foundry to an assem-

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bly line where some 300 men transformed it into an engine in 3½ weeks. This method became archaic in the middle 1950's. In the new system the block was taken from the foundry by a conveyor belt and an engine untouched by human hands was produced in under 15 minutes. Human monitors watched lights and dials to adjust the line. This system too is archaic, for now a computer with sensory apparatus stands guard over the line. Soon there will be no humans at all.

The AFL-CIO has officially called for a Presidential Commission on Automation, an idea that Congress has finally accepted. Beyond that the labor movement urges an expansion of retraining, relocation aid, and area redevelopment. An examination of the efficacy of these programs would call for a further article. The particular approaches of the unions to automation, considering the limitation of bargaining to the unit in the plant or company, are at best, holding actions, or at worst, helpless rhetoric. As an astute labor reporter, John Herling, remarked, the nature of the problem is economy size and collective bargaining in a single area or industry offers only retail help for a wholesale condition. The UAW wants to compel management to respect the dignity of the worker and urges its locals to resist the erosion of its bargaining units. But what if the computer *does* make it easier for the job to be done at another location? Several recent arbitration and NLRB cases make it clear that management has the right to transfer work under such circumstances. While the Machinists' Union acknowledges that automation poses problems, all it can think of is another conference or perhaps better severance pay. The IUE, the Rubber Workers, the Retail Clerks and several other unions have asked for joint study committees, but there has been no answer from the corporations which continue unhampered in substituting machines for men. The Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, and now the Railroad unions, too, call for higher wages to be paid whenever new equipment is to be installed, a response sure to be used as an excuse to bring in more machines. The Packinghouse Workers wants a year's notice on plant closings, transfers for the displaced, more separation pay, and a shorter work week. The Steelworkers stressed shorter *time* and secured 13-week sabbaticals for long-term employees in the hope that this would absorb some of their members without jobs.

Most unions, however, turn to a shortened work week rather than longer vacations or paid furloughs. As might be expected, this suggestion always sets devotees of the conventional wisdom to shivering as they warn that a reduction in weekly hours from 40 to 35 implies an intolerable labor cost increase of 14 per cent. But such arithmetic stops short of a complete analysis, since labor cost as a proportion of total

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cost or of revenue may be as low as 25 per cent. Thus, a 14 per cent increase in the labor component may be but a two or three per cent increase in comparison to revenue. Considering industry's incessant push for more and more sales and its great capacity to produce, such a modest jump in cost could be absorbed quite easily. Indeed, was this not the history of hours reduction over the last half century when on the average the work week had been reduced 15 minutes a year? Those who fear the burden of costs stemming from a shorter work week must explain how it was possible to get down to 40 hours today!

Is the likely future of the trade unions one of declining power and influence? If this were to be the case then we should all be the worse for it: the patent fact, despite the many strictures levelled at them, is that American unions have made the material lot of the ordinary workingman, and indeed for all of us, far better than it would have been had they not existed. For the craft unions automation is not yet a burning problem; for the industrial and even white-collar unions it is. And the unhappy consequences are magnified because it is precisely the latter, those most vulnerable to automation, which generally have been the more progressive and socially responsive.

What may await some unions in the not-too-distant future is the likelihood of becoming "ghost unions," top-heavy with officialdom, excellently financed, but reduced in size and national influence. If the present trend continues, they may come to represent an entrenched but dwindling minority and will be cut off from—if not violently at adds with—the lower, poorer strata of the working class. Affluent shells of their former selves, they would resemble the present United Mine Workers, only 25 years ago a major social force in the U.S. but now with little influence beyond the constricted limits of the coal fields. Twenty-five years ago everyone knew that John L. Lewis was president, everyone knew what he stood for, everyone listened to what he said. Who, today, so much as knows the name of his successor?

There is no easy way out; and in the absence of hard thought and a sense of acute crisis, there will be no way out at all. Ways must be found to organize and represent the workers thrown out of jobs by automation; ways must be found to organize and consider the millions of ill-paid "marginal" workers who scrape along on the minimum wage and suffer the consequences of racial discrimination. Perhaps new structures will be needed, amalgamated unions of workers cutting across industrial lines, just as in the thirties the CIO cut across craft lines. But the time

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to think, to worry, to discuss is now, when there are still a few years of grace.

But finally—immediately, too—it all comes down to politics, not in the narrow sense of maneuvers and endorsements, but in the fundamental sense of planning and perspective. It is a painful situation: programs must be sold to a Congress inhabited by an assortment of troglodytes (there are exceptions) for whom the Federalist papers and the speeches of Calhoun are the touchstones of eternal wisdom. It is this problem—antecedent to all the proposed solutions for automation—to which the unions as well as others must face up if we are to escape the tyranny of the machine. The displaced need to be shifted to jobs still available (the printing trades' unions in Washington claim there are several hundred openings for which people might be trained: government bureaucrats disbelieve the unions; consequently, no training program). We ought to encourage secondary wage earners to stay home (they will if the breadwinner earns enough). People might be drawn into voluntary community activity (*vide* the fantastic response to the domestic Peace Corps idea). Why not give longer vacations, sabbaticals, travel grants (as Herbert Gans says, this might "professionalize" a good many occupations). Perhaps the introduction of new equipment ought to be licensed (not to inhibit or eliminate them, but to apply them in accordance with a time-table that would avoid the present helter-skelter uses of technology). Keep teenagers in school (but for heavens' sake! let's improve the education system). And finally, let us simply give money to those who have not enough and will never earn enough—the aged, indigent and shattered (it might sound better if this were called more extensive transfer payments). All this needs to be done soon; otherwise, a vast trauma awaits us all.

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Lewis Coser

CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE INTELLECTUALS

The French *philosophes*, so the schoolbooks usually say, were mighty champions of liberty; they preached the defense of freedom against the arbitrary powers of the state. Did not Diderot write, "Each century is characterized by a specific spirit. The spirit of ours seems to be that of liberty"? It comes therefore as a shock to realize that many of the *philosophes*, as well as such other champions of liberalism and individualism as the physiocrats, the ancestors of classical economics, admired the societies of China and Russia above all others in their day. This is a paradox worthy of attention.

When intellectuals are out of tune with political trends at home, they are apt to look for more congenial harmonies abroad. "Not finding anything about them which seemed to conform to their ideals," wrote Tocqueville of the physiocrats, "they went to search for it in the heart of Asia. It is no exaggeration to say that every one of them in some part of his writings passes an emphatic eulogy on China. . . . That imbecile and barbarous government . . . appeared to them the most perfect model for all of the nations of the world to copy." And l'Abbé Baudeau, one of the principal members of the physiocrats' circle, wrote, "More than three hundred twenty million people live there [in China] as wisely, happily and freely as men can ever be. They live under a most absolute but most just government, under the richest, the most powerful, the most humane and the most welfare-conscious monarch." The *intendant* Poivre, whose writings were considered authoritative by the physiocrats, went so far as to assert in his *Travels of a Philosopher* that, "China offers an enchanting picture of what the world might become, if the laws of that empire were to become the laws of all nations." To the father of physiocratic doctrine, Quesnay, China was a model state "founded on science and natural law."

This strange Sinophilia was not limited to the physiocrats; it was

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in fact shared by a great many among the eighteenth-century *philosophes.* Voltaire in particular never tired of singing the praises of China, "the widest and best policed nation of the world." "One need not be obsessed with the merits of the Chinese," he wrote, "to recognize at least that the organization of their empire is in truth the best that the world has ever seen, and moreover the only one founded on paternal authority." There is almost equally enthusiastic language about the Chinese in the writings of Diderot and Helvétius. Leibniz had already expressed similar enthusiasm in an earlier day.

French knowledge of Chinese affairs was, of course, fragmentary. Most of it came from Jesuit missionaries, and their accounts were, to say the least, not always free from a bias imposed by the need to defend themselves against their theological adversaries in the famous quarrel over the Chinese ceremonies. The Jesuits had been led to make a number of major concessions to traditional Confucian culture in their effort to bring the Chinese to the Faith, and they had therefore a vested interest in presenting an idealized picture of the country of Confucius. Such idealization by the philosophers was not, however, due to ignorance alone. Russia was much better known, yet we find idealizations of Russian conditions in the writings of Voltaire, Diderot, Helvétius, Grimm, and many others that fully match their unrealistic ideas of China.

A certain degree of self-interest helps to account for this Russophilia. Catherine II assiduously courted the Parisian enlighteners. In 1763, she bought Diderot's library for 15,000 francs but left it in his possession—giving him a pension of 1000 francs a year for assuming the task of librarian. Two years later, she gave him 50,000 francs for fifty years in advance. D'Alembert was offered the tutorship to the heir of the Russian throne; others were given similar tangible proofs of the Empress's support. Yet it would certainly be most unfair to aver that self-interest was the main spur to admiration of Catherine and her administration. Not all admirers of Catherine derived such material benefits from their commerce with the Empress, and, further, Voltaire and many of his friends admired the long-dead Peter the Great as much as his successor.

Voltaire never tired in his praise of Catherine. He was a kind of unofficial public-relations expert for her until her death. "What times are these," he wrote to D'Alembert. "France persecutes the philosophers and the scyths favor them." "I admire Catherine, I love her to folly," he wrote a few years later, "the scyths become our masters in everything." He compared Catherine to Lycurgus and Solon and was

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never at a loss to explain away her failings. He acknowledged that she had had a hand in the assassination of her husband but referred to this event as "family quarrels" and "bagatelles." His admiration for Peter the Great was equally unbounded. The Empress Elizabeth had commissioned his biography of Peter and had liberally rewarded him after that piece of hack work had turned out to her satisfaction. But even before he had any relations with the Russian court, he had written that Peter "resolved to be a man to command men, and to create a nation," that Peter had single-handedly changed the greatest empire in the world, had "civilized his people." Marmontel, whose *Bélisaire* Catherine herself had translated into Russian, and Grimm, her most assiduous correspondent, never tired in their championship of the virtues of the Empress's regime. Although some of the *philosophes* were not beyond opportunism and even venality, other factors must also have been at work.

The social position of the man of letters in the eighteenth century helps to account for his fascination with "enlightened rulers." In his isolation at home, persecuted, censored, forbidden to publish his books in France, he was naturally prone to look abroad for encouragement and support. Interest on the part of powerful foreigners flattered him and bolstered a self-esteem that was often badly shaken by discouragement at home. Such treatment, according to Peter Gay, "created some false impressions among the philosophers . . . they were all too easily tempted to imagine themselves, at least on occasion, in the role of Plato and Aristotle, and to imagine their royal friends as a Numa or Lycurgus." But why did the *philosophes* turn specifically to Russia, and how does one account for their Sinophilia, since clearly no tangible or even intangible benefits could have been expected to descend upon deserving philosophers from the Son of Heaven, even when similar benefits were possible from the Semiramis of the North?

Suffering from a multiplicity of laws and authorities, fragmentation of political will, lack of concerted planning in governmental affairs, and all the privileges accruing to favored estates and orders, the philosophers yearned for a body politic that would be efficiently run by a central administration. Such an administration would know how to deal with the obstructions of rank and birth and how to order the affairs of the state in the mirror image of universal reason. Reason could not be expected to prevail in a society split into autonomous, warring powers, in which *parlements* checked the court and the clergy, subservient to Rome, utilized the secular arm in its struggle against the Enlightenment.

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Frederick the Great, in one of his letters to Voltaire, provides us with a first clue for understanding Voltaire's infatuation with China. Frederick wrote that he visualized Voltaire ever repeating to his friends, "Seeing that only one law prevails throughout the whole vast empire of China, must you not desire, oh my countrymen, to imitate them in your little kingdom." China seemed to the *philosophes* a society in which things got done. They got done, moreover, with the help and under the guidance of wise scholars, of fellow *philosophes*. What impressed Voltaire even more than the beneficent rule of a benevolent Emperor was the fact that the Emperor was surrounded by men of letters, an official class of literati chosen on a rational basis, free from the corruptions of organized religion and the particularistic criteria of rank and birth. And imagine, said Voltaire, that the Emperor could do nothing without consulting "these men educated in the law," who would check all tendencies toward arbitrary action.

The same reasoning seems to account, in somewhat modified form, for the philosophers' Russophilia. Everything, they argued, is possible if, in a country that had been until recently wholly barbaric, one man aided by right reason could transform a whole people. Russia had made enormous progress within the short span of a few decades; to use modern terminology, it seemed to have jumped many stages of development. It moved ahead so fast that, in many respects, it was already a model for countries of much older civilization. And what, if not enlightened despotism, had allowed the Russians to make such giant steps forward? Despotism, of course, if properly enlightened, turned out upon inspection to be by no means so horrible as Montesquieu had pictured it; it was, in fact, one of the most impressive means of progress. Even though such despotism might not be wholly suitable at home, it certainly was the most potent means to allow "underdeveloped countries" to reach quickly and even to surpass the lands of older civilization. If Russia had succeeded in thirty or forty years, through enlightened legislation, in overcoming a lag of three centuries, then indeed one could continue to believe in the perfectibility of man and be optimistic about progress. Russia's advance revived the spirits of those discouraged by the anarchy and apparent hopelessness of the political scene at home.

In enlightened Russia, in contrast to Western Europe, the sovereign was not hindered by all sorts of obsolete and obsolescent resistance to his beneficent actions. There one could paint with broad strokes upon the canvas of the future. In Russia—and in the other enlightened despotisms of the North—the ancient alliance of the throne and the altar seemed about to be replaced by the alliance of throne and

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philosophy. "The greatest happiness of a nation," wrote D'Alembert, "is realized when those who govern agree with those who instruct it." To enlighten an absolute monarch appeared a most advantageous short cut on the road to the universal reign of reason. To instruct the people would take centuries, to enlighten an elite was a most arduous task, and the shortest route was, in Voltaire's words, "to make a revolution . . . in the spirit of those who are made to govern." Leibniz had already said it: "To win the spirit of a single man such as the Czar or the monarch of China . . . is to do more than to win a hundred battles, because millions of others depend on the will of such men."

China and Russia, to the *philosophes,* were unlike in many respects, but they had one thing in common and a most important thing at that: In both those great empires, the men of letters served in places of eminence, at the very center of things. In China, the literati, wise and incorruptible counselors to the Emperor, exercised both administrative and judicial power. There the powerful knew how to give due honor to the men of letters. In consequence, the country was well ordered and well policed, the customs agreeable and refined, the mores simple, and the people content. And, according to Voltaire, if a certain lack of progress might be discerned, it was due to the fact that they had attained so high a point of perfection that they saw no need to push any further. . . . In Russia, on the other hand, the necessary progress was assured because despots, enriched by the advice of the enlightened from abroad, could freely knead with their own hands the paste of the future.

Almost all the *philosophes* were royalists at home, usually supporting the King's party against *parlements* and estates. But at home, their scope of action seemed fatally limited because the King was prevented from right action not only by personal insufficiency but also by built-in checks to his power. "The sole remedy against all the ills involved by the immensity of our States, the multiplicity of our laws, the slowness and uncertainty of our justice, the impunity of resourceful and clandestine crime and the favor of unjust power," wrote Grimm, the confidant of Catherine, "the sole remedy, if it exists, must be sought in the heart and character of him to whom the right to rule has come with his birth." Louis XV, of whom so many had expected so much, had turned out to be vacillating and corrupt. His successor was an honest simpleton. But how could even wiser kings prevail against the domination of the "eternal yesterday" in the old countries of the West? What then was more rational than to turn in admiration and respect to those countries in which enlightened rulers, unhampered by tradi-

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tion and precedence, were willing to accept the advice of philosophers? "It is most advantageous for the prince and the state," wrote Voltaire, "when there are many philosophers. The philosophers having no particular interest to defend, can only speak up in favor of reason and the public interest."

Tocqueville summed it all up in his continuation of the passage quoted at the beginning of this essay. He wrote, "They were moved with rapture at the vision of a country in which the sovereign [is] absolute but free from prejudice . . . and in which all offices are obtained by written examinations; which has for religion only a philosophy, and for an administration only men of letters." In their rage for order, they were wont to forget their passion for liberty. "You might have thought," writes Paul Hazard, the great intellectual historian, "that you were looking at a minuet: the Princes bow to the philosophers, the philosophers return the bow. . . . As if the mighty ones had forgotten how they had persecuted, and were still persecuting, writers who were trying to undermine their authority; and as if the writers had forgotten about the furious rhetoric they had hurled, and were still hurling, against the tyrants."

The philosophers' hopes, of course, came to nought. They "thought they were using the kings; and it was the kings who were using them." Catherine ruled Russia with rude and despotic practicality; enlightenment was a sport of kings but hardly a matter for realistic guidance. In the meantime, it was good indeed to have respected philosophers who could find enlightened arguments for calling crimes "family quarrels" and for justifying wars of aggression or the pitiless suppression of peasant *jacqueries.* Intellectuals who had sought to guide power managed in the end only to legitimize it.

A modern political scientist, Suzanne Labin, has written, "The contributions of Voltaire's vigorous mind were not approved by an ancient society stuffed with traditions, but his light was accepted in the faintly illuminated North, where a despot, free from the shackles of an ancient civilization, could smile prettily at his theories. *The elite of the word tries to establish its ascendancy where there is no elite of any other kind.*" The "elite of the word" cannot be said, as Miss Labin seems to have assumed, to have a single, unified orientation toward the men of power. Rousseau and Montesquieu, for different reasons, never shared their contemporaries' enthusiasm for Russia and China. Yet the orientation that has been sketched here, though not the only possible one, is significant. Almost 200 years later we encounter a very similar one among European and American intellectuals.

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Lewis S. Feuer

MEETING THE SOVIET PHILOSOPHERS

I make no claim to being an "area specialist" on the Soviet Union, but for many years I have read the literature on Soviet society and ideology. For several years I attended courses in the Russian language, and acquired a stuttering knowledge. My hope in going to the Soviet Union was to do what I had once done in Japan—namely, to engage in discussions with its philosophers, sociologists, and students, to speak with them while their doubts and searchings had not yet been blue-pencilled out of existence by editorial committees, administrators, and bureaucrats. I was to find that it took a month or more to learn in the Soviet Union what needed only a week in Japan. One could meet readily in Japan, for instance, with a variety of factions in the Zengakuren, but in the Soviet Union my meetings with free student circles had to be arranged with caution. Where Marxist professors in Japan would speak freely of their different tendencies, among Soviet professors there was a conditioned preliminary response to profess a unanimous consensus in dialectical materialism, even when their differences were patently straining the consensus into a dissensus, and tearing the ideological garments at the seams.

During four and a half months, I talked with upwards of a hundred and fifty Soviet philosophers and social scientists, sometimes for an hour, sometimes for five hours. At the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, I gave five lectures to the research workers, ranging in number from twenty to fifty. I went to Tashkent to talk with the Institute of Philosophy and Law in Uzbekistan, and to Tbilisi, for long discussions with scholars at the Georgian Institute of Philosophy. At Leningrad, I inquired into the projects of the hard-working sociologists of the Social Research Laboratory. Most of all, I learned from discussions with Soviet philosophers who raised objections and questions at my lectures.

My first lecture was on "The Development of Dewey's Pragmatism."

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The audience consisted largely of the Institute's Section on Bourgeois Philosophy and Sociology. I suggested this subject because I thought it would enable me to raise directly what I regarded as shortcomings and misstatements in the studies by Soviet ideologists of American philosophy. The discussion which followed showed how hard the Soviet ideological stance makes it for them to approach the history of ideas in an empirical spirit.

In the last few minutes of the lecture, I considered the allegation which I found in Soviet books that Dewey was the philosopher of American imperialism. I said that from his first political writings, Dewey had been a critic of all imperialist ideology; that his essay on savage mind in 1902 had been directed against racist imperialism in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War; that he had lived in China for two years and had witnessed the May Fourth movement in 1919, and had written a series of remarkable articles defending its anti-imperialist program; that he had been a critic of American imperialism in Mexico; that he had been personally invited by Krupskaya, presumably on Lenin's behalf, to help in reorganizing Soviet education; that he had visited the Soviet Union in 1928, and written a series of warmly enthusiastic reports concerning the Soviet experiment; that, finally, the Soviet attacks on Dewey as an imperialist philosopher had begun only in the mid-thirties when Dewey criticized the Moscow trials and purges. "You yourselves," I said, "have since then come to recognize that with regard to these trials Dewey was right and Stalin was wrong."

The young philosophers in the audience listened intently, and did not challenge these observations. But the chairman cautioned everybody to remember that I was giving my "personal opinions," and that they should bear in mind that Dewey had supported Trotsky, and that Trotsky had been trying to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union. It was amazing. These were not illiterates; these were the picked Soviet research workers on Western thought, and all had to acquiesce in this nonsense. Questions on my findings and method followed, and then the floor was taken by the Soviet authority on American pragmatism, Yuri Melvil. Dewey, he asserted, *was* the philosopher of American imperialism, and all the facts I had adduced were trivial; for "objectively" Dewey was a supporter of imperialism; he quoted from an American book which said that Dewey had become anti-communist long before it was fashionable to be so.

I prevailed on the chairman to allow me a few minutes to reply (it is the custom of the Communist party to allow its spokesman the last word). I pointed out what a "dogmatic Marxist" he was, for his

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dogmatism was such that no set of facts could possibly move him from his belief that Dewey "objectively" was a philosopher of imperialism; this was using "objectively" in an unverifiable sense to conform to dogmatic preconceptions. (There was a round of pleased laughter from the younger side of the room.) I then tried to show how the history of American philosophy did not confirm the Marxist formula that materialism was the progressive philosophy, and idealism the reactionary. Transcendentalism, for instance, was the philosophy of the most radical group of reformers in American history—the New Englanders, who, before the Civil War, dedicated themselves to socialist and abolitionist movements. I said I had once been a Marxist, but that my experience, and philosophical and sociological studies, had persuaded me there were basic limitations to Marxism.

Obliteration of Soviet Philosophical Past

It would be hard to exaggerate the degree to which the Stalinist era extirpated original philosophy and social science, and how its effects still persist. The sense of a continuing and supporting tradition of philosophical discussion is absent. I asked one young philosopher, the author of a work on English intuitionist ethics, if he could give me the title of a good history of Soviet philosophy; I remarked that in the United States we had several histories of American philosophy. He replied, after a moment's thought, that no such history of Soviet philosophy existed. The reason, he said, was simple: they had no need of one because, unlike America, they had no different schools of ideas; everybody worked within the framework of Marxist philosophy. This struck me as tantamount to admitting that the philosophical life of his country was so uninteresting that it didn't deserve to be written; why bother writing a history of commentaries and explications of the Truth which was already written clearly enough by Marx and Lenin? The young philosopher went on to add that a chapter on philosophy during the Lenin period had been prepared for the sixth volume of their collective history of philosophy, but it had been so much criticized that it had never been published. Clearly, silence about the destroyed generation of Soviet thinkers is still regarded as judicious.

An incident during the discussion of my second lecture on "The Sociology of Science" illustrated vividly the official obliteration of the Soviet philosophical past. I was presenting material which was published the following month in a book, *The Scientific Intellectual*. In reply to a question, I said that I disagreed with a seminal Marxist essay in this field. Someone asked to what essay I was referring. I answered it was

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an article by the Soviet scholar, B. Hessen, "The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's *Principia*," published in 1931 in a book called. . . . The chairman looked at my interpreter, an unspoken message seemed to flash between them, and the interpreter interrupted me: "We do not know anything of the author. I do not know his name." The chairman nodded assent. I looked at the audience. Not a word, not a question about the Soviet scholar to whom I had referred. In any normal gathering, the scholars would have been eager to get the exact reference to an important, neglected essay of one of their own countrymen. But with one glance they had been warned: Do not ask about this man. No doubt the book *Science at the Crossroads* was known to both the chairman and interpreter; its opening essay was by the still unrehabilitated Nikolai Bukharin, and Hessen himself evidently vanished during the Stalinist era. Their names are still enveloped in the collective repression of Soviet memory; references to their writings are to be avoided by the prudent Soviet scholar.

My third lecture was on "Contemporary American Thought." I chose this subject because I wanted to emphasize the tremendous variation in American philosophies, the "law of the spectrum," I called it, according to which the distribution of philosophies was primarily the outcome of differences in individual temperament, and the "law of the wings," in accordance with which every philosophical movement, whether pragmatism, idealism, or materialism, tended to evolve into right, left and center wings. I spoke of the generational differences among American philosophers—how the older philosophers were idealist, realist, or pragmatist, the middle-aged ones naturalist or positivist, and the younger ones, existentialist or ordinary linguisticians, and suggested that under normal conditions such a spectrum of philosophies would manifest itself in the Soviet Union, that this was typical of societies where the spectrum was not deflected by external pressure.

I was promptly challenged at that meeting and at subsequent discussions to apply these "laws" to Soviet philosophy. When I first did so, and pointed to the emerging diversity which I had encountered among Soviet philosophers, I was told that a few weeks of discussions were no sufficient basis for such a judgment; all Soviet philosophers were dialectical materialists. As the months went by, and the discussions accumulated, it became still more evident to me that a variety of conflicting philosophies is emerging in the Soviet Union, and that they are housed together under the rubric "dialectical materialism" in an unstable equilibrium. Dictatorial power, not intellectual agreement, imposes the harness of a planned ideology on recalcitrant temperaments. Neverthe-

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less, even within the framework of the mandatory creed, one discerns the workings of the law of the spectrum. In the Soviet Union, the counterpart exists for every philosophical movement in Western Europe and America. If planned ideology was eliminated, one might expect a flowering of these diverse philosophical trends.

Among the young philosophers, I found chiefly three trends: scientific realism, existentialism, and pragmatism. The scientific philosophers are (what I called) "scientific realists," that is, their "materialism" is simply a belief in the reality of the physical world. They are engaged in catching up with problems and readings which were central in American philosophy thirty-five years ago. I found circles, for instance, studying such works of Bertrand Russell as *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* and the more recent *Human Knowledge.* They are intrigued by the concepts of "structure" and "isomorphism," and talk very much in Russell's terms about how only the structure of the physical world can be known. They tend to reject Engels' theory of sensation as a "reflection" of the world, and find this to be "mirror-magic." They take the basic meaning of "reflection" to be "isomorphism." The scientific realist group is on friendly political terms with the Soviet existentialists, that is, they regard them as "moral people." They do not, however, think highly of the philosophical merits of the existentialists, who in their opinion have not yet broken with the Hegelian concept that contradictions can exist in reality.

What characterizes the Soviet existentialists? In the first place, they prefer to study the humanistic Marx of the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts,* the Marx of the concept of alienation. As one professor observed: "They are interested in Marx when he was not yet a Marxist." When I noted that this was the precise point—that they preferred the Marx who was not a Marxist—he retorted: "They will evolve towards Marxism." The Soviet existentialists are concerned with problems of freedom and ethics which were banished from the consciousness in the Stalinist era; they are concerned with the quality of individual life rather than with the tactics of ideological class struggle. They enjoy reading such authors as Berdyaev and Solovyov, and take an interest in Freud. They find German existentialist philosophy more interesting than American thought, and feel themselves closer in spirit to the Germans than to the Americans. The Germans are said to be deeper, to raise at least the problems of existence though they cannot solve them; the Americans are regarded as proponents of common sense, as relatively superficial.

Both the scientific realists and the existentialists are together in one

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camp as "anti-dogmatists." "The dogmatists," said a young philosopher, "are the previous people, the immoral ones, who fear that logical methods will unmask their foolish doctrines." "In what way," I asked, "are they immoral?" "They are immoral," he replied, "in their daily practice; they try to suppress their enemies administratively. When a person can prove something, he doesn't need illegal methods." The scientific realists and the existentialists regard each other as "socially progressive" because both oppose the dogmatic Stalinists. This fact of their political unity is perhaps an item of evidence against the historical-materialist theory of ideas, since, on the face of it, their philosophical differences correspond to no differences in politics, and this indeed may be the beginning of philosophy and the end of ideology in the Soviet Union.

The existentialists and scientific realists do not, of course, exhaust the modes of philosophy found among young Soviet thinkers. A significant group, particularly in the social sciences, is drawn to American pragmatism. The dogmatists continue to insist that pragmatism is a form of subjective idealism, but some younger thinkers are turning to the study of Peirce and Dewey. They are concerned with clarifying such an ambiguous concept as "practice." As Marxists, they hold that the Marxist sociology of revolution is confirmed in "practice," but what does this mean? There is not a large collection of revolutions which would give meaning to probability-frequencies as the verificational basis for their assertions. Confronted by a series of ambiguities in "practice," they propose vague solutions which are remarkably akin to Dewey's logic.

The Invasion of Revisionism

All the varieties of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union fasten on different texts of Marx, Engels, and Lenin for their support. The scientific realists make their appeal to Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.* Neo-dialecticians prefer to quote from Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks.* The positivist-inclined cite from *Anti-Dühring* the passages where Engels speaks of the replacement of philosophy by science. The historicists quote the second Preface to Marx's *Capital,* whereas the anti-historicists cite Marx's letter to Mikhailovsky and Engels' letters on historical materialism. The pragmatists like to recite Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach.* The existentialists quote from the *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts.* When will the revolt against canonical texts begin?

The younger sociologists have as quietly as possible discarded the dialectical methodology. According to Marx, there were no universal laws of social science; each social system had its specific sociological laws, but a law common to diverse social systems was out of the question. The

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Soviet sociologists, under the pressure of their actual researches, have found themselves obliged to drop this dialectical outlook. Professor Kharchev at Leningrad, for instance, found that one-fourth of the married couples were living under "abnormal housing conditions." This was a situation, he argued, common to all industrial countries; France, for example, with its "hotel families" was in a similar position. I observed that he was engaged in a revisionist enterprise, for according to the dialectical standpoint there should be a capitalist law of population and a socialist law, but not one common to all industrial societies, socialist or capitalist. Professor Kharchev, of course, denied that he was a revisionist; it would be revisionism, he said, to assert that history knows no progress, or to deny that existence determines consciousness, but it was not revisionist to ascertain a general law by means of concrete researches. Thus the dialectical method is being revised out of existence by Soviet methodologists, even as they continue to profess their unswerving loyalty. Similarly, in Moscow, one investigator has found a decline in the average size of the urban family which evidently brings it even lower than the comparable American figure. At any rate, he supports the view that a general pattern with similar birth control practices is emerging in all industrial countries, socialist as well as capitalist. But what then of Marx's attack on the Malthusian notions as arising from specific capitalist conditions? To their great good fortune, the young Soviet demographers have managed to find a canonical text, a letter of Engels to Kautsky in 1881, which acknowledges that even communist society may find itself "obliged to regulate the production of human beings," and "to achieve by planning a result which has already been produced spontaneously, without planning, in France and Lower Austria."[1] They are thus in a position to argue that a universal law and pattern of population common to both socialist and capitalist countries does not contravene their philosophy. Thereby the long paragraph on the dialectical method in Marx's second Preface to *Capital* is rescinded.

The official conception of philosophy as ideology makes it difficult for the ideologists to understand the nature of American philosophy and society. They project the Soviet model on American thought, and regard American philosophy as a kind of official ideology akin to their own. I encountered this projection many times. For instance, when I lectured on "Contemporary American Thought," one questioner asked me about the influence of such Catholic philosophical journals as the *American Ecclesiastical Review, New Scholasticism,* and *Thought.* When I replied

[1] *Cf. Marx and Engels on Malthus* (London, 1953), pp. 108–109.

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that their influence was small, he was extremely skeptical, and said that after all President Kennedy was a Catholic, and that consequently, the importance of Catholic ideology must have increased. I assured him that despite President Kennedy's election, I did not know a single colleague who read the periodicals he had named, that the fact that the President was a Catholic had in no way affected philosophical teaching in the United States, and that, if anything, I felt that Kennedy's election had strengthened the liberal rather than the ideological side of Catholicism. The questioner was puzzled. In the Soviet Union, the philosophical views of the head of the government do become those of the universities, and he found it hard to conceive that the religion of the American President was not reflected in the American universities.

The primary task of Soviet philosophers, in the government's eyes, is to serve as officers of ideological warfare against the West and against "ideological coexistence." The Institute of Philosophy should be renamed more accurately the Institute of Ideological Warfare. The Section on Bourgeois Philosophy and Sociology, for instance, instructs each research worker to prepare an authoritative refutation of some bourgeois representative; such "ideologettes" are in preparation against Husserl, Hartmann, Santayana, the German realists, Whitehead, personalism, French Positivism, German neo-Thomism, and Reinhold Niebuhr.

This conception of philosophy as ideological warfare enforces on its practitioners a spirit which we might call *"protivism."* The word "protiv" means "against"; it is the most characteristic word in Soviet philosophical essays. They are "protiv" existentialism, "protiv" pragmatism, "protiv" realism, "protiv" abstractionism, "protiv" whatever emanates from the bourgeois world. Whether it's a biography of Marx, a treatise on Buddhism, or an analysis of American culture, somewhere the Soviet ideologist is called upon by the Institute head, or his section chief, or the party group, or the magazine editors, to sound the keynote of protivism which alone shows that the given work is helping to fulfill the role assigned to philosophy in the seven-year plan.

This protivism ramifies throughout Soviet ideology in manifold ways —choice of titles of books, choice of subjects, choice of arguments. A young scholar told me of the book he is writing on the emergent evolutionists; he would like to call it, he said wistfully, *Man and Movement,* but its title will be *English and American Philosophy in the Epoch of Imperialism.* Another scholar who has turned from contemporary philosophy to ancient Asian thought in order to escape ideological pressures told me he would probably have to compromise by studying the philosophy of Nehru. I encountered an amusing instance of protivism in the

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person of Professor Sokolov of Moscow State University. He had reviewed my book on Spinoza recently in *Voprosy Filosofii* on the whole favorably, while regretting my lapses into "Freudo-positivism." I mentioned to him that I had sent a copy of my book to Premier Ben-Gurion of Israel who had then responded with a friendly appreciative letter. Professor Sokolov was incredulous: "But how can that be?" he said. "Your book is against *(protiv)* the Judaistical interpretation of Spinoza. How could Ben-Gurion have written you a friendly letter?" I replied that Ben-Gurion was keenly interested in Spinoza's philosophy, and that I believed he would appreciate my study for whatever scholarly merit it might have. But Professor Sokolov remained adamant. The logic of protivism dictated that the Israeli Premier should have taken a stand against my book; my friendly philosophical correspondence with him violated the "laws" of ideological warfare.

The language of protivism, militant, hortatory, embattled, finally becomes a meaningless literary convention. I met a smiling young author who presented me with a passionate pamphlet "protiv" Sidney Hook. I looked at the author and looked at the pages, and decided one was alienated from the other. He was a protivist only when engaged in the ceremonial ritualistic exorcism of some name which was not really a name but an intimation of an unreal bourgeois ghost.

The Soviet bureaucratic ideologists, moreover, evaluate their participation in international philosophical and sociological meetings in strict protivist terms. One day I asked an Institute official which Soviet philosophers were going to attend the forthcoming International Philosophical Congress in Mexico. No Soviet philosopher, of course, can decide simply on his own; he has to be chosen by the Academy of Sciences, and only after having been thus chosen is he allowed to receive the customary invitation and announcement which individual scholars receive, as a matter of course, all over the world. I said I hoped the Academy would send some of the young philosophers who were really interested in discussion with Western and Asian scholars, and whose own thinking was alive. I hoped they would not send a delegation dominated by some of those familiar official figures who had already made their appearance at the International Sociological Congress. The official replied with simple, straightforward bureaucratism, "You are wrong," he said. "Our delegation must be made up of men who can make decisions. Perhaps we can have some young philosophers accompany them, but above all we need experienced men who can make decisions." I said that no decisions were made at an international philosophical conference. The Soviet Academy, however, regards such congresses as international

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ideological skirmishes in which tactical decisions have to be made on the spot. Theirs is a "delegation," not a group of individual scholars who have decided entirely on their own to attend and who speak for themselves only. The Soviet delegation is organized hierarchically with a chain of command. It holds meetings at which tactics are determined. It is all thoroughly protivist, but the consequence is that the abler Soviet thinkers remain at home while the bureaucrats make jaunts abroad.

Search for Intellectual Freedom

The restless searching for a new philosophy manifests itself in the purely voluntary students' discussion groups which have come into existence in the universities. There is a tacit understanding within them that their discussions are sincere and private, and not to be repeated to the authorities. I got to know one such group, and found in it a curious mixture of political idealism and technocratic views, and a yearning for more intellectual freedom. The circle was composed of about twelve young instructors and graduate students. We began one evening with a discussion of the theory that the intellectuals were the ruling class in the Soviet Union. "That is not true," said one of them; "if you examine the lists of directorships of big enterprises and leading positions, you will find that most of them are held by uneducated men. The machine-bureaucrats rule, not the intellectuals." Another continued in the same vein: "I think the intellectuals should rule. I believe in technocracy. What is scientific is moral, and what is moral is scientific. Not the voting of the uneducated and ignorant, but the rule of the scientists, that is the best." Another man, however, disagreed. Although a scientist himself, he said he remained a communist, that it was a question of liberalizing the system—allowing foreign papers, journals and statistics to circulate so they could make meaningful comparisons.

They wanted to know all about the American beatniks, with whose anti-organization and anti-establishment attitudes some of them clearly felt a kinship. They were much interested in hearing also about the all-night vigil in Berkeley after the Soviet resumption of nuclear bomb testing, and about the proliferation of student magazines. Their longing for a single free students' magazine in the Soviet Union was patent. Their ignorance of the details of international political debate was astonishing. What impressed me most was how even in such an intelligent circle the capacity for thinking in terms of political alternatives and concrete reforms has been almost extinguished. The organs of independent political reasoning have atrophied in the Soviet Union from compulsory disuse. It struck me that the most significant practicable reform in the

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Soviet Union today would be a simple one—to begin the publication in the newspapers of the differences of opinion in the Central Committee, or to start the regular publication of a *Central Committee Record* like our *Congressional Record.* Then the habit of political discussion might re-awaken among the Soviet people, and they would begin to emerge more fully from their Stalinist torpor.

The younger generation of Soviet thinkers asks above all for a final reckoning with the ethical and sociological problems of the "cult of personality." They do not share the guilt which haunts the older generation, almost universally involved in different degrees in Stalin's guilt. The older men wish to repress the problem; the younger generation observes their evasions; it is around this problem that the future of Soviet thought will be determined. A successful outcome will mean a Renaissance of Soviet Thought, as the burden of guilt is lifted from people's minds. A defeat will mean the repartition of guilt among the younger people, and another Time of Torpor.

The problem of the "cult of personality" virtually haunts Soviet social science and philosophy; the cost of its repression is the destruction of their sincerity. I asked almost all the 150 scholars I interviewed whether he or she was in any way concerned with the sociological and philosophical problems arising from the "cult" phenomena. The most frequent answer I got was "that is not my problem." A young member of the editorial board of *Voprosy Filosofii,* for instance, knows all about alienation in bourgeois society, and can discourse at length on how Jaspers and Freud show the bankruptcy of their society, but when I asked him for his explanation of the Stalinist era he took refuge in: "I am not a specialist in this field." A lecturer at the Institute for International Relations pursues his labors by reading the critiques of America by Americans, and rewriting them in the clichés of the decline of capitalist society. He too is facile in depicting the common man's alienation in Western society, but when asked about the Stalinist era and present-day alienation he will just pass the former over with an unctuous phrase of how regrettably bad it was, and then go on to a glib misdescription of an all-contented Soviet citizenry.

Next to taking refuge in one's specialty, the most frequent answer I got was that the explanation for the cult of personality was well-known, inasmuch as it was based on Stalin's mistakes. How often I heard that self-exonerating phrase about the *oshibki* of Stalin. What is a "mistake," an *oshibka?* A child does an arithmetical problem for homework; it makes a *mistake.* The child wanted to solve the problem, but its skill with numbers was inadequate. Or a child makes a mistake in its spell-

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ing. The person who makes a mistake is always credited with motives that are sound; a mistake is a reminder of human fallibility; it does not proceed from vicious motive. Thus, the very use of *oshibka* implies that Stalin was trying to do the right thing. Its use is part of the continuing repression in the Soviet Union of the facts of Stalinism. One Soviet sociologist in Tbilisi said that when something unpleasant has occurred, we prefer to avoid speaking about it; that was why they avoided discussing the causes of Stalinism. I replied that in America the depression was unpleasant, but that we analyzed and discussed its causes. The point, of course, is that a terrible guilt is felt about Stalinism; large numbers were involved in its operations, and that is why the phenomenon is repressed by making Stalin the bearer of all that was rotten in themselves, and mitigating it all with the mild, de-emotionalized word, *oshibki*. No American felt guilty for the advent of the depression; therefore no one feared the analysis of its causes. The continuing use of *oshibki* as an explanation for a whole era's distortions is a sign that the mentality of that era persists. For there is a callousness in equating the millions of destroyed lives with a child's spelling mistakes through the use of the same word.

Soviet philosophers and sociologists are vaguely apprehensive that there are problems whose honest study might shake the foundations of their theoretical structure. For the "cult" confronts Soviet ideology with what we might call its "Great Contradiction." On the one hand, the Soviet ideologist can remain loyal to historical materialism, and explain the Stalinist superstructure in terms of the underlying economic foundation; in that case, he finds himself a critic of the Soviet social system. Or, on the other hand, he can attribute the "cult" phenomena to the effects of Stalin's paranoid personality, his persecution complex, his fears, his irrationality. In that case he would have to have recourse to psychoanalytical concepts; he would find himself becoming a Freudian despite himself, and raising such problems, furthermore, as the factors which made the Communist Party so sado-masochist in its psychology that it collaborated in and glorified Stalin's rule during all that time. All sorts of intermediary theoretical positions are possible, but every intermediary position would involve an admixture of an acceptance of the totalitarian potentialities of the Soviet system and the crucial role of unconscious, irrational, "Freudian" factors in history.

Soviet ideologists still shrink from the serious study of Freud. They say the study of "subjective" motives is futile. Once I asked whether the motives of intellectuals in the socialist movement were those ascribed to them by the *Communist Manifesto*. I was told this was an unsound

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approach "because on this level an antinomy arises between ethical and material motives. The problem has to be dealt with objectively," they said. "One must study the laws of development which determine the shift of intellectuals without reference to their subjective motives which they think determine them." This repression of the "subjective" is probably the most basic reason for the antagonism to Freud in the Soviet Union. Psychoanalytical ideas are suspect because the Soviet regime wants people to accept all its propaganda on the manifest level, and never to enquire into latent meanings. Psychoanalysis threatens the "official face" with the underlying "real face."

A Last Report—and Recommendations

My last talk at the Institute of Philosophy brought forth an outburst of populist bureaucratic denunciation on the part of the Director. I was asked, now that my travels in the Soviet Union were over, to give a last report on my impressions of their philosophy and sociology, and had been reluctant to do so. I explained to the Institute official that were I to speak, much that I would have to say would be unpleasant, and that perhaps it would be better if such a last report were omitted. He said they regarded me as a friend, and that the Institute had had such talks in the past from visiting Americans, whom he named. The names in question, however, were with one exception those of American communists or fellow-travellers, who, I suggested, had probably told their hosts what the latter would like to hear; the exception, a professor of sociology, had been in the country too short a time to have learned very much of what was going on. The official insisted, however, that it would be a worthwhile occasion especially for the audience which, he said, would be made up of the young researchers with whom I had had individual discussions several times. On the day in question, however, although the younger researchers were present, the discussion was monopolized by older ideologists, who had rarely participated in our previous meetings.

So the meeting began. Soviet thought, I said, was at the crossroads; its mood was best described in Turgenev's title, *On the Eve*. I proposed to raise problems to which I did not know the answer, and which I did not know how I would face were I in their place. But I had talked with scholars and students in institutes and universities in a series of "interview-dialogues," the oldest philosophical method in the world. I would compare their sociological studies with work in America.

Soviet social science seemed to me to have failed to confront four important problems: First, there was no research on the conflict of gen-

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erations. In America we had several studies under way on student movements. In the Soviet Union it was denied that there was any conflict of generations. I had in the course of my travels, however, found ample evidence of such a conflict. At Leningrad University, at an open meeting of the Communist organization of the Philological Faculty, students had challenged and ridiculed the apology which the editor of *Neva* tried to present for the new party line against abstract art. There were recent occurrences at Moscow State University into which I would not enter. No Soviet sociologist, however, had shown any readiness to study the phenomena of conflict.

Second, I had found not a single article or book on anti-Semitism. They denied that there was anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union but I had visited the synagogues of four Soviet cities, and everywhere had been told that the Jews lived in fear. I could not tell how much anti-Semitism there was; this was a subject for detailed investigation. But questions such as why there had been a recrudescence of anti-Semitism would have to be dealt with scientifically. In America, I added, where I believed there was much less anti-Semitism than in the Soviet Union, the problem was nonetheless studied extensively. At the University of California, several hundred thousand dollars were being spent in such an investigation. (The argument which followed, begun by the chairman calling me "an agent of the cold war," would take too long to tell; and there were several more heated interludes.)

I then spoke of the lack of any sociological article or book analyzing the "cult of personality." I said that in America we devoted much time to the sociology of political leadership. In the Soviet Union, however, although they evidently knew all about racial problems in Birmingham and imperialism in Asia and Africa, they could produce no scientific study of the most important recent phenomenon of political sociology in their own country. I said I didn't mean by a scientific analysis their repeating Khrushchev's phrase about the mistakes *(oshibki)* of Stalin. I could read those speeches too. I meant a sociological analysis: How many victims had there been, year by year? From what social classes had they come? What varieties of accusations had there been? Who were the accusers? How did the accusers profit by the accusations? I said they should study, too, what happened to the children of the people who were sent to Stalin's camps. When millions of people had been killed and tortured, it was not sociological analysis to refer to it as *"oshibki."* I had asked upwards of 150 sociologists and philosophers whether any one of them was studying the cult of personality, and without exception they had all replied: "That is not my problem." I had been told that

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historians at the Marxism-Leninism Institute were preparing the publication of the documents on the "cult" period; I had gone to the Institute to confirm this report, and spoken with its secretary. He told me emphatically they have no plans whatsoever for such a publication. I said Marx would never have concealed such documents.

I tried next to consider the sociological study of Soviet mass culture. I said that though they criticized American culture, they did not study their own culture as the Americans did theirs. There was no study extant of the appeal, for instance, of American jazz to their youth. (Someone interrupted and said they have had other things to do.) I continued and said they had not studied the social consequences of tying their moral education to historical models—Lenin's picture as a hunter in a rifle-shop, Lenin playing chess for the chess club, Lenin with children telling them: "study, study, and study"—and present Marx's character as the model for family life. Questioned, I replied that the letters of Eleanor Marx, the daughter who had killed herself, showed there was a deep-seated unhappiness in the family, and that one factor had probably been the birth of an illegitimate son to Marx by the maid of the household, Helene Demuth. I said that on my way to Moscow I had visited the International Institute of Social History to confirm the existence of documentary evidence on this matter, and had been informed the evidence was incontrovertible. The chairman was quite interested, and one of his colleagues then piped up: "That accords with Marx's saying *'Nihil humani a me alienum puto'*." The only Marxian joke I ever heard at the Institute.

Many of those present had to leave at this time for a candidate's examination. The chairman proposed another meeting but I said I was leaving shortly, and would summarize briefly what I had to say concerning their philosophical work. I discussed my characterization of their philosophical attitude as "protivism," and the development of "Soviet existentialism." I spoke of the interest in Freud, despite the great difficulty in securing his books. Then I went on to develop my "law of the spectrum," the emergence of diverse philosophies in the Soviet Union, with critical realists in the Russell fashion, positivists, mathematical logicians opposed to the dialecticians, and those who emphasized "practice" indistinguishable from American pragmatists. Heads were shaken in vigorous disagreement. Finally, I said that if I had a "last message," it was that Soviet thought now needed someone who would do for it what John Stuart Mill did for England and Ralph Waldo Emerson for America—to emphasize not "class," not "people," but the importance of the individual.

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NOTEBOOK

Alfred Rosmer (1877-1964)

On May 6 died in Paris in his 87th year Alfred Rosmer, a revolutionary of irreproachable character. He was not well known to the present generation of radicals, but to those who lived through the events of the First World War and of the '20s and '30s he was an impressive example of integrity and independence. Active in the pre-1914 anarcho-syndicalist movement, one of the few radicals who resisted the chauvinism that overwhelmed the French left in 1914, and who helped to found the 3rd International, he resigned as editor of *L'Humanité* in 1924 and broke with the Communist party in protest against the bureaucratic turn of the movement. He remained loyal to his socialist convictions and continued to write as a thoughtful observer of world politics and critic of the left. Rosmer was an editor of the *Vie Ouvrière* (1910–1921) and later of the *Révolution Prolétarienne* (1925–1964), the organ of the old syndicalist militants who had become á dissident communist group. Among his writings are a carefully documented two-volume history of the French working-class and its organizations during the First World War *(Le Mouvement Ouvrier Pendant la Guerre,* 1936, 1959) and *Moscou sous Lénine* (1953), with a preface by Albert Camus—Rosmer's memories of the fateful years 1920–1924 in Russia and his experiences in the Comintern of which he had been a member of the Executive in 1920–1921; it is an important testimony by a pure-hearted man, free from ambition and sectarian zeal. In 1937 he came to America as a member of the Commission to Investigate the Moscow Trials and was an editor of its reports. After his stay in Mexico, he lived in this country until the end of the war. As a close friend of Leon Trotsky since the days of their collaboration on *Nasha Slovo* in Paris during the First War, he wrote considerable prefaces and supplements for the French editions of several of Trotsky's books.

Rosmer's life was bound to his cause from the beginning. He was born Alfred Griot in Patterson, New Jersey, the son of a French worker exiled as a result of the Commune. The family returned to France in the 1880s. Very early he was drawn to revolutionary syndicalism and for many years was a journalist for the labor press in England and France. His wife, Marguerite, was a devoted comrade in anti-war and relief work. Those who knew them will remember the warmth and good sense, the cordiality and selfless dedication of this noble couple, living in idyllic peace in a remodelled barn in a village near Paris, alert to all that concerned the well-being and future of the working-class throughout the

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world, and undiscouraged by the bitter experience of the last twenty-five years.

Rosmer was a model figure of a working-class revolutionary. His long life was spent in his chosen milieu of radical action and thought, without his seeking a personal success through office, recognition, or financial rewards. In his later years he earned a meager living as a proofreader for a Paris publisher. He was uncompromising, but gentle and modest, and charming in conversation, with a vein of irony. He had a strong interest in literature and history and enjoyed nature deeply. While in this country he contributed to an art magazine an essay on the painter Henri Rousseau, based on his own frequentation of art circles in Paris in the late 1890s. He was engaged also in a study of Walt Whitman. In his writing he showed a scruple and lucidity of statement that are in the best tradition of French culture.

MEYER SCHAPIRO

Hal Draper

The Fabian and the African

or

How Sidney Webb Became Lord Passfield and Johnstone Kenyatta Became Jomo

Almost everyone knows that Sidney Webb's Fabianism was, if nothing else, practical, constructive, and hardheaded, unlike the revolutionary extremists he held in sovereign contempt. Now there is no better opportunity to be practical, constructive, and hardheaded than as a cabinet minister. In fact, one of the main aims of the Fabian Society was to ensure that socialists would know exactly what to do when they took over the government.

In 1929 the Labor party did take over the government, and Sidney Webb entered the cabinet as Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs. For technical constitutional reasons he had to be raised to the peerage before taking office, becoming Lord Passfield.

It is rather strange that nothing of any importance has ever been written on this decisive test of Mr. Fabian himself—until the recent appearance of an unheralded monograph by Robert G. Gregory, *Sidney Webb and East Africa*.[1] Now we have an examination in depth of Webb's activity as colonial secretary, concentrating on the main problem (outside Palestine) that faced him: Kenya. The picture that emerges, often despite Gregory, gives a fascinating insight into the underlying nature of Fabianism, that is, of the purest variety of socialist reformism ever developed in the history of socialist

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thought. One aspect of this picture is fairly well known: Webb's almost unquestioning pro-imperialism; but this is not the side we are interested in here.[2] It is something else.

When Webb took office, the British policy of White Supremacy in Africa had already gone under various pseudonyms: the Dual Policy, or Multi-Racial Partnership, or Equal Rights à la Cecil Rhodes. Another such term was Native Paramountcy. This Orwellian synonym for White Supremacy was invented under the 1923 Tory government when the Duke of Devonshire was colonial secretary. It was an admonition that "the interests of the African natives must be paramount" in the minds of the white masters, i.e., a rewording of the tired slogan of the White Man's Burden.

After a year in office Webb issued two White Papers on East Africa, in one of which he revived the 1923 term and ordered that "the doctrine of native paramountcy" be applied "without delay." The doctrine was defined by explicitly approving the 1923 formulation of the good duke, together with some additional benevolent banalities. Webb's document insisted on the continuity of imperial policy since 1923 and fully accepted the White Paper of 1927, which had been a fairly plain statement of the "Dual Policy" brand of White Supremacy. This insistence on continuity in policy was implemented by Webb's definition of "right to equal treatment" of races as "right to equal treatment *in accord with their several needs.*"

Let us get out of the way, first, any suspicion that Webb expected any new policy to be applied with or without delay. The Kenya government was *de facto* the governor alone, Sir Edward Grigg (later Lord Altrincham). Grigg had a long public record as a virulent White Supremacy imperialist, the kind who could openly say in his opening address as governor: "The base on which the whole pyramid of our civilization in this Colony is reared is native labor," and extol the "white man's burden." He was an admirer of Mussolini and liked to address his public dressed in similar black-and-tan military attire. Just before Webb came in, Grigg had been scheming with Tory officials in Britain to put across a program dear to the white settlers, one not only more ruthless toward the Africans but aimed at loosening even London's reins on their power. (We have here blood-brothers of the French Algerian *colons,* the ultras of Kenya.)

Now the new colonial secretary was not stuck with Grigg, who was going to retire shortly. On the contrary: "Webb, favorably impressed with Grigg and desirous of minimizing change during the transition in governments, persuaded the Governor to accept an additional year of office."

This may be deemed merely an error in judgment by our hardheaded statesman, especially by change-minimizers. After all, it is the legitimate duty of a gradualist to be gradual, and he might fear lest the shock of replacing a fascist-minded ultra with a less virulent type be too much for the social fabric to bear all at once. But this was not all. Grigg openly and stridently opposed and sabotaged Webb's orders. For example, Webb, who was a benevolent man, wanted an African leader released from jail.

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Grigg refused. In long diatribes he denounced not only his minister Webb but the government party. "Such criticism by a governor of his Secretary of State was so extraordinary that the officials [in the Colonial Office] were perplexed as to how to word the reply." Webb did nothing; did not even censure, let alone recall Grigg.

Then there was the episode of the Joint Committee of 1931.

Webb's White Papers on East Africa were unacceptable to the settlers (and Tories) for two reasons. First of all, Webb advocated stricter control from London than the settlers aimed to achieve. Second, the latter objected to the "benevolent" part of Webb's benevolent colonialism: security of land tenure for Africans, not quite so exploitative a taxation schedule, better education, housing, etc. Modest enough, but the whites were in no humanitarian mood. In addition, they were often political reactionaries on principle and were not loth to use any handle against the "socialist government" in office.

Therefore there had to be a fight, and the battleground chosen by Webb himself was the device of a Joint Committee of Parliament. Since he and his government would name the members, this would seem to be a safe move; a hardheaded man would know what to do.

First of all, the government decided that the Committee would consist of 20 members drawn equally from both Houses and from the two leading parties. Fair and square, except for one inconvenience: this meant the appointment of five Labor members of the Lords, and outside of Webb himself *there existed only three.* The scheme therefore handed the Tories a free-and-clear majority of 12 to 8, gratis. Secondly, the chairman naturally had to be either a Laborite or a Tory. It might seem that a Labor government would have no hesitation in doing what a Tory government would have done by reflex: taken the chairmanship for its own man. "But," writes Gregory, "Webb paid too much heed to the opinion of others that the chairman should be a disinterested person. The *Times,* for example, had devoted an editorial to this plea."

Did then Webb appoint a "disinterested person"? He did not. The chairmanship went to a "strong Conservative," and when he died, to another strong Conservative. The rigging was complete.

The Tory majority had no reluctance to use its control, all the more since it obviously had nothing to fear from Webb. "That the Committee was biased is evident in the record," says Gregory. Webb never uttered a complaint or reproach; but then it is not certain what he would have recognized as bias. For example, in the list of witnesses gotten up by Webb, not a single African was included. "Only because organizations such as the Anti-Slavery Society protested did Webb and the Committee correct this oversight [*sic*]." When ultimately three African witnesses from each of the three East African territories did appear before the Committee, they were heard only cursorily and *pro forma:* "Obviously, they were summoned, not because they could furnish important information, but because without them the committee could not claim that it had heard the opinions of all communities."

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Of course, no African suspected of an independent attitude was permitted to appear; Webb saw to that.

> When Africans in Kenya heard that they were to be represented on the committee, the Kikiyu Central Association requested that it be authorized to proceed with the election of the Kikiyu delegates. The local government flatly refused; and . . . the association at its own expense finally sent its president, Johnstone Kenyatta, and a Kikiyu teacher, Parmenas Mockerie, to appear before the committee. The two were well educated and could speak English fluently. But when they arrived in London, even though examination of witnesses was to continue for many weeks, they were notified that they had arrived too late. . . . As a last resort, they submitted to the committee a written exposition of their grievances. To their consternation, however, the memorandum was not published as part of the written evidence.

Gregory is moved to comment that this showed "the existence of Kikiyu grievances was scarcely acknowledged by the British government," i.e., the Laborites. One can be sure that the man who called himself Johnstone Kenyatta thought so too.

Not only the African independents were excluded. The prominent Labor men interested in African affairs whom Gregory labels the "humanitarians"—Josiah Wedgwood, Leonard Woolf, Julian Huxley, Norman Leys, W. M. Ross—were regarded as too pro-African by Webb and likewise kept out. Five other "humanitarians" did get before the Committee, but "most witnesses expressed the settlers' viewpoint," says Gregory. Naturally the conclusions in the Committee's report went to the Right; essentially the "Dual Policy" was endorsed with an obeisance to the term "native paramountcy." Webb never expressed any objection to the report. More outlandish still, he did not think there was anything objectionable about it.

The consequences of Labor's failure to make even a gesture in the direction of African interests may well have been decisive for the direction taken by Africa:

> The report of the Joint Committee . . . was the final act in a drama of intense controversy that had held the attention of British, African and Indian audiences for a decade. Discouraged by failure and confused by the many definitions of policy, humanitarians ceased to campaign for a change in East Africa. After the disgraceful collapse of their second government, Labor abandoned a radical approach to reform in imperial as well as domestic affairs. For many years the Labor Party avoided all reference to native paramountcy. In 1949, during the third Labor government, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, the Earl of Listowel, assured Conservatives in the House of Lords that the doctrine was no longer the official policy in East Africa.

What Webb established for the Africans was that none of the whites, not even the white "socialists," was willing to concede self-government; they would have to conquer it themselves.

> Convinced that their trust in the British government was betrayed, many Africans in subsequent years sought other means to redress their grievances. The logical alternative was subterfuge; and the causes of Mau Mau . . . can be traced to the fluctuations in British colonial policy between 1923 and 1931.

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It was after this that the man called Johnstone Kenyatta changed his name to Jomo Kenyatta, and, as secretary of the Kikiyu Central Association, set about "to rouse the African community into mass protest against the the white man's civilization."

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Why?

It is an extraordinarily *extreme* picture, this account of Webb's fatuous futility as colonial secretary. As mentioned, it is easy to explain it all by Webb's imperialist-mindedness, but while this is a fact, it does not get to the bottom of the episode. A deeper level of motivation—and incidentally a farther insight into Fabianism—is suggested from another direction.

To begin with, Gregory insists justly that Webb's policy cannot be blamed on "bad advisers"; the responsibility was his.

There was, indeed, a party Advisory Committee on International Questions which concerned itself closely with East Africa, but

> Ironically, it exerted less influence when Labor controlled the government than when Labor was in opposition . . . because of Webb's attitude and an ill-defined party constitution, it had no direct connection with the administration. It could not even persuade the Secretary of State to attend its meetings.

Leonard Woolf thought Webb was being misled by Grigg, but this was untrue, says Gregory:

> Through the years, as an opponent of Marxist revolution, Webb had directed the Labor Party toward socialism along a course in line with his own philosophy, "the inevitability of gradualness." In his opinion the advisory committee had fallen into the hands of militant radicals—Buxton, Woolf, Leys, Ross, and Wedgwood.

Perhaps needless to say, none of these men was a left-wing socialist, let alone a Marxist or a revolutionary. They were merely relatively militant in advocating redress of African grievances. After a first meeting Webb decided that Ross was "very fanatical." As we have seen, he did not even permit his party "advisers" to testify before the Joint Committee.

He certainly did not want any advice from Africans themselves. When Kenyatta and Mockerie came to London at considerable expense to present their views in person to the white-sahib Colonial Secretary, they were granted an audience only with the Permanent Under-Secretary "and their conversation with him was disappointing."

Whom, then, *did* Webb rely on, if we count out Tories, Laborites and Africans?

> While Webb held office, he was accused of being the tool of his civil servants. "But that is inevitable," explained Beatrice, who was aware of this criticism. "By temperament and training Sidney belongs to the Civil Service." Webb also was attracted to his permanent officials because they were neither reactionary, as he thought preceding Secretaries of State had been, nor radical, like some within his own party.

To be sure, Gregory rightly insists that Webb was not the "tool" of his civil servants, but "These men made suggestions, of course, and their recommendations usually were accepted without question; and they drafted the letters that he sent to Grigg and also his main statements of policy."

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Drummond Shiels, his under-secretary in the Colonial Office, wrote in *The Webbs and Their Work:*

> It has been asserted that he was dominated by his Civil Servants. This is not accurate, though the effect of the real position may seem to have been somewhat similar. He had spent the first ten years of his career in the Colonial Office and during these impressionable years, he, no doubt, got into a civil service way of looking at things. . . . Another influence which affected him was his great respect for the individual whom he believed to be an expert. . . . He regarded as experts most, if not all, of the senior men in the Colonial Office and was, perhaps, inclined to accept their judgments without always applying the same critical examination which he gave to other matters.

Beatrice Webb wondered, in her diary, what the Colonial Office staff thought of Sidney:

> A super-civil servant added to the C.O. staff? His main activity is to pick the brains of all and sundry, selecting from or harmonising conflicting or divergent policies. Not quite all and sundry, by the way! His would-be visitors are censored. "Not desirable that you should see Philby; he has been most troublesome to the office fomenting discontent over there," said his official adviser. And S. did *not* see him. "Why not meet him casually in the Fabian office?" said I, on behalf of the rebel, who happens to be a Fabian approved by Galton. "Perhaps," replied Sidney, doubtfully. (Oct. 2. He did.)

That is a lovely picture painted by Beatrice: the Fabian minister refusing to see a fellow Fabian because his civil-service expert informs him the fellow is a troublemaker . . . Essentially Beatrice shared the faith in the permanent government bureaucracy: she had meditated in her diary a few years before that the "civil servants—a fine body of men—[are] I think the most upright and intelligent class in the community."

Gregory's remark that Webb viewed the permanent officialdom as being neither reactionary nor radical hits the mark. They were not reactionary: that is, they did not (most of them) act as mouthpieces of the white settlers against London. They were not radical: that is, they did not get "fanatical" about African interests. As permanent bureaucrats their concern was maximizing the interests of the State. But what were the interests of the State? These could hardly be viewed except within the framework of white supremacy in Africa, even though the white settlers also had to be kept under control by London. Some day, of course (said the doctrine of the Inevitability of Gradualness), the Africans would have more freedom, but for today what was inevitable was white supremacy. Webb settled comfortably into the groove as first among the servants of the State.

The interests of the State also demanded no rude shocks to its stability or prestige among the Lesser Breeds. "The most disappointing of Webb's actions," says Gregory, "was his stand before the Joint Committee," because he took his stand on the parliamentary myth of "continuity of policy." According to this pretense, the policy of His Majesty's Government had remained unchanged throughout the various White Papers. Before Webb, this "continuity" was also the Tory tradition.

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What was the general reason for the myth, and why did Webb fall in with this pattern of apparent parliamentary cretinism? One powerful motivation was the maintenance of the united front of the white sahibs before native eyes. The whites must not seem to split among themselves because this emboldens the natives to make trouble. If the white masters admit that they sometimes *change* policy, the natives too may get the idea that the policy can be changed . . . by other means.

Dr. Norman Leys, the Laborite "humanitarian," wrote after the Labor government's debacle that the Laborites "allowed themselves to be misunderstood. All over East Africa the news has gone that the Labor Government has recanted." Was it a misunderstanding? Suppose that the Fabian colonial secretary had pushed ahead with a militant "pro-African" policy and had gotten defeated on it; the news "all over East Africa" would have been that there was a deep split between the central government of the white masters in London and the local power of the white settlers. The consequence would have been an earlier spur to African unrest.

The Fabian super-civil servant dreaded this as much as the Duke of Devonshire. Webb yielded to Tory outcries and white settlers' pressure not because he was convinced by their arguments nor because he was a coward, but because he was afraid of the same danger they were afraid of, i.e., stimulating the Africans to take matters into their own hands. Webb differed from the reactionaries wholeheartedly in wishing to control the subject races benevolently, but he did not differ in fearing their tendencies toward self-emancipation. He wanted no more inconvenience from below than did the Kenya whites.

The interests of the State were paramount because this State was itself, by the inevitability of gradualness, being transformed in the direction of collectivism. This transformation depended particularly on "the most intelligent class in the community," the enlightened bureaucracy, with whom Webb felt at one even as against Fabians. While it was in the happy process of being transformed from above, it could not tolerate any disturbances from below that might shake its equilibrium. Hence the rather venomous hostility toward the "extremists" Kenyatta and Mockerie, the "fanatics" Ross and Wedgwood, the "militant radicals" Woolf et al. This was the essence of Fabianism at work.

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Postscript:

It was precisely at this time, while the Labor cabinet was foundering and the colonial secretary was floundering, that Beatrice was discovering the fascinating vision of the Super-Civil-Service State in the totalitarian system under Stalin. By August 24, 1931 when the Labor government fell, she was well on the way. About two weeks before, Bernard Shaw, returned from Russia, had given his Fabian lecture in which he explained that the Russian regime was pure Fabianism, that Stalin "had given up 'workers' control' for the Webbs' conception," and that Stalinism was Webbism plus the new concept of a party-oligarchy. On September 10, Beatrice wrote in her diary: "Am I strong enough to go to Russia so as to give vividness to any line we

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take? . . . For without doubt we are on the side of Russia . . . " On January 4, 1932 she jotted down: "Will she [Russia] become the Mecca? If so it will be the British Fabians who will show the way: not the continental Marxists. A pilgrimage to the Mecca of the equalitarian state led by a few Fabians . . . will bring about the world's salvation! Well, well; it is an exhilarating, even an amusing prospect . . . " On May 17 she and Sidney drafted "our hypothetical conclusion prior to our tour," since they already knew what they were going to find in the promised land. In the course of their sojourn in Russia, Sidney would whisper, "See, see, it works, it works." On their return they devoted their remaining years to consummating a near-total marriage of Fabianism and Stalinism.

1 Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962. (Univ. of Calif. Publications in History, vol. 72.) All quotations not otherwise ascribed are from Gregory.

2 For this aspect of the Webbs and Fabianism, barely touched on by Gregory, see Bernard Semmel's *Imperialism and Social Reform* (Cambridge, 1960), chap. 6, esp. pp. 133, 140.

Boris Souvarine

Gorky, Censorship and the Jews

Lenin's death in 1924 produced in the Soviet Union a flood of apologies, memoirs and eulogies, no less sincere because their author had criticized Lenin on previous occasions. Among them was Gorky, who paid tribute to Lenin in many moving pages. These writings have been frequently republished since 1924; there even exists a French translation by Dumesnil de Gramont.[1] Gorky had a remarkable memory and was undoubtedly a first-rate story-teller. He relates several interesting conversations and quotes the following passage from Lenin *verbatim:*

"There are few intelligent people among us. We are, generally speaking, a gifted people, but intellectually lazy. An intelligent Russian is almost always a Jew or a man with Jewish blood."[2]

One may or may not agree with Lenin; it doesn't matter. It is Lenin who speaks and Gorky who quotes him —a Gorky who rallied to the regime he had so bitterly criticized. Both Lenin and Gorky are beyond suspicion to Marxist-Leninist purists; no one contests their places in the Communist Pantheon. Yet, if we consult Volume 17 of the 30-volume edition of Gorky's work published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Moscow 1948–56), we find

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that the last sentence of the passage quoted above has been omitted. The omission is hardly academic and certainly not scientific; nonetheless, it was repeated in the numerous republications of Gorky's *Works,* including the latest, in 18 volumes (1959–63).

Gorky's book on the Russian peasant contains, in addition to numerous condemnations of the acts of collective cruelty which tarnish the history of Russia, a particularly vehement passage on the pogroms.[3] But this passage is not to be found in the Academy edition of Gorky's *Works.* This time the entire passage has been censored by a decree from on high. Nor can it be found in any new edition, or anthology.

There are people who try to justify Soviet anti-Semitism by pretending that the Communist government has nothing to do with it and that the Soviet leaders are doing their best to uproot an evil deeply rooted in the popular mind. These are barefaced lies. Can any one seriously believe that the Soviet Academy of Sciences censored Gorky and Lenin in response to the wishes of the illiterate masses?

Nor did such things happen by accident or as exceptional cases. The late Léon Bernstein, an old Bundist, a very learned man and an expert on modern Russian political literature, wrote a comparative study on the publication of Gorky's works, alas left unfinished. Here are some of his findings.

Gorky's article on *The Black Hundred Pogromists* published as a pamphlet in Berne by the Commission to Aid Political Prisoners and republished in the Geneva Russian magazine *Novyi Koloss* (no date available) was omitted from the Academy edition of Gorky's *Works.* The pamphlet also contained a pro-Jewish piece by the Russian novelist Korolenko, *The Treason of Mariampol,* reprinted in the *Russkie Vedomosti* of August 30, 1916, but excluded, as if by accident, from its rightful place in Volume 10 of Korolenko's *Works* (Moscow, 1953).

Gorky's New York lecture *On the Jews,* read in the Grand Central Palace on April 25, 1906, and his letter *On Zionism,* published jointly as a pamphlet by *Pravda* in 1907, have also been eliminated from the 30-volume Academy edition.

Further omitted are Gorky's 30-page preface to *The Legend of Ahasverus, The Wandering Jew* (Petrograd, Grebin, 1919) and his famous article on the Kishinev pogrom, first published in the anthology *A Protest against Society* (Berlin, Hugo Steinitz, no date).

A report which Gorky presented on December 12, 1915 to the Russian Association of Studies of Jewish Life, published in *Letopis* magazine of January 1916, is also omitted from the Academy edition.

The anthology *Shchit (Shield),* compiled by Gorky, Leonid Andreyev and Fyodor Sologub (second edition, Moscow, Mamantov, 1916), included an untitled contribution by Gorky, which the Academy chose to omit for reasons it prefers not to disclose.

The Urchin, a short story by Gorky, also included in *Shchit,* was omitted from the Academy's 30-volume edition and the later 18-volume edition, just as it had been from the previous 23-volume edition (Moscow and Leningrad, Gosizdat, 1925–30). The same fate befell Gorky's article on Bialik, published in the magazine *Evreiskaya*

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Zhizn, number 14–15, 1916. Equally censored was another Gorky article *On the Kishinev Pogrom,* first published in the 1900's, *Osvobozhdeniye,* republished in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* and in many other magazines.

This list is far from exhaustive. Léon Bernstein, who died at an advanced age, was unable to complete his study. But there is no reason to doubt his estimate that the pages written by Gorky in defense of persecuted Jews and censored by the Soviet government and the Soviet Academy acting upon its orders, would fill a volume of some 200–300 pages.

I need hardly add that the articles on the Russian Revolution, which Gorky wrote in 1917–18 for the *Novaya Zhizn* magazine as long as it was allowed to be published, have also been censored in our time in the name of "science." They exist in a French translation by André Pierre *Écrite de Revolution* (Paris, Stock, 1922). But that is another story, and not a Jewish one.

And it hardly needs stressing that the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow could no more censor Gorky's works on its own initiative than the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences could publish on its own *Judaism Without Embellishment,* a pamphlet of Nazi inspiration and illustrated in Nazi style, which roused a brief flurry of indignation in the West. Both Academies are strictly controlled by the party's *apparat* which gives them orders and sees to it that they are properly carried out. Those who try to exonerate Khrushchev and Co., exhibit either ignorance or bad faith. The systematic censorship of Gorky's works by the Soviet authorities for more than a third of a century proves this abundantly.

The censorship is merely one little detail of the systematic policy of hostility to the small Jewish minority of the Soviet Union, matched by a foreign policy which goes out of its way to sell Soviet arms to Arab countries for use against Israel. But it is a detail that deserves full publicity.

Reprinted from *Preuves* and translated from the French by I. A. LANGNAS

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1 Maxime Gorky, *Lénine et Le Paysan Russe,* Paris, 1924, Editions du Sagittaire. Chez Simon Kra.

2 Maxime Gorky, *Vladimir Lénine,* Leningrad, 1924, p. 20.

3 Maxime Gorky, *O Russkom Krestianstvie (On the Russian Peasantry),* Berlin, J. P. Ladyzhnikov, 1922, p. 20.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Marshall Berman

Alienation, Community, Freedom*

In his attempt to define an organic "structure of feeling" in 19th century social thought, a structure capable of supporting the political Left and Right alike, Raymond Williams brings together much material that is of deepest interest to anyone who wants to rethink and refurbish socialist traditions. On the other hand, the very fact that he does bring such material together is a symptom of how dangerously vague and inchoate socialist traditions have become. In Williams' view, the conservative-reactionory Wordsworth and the radical-revolutionary Blake, while pulling politically in opposite directions, are enveloped in a deeper, cultural unity of focus and insight: it is "the perception of *alienation,* even as a social fact, [which] can lead either way...." But to assimilate the Blakean "structure of feeling" to the Wordsworthian, even in such a limited way, seems to me misleading. A little scrutiny will show two sharply distinct perceptions in operation here, rooted in profoundly different systems of values; the covering term "alienation" only covers up their fundamental alienation from one another.

Consider, first of all, the passages cited by Williams in which "alienation" is supposedly expressed by Blake. Blake is lamenting the absence from the world of creative energy, spontaneity, exuberance, sexual expression and sensual delight. These personal qualities are stifled by a social system shot through with political and religious, economic, and militaristic exploitation. What makes the city, London, so fearful a place is that it reveals the general exploitation ("the mind-forg'd manacles") in such a diversity and profusion of forms: a different mark on every man. But Blake never rejects urban life in itself; it is only incidental to his picture of the modern world, a world essentially defined by repression and exploitation. The city of today is a vast exhibition hall for the "arts of death"; yet its dark Satanic mills will provide the foundation for that new Jerusalem, to be built with all the "arts of life," in which Blake's visions and prophecies of liberation will be fulfilled.

If we examine Wordsworth's sense of alienation, as it is explicated by Williams from Book Seven of *The Prelude,* we will see how radically opposed to Blake's his perceptions are. Wordsworth is undertaking here to

* A discussion of Raymond Williams' essay "Prelude to Alienation" in DISSENT, Summer 1964.

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describe London—for him, the epitome of the modern world—and his first, "alienated" reaction to it. We will notice, however, that for all Wordsworth finds to deplore in the city, his vision is marked by none of the poverty, squalor, privation and slavery that Blake was so plagued by. (Granted, there is some vague generality about the city's "low pursuits"; and the brief entrance of a beggar, who, however, is explicitly labeled as a symbol for Man and the Universe.) Not that Wordsworth is being callous: his vision of London is not really marked by anything else either. What is most striking about his response to the city —in contrast to his perennial response to the country, to nature—is its lack of *concreteness*. The doors of his perception are closed tight to what is actually going on in *this* place at *this* moment in historic time. The alibi he offers—that in fact nothing *is* going on around him, that here there are only "trivial objects, melted and reduced/ To one identity"—only gives away the narrowness of his perception, the breakdown of his imagination. That he fails so dismally to grasp and evoke the contents of life in one particular city can be traced, I think, to his overriding and bitterly hostile preoccupation with the general *form* of urban life *as such*. What is it about this urban life that upsets him so? The city is a mad rush which, he feels, lays the "whole creative powers of man asleep." It is a wild conglomeration of "self-destroying transitory things" from which he seeks refuge in the "composure and ennobling Harmony" which the vision of rural nature can provide. As a primary symbol for citification and its discontents, Wordsworth uses the Fair of St. Bartholomew, which he describes ironically:

> The Wax-work, Clock-work, all the marvelous craft
> Of modern Merlins, wild Beasts, Puppet-shows,
> All out-o'-the-way, far-fetch'd, perverted things,
> All freaks of Nature, all Promethean thoughts
> Of Man.

In short, it is precisely those qualities which Blake saw as the noblest expressions of man's "Promethean" freedom and power, and with which he felt most deeply at home—energy, exuberance, diversity—which Wordsworth finds most alien in the city; he despises them as "freaks of Nature" and "perverted things" because they alienate him from the stable peace and cosmic harmony he so deeply craves. Thus Wordsworth's political and social authoritarianism is no accident: the structure of his feelings places him firmly within the metaphysical Party of Order.* He perceives, more clearly than Blake did, the elective affinities between the spirit of urban life and that dreadful freedom he hates and fears; that is why he is so anxious to escape it.

Williams does not recognize the conflict of values I have pointed out. Nevertheless, I would judge from his general tone, both here and in his

* And yet, as we can see in those great passages (mostly in *The Prelude*) where he evokes nature most powerfully and beautifully—his very conception of Order explodes the premises of any such Party. The order of Nature, as Wordsworth feels it, is inherently dynamic, infused with energy and exuberance, itself "Promethean." I hope to show in a more elaborate study how Wordsworth's politics actually betray his deepest poetic insight.

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previous works, that if forced to choose he would opt for Wordsworth against Blake, for the Country against the Town, for that tradition in English social thought which exalts and aims to recapture "a medieval unity and innocence." I am deeply disturbed by the structure of feeling that lies behind these preferences. Consider Williams' own response to the city, which —going beyond Wordsworth, who had his reservations (which Williams mentions, but does not take seriously enough to understand)—is not so much a description, let alone an evocation, as a conceit. Thus he ascribes to city life "a new kind of display of the self: no longer individuality of the kind that is socially sustained, but singularity—the extravagance of display within the public emptiness." Wordsworth's judgment is cited, in tones of approval:

> All the strife of singularity,
> Lies to the ear, and lies to every sense.

A man's life can evidently be "true," that is, personally authentic, only within the context of a *community*—a small, homogeneous, face-to-face society, necessarily rural, in which his identity is clearly "recognized" (to use Hegel's term) or (in Williams' own formulation) "socially sustained." Once this idyllic community is eclipsed, individuality becomes possible only as a desperate form of overcompensation, a defense against being totally engulfed, hence in some sense a fraud, a lie. I have a feeling Williams has been influenced in these persuasive formulations by the first part of Simmel's classic essay on "The Metropolis and Mental Life." I only wish, however, that he had been influenced by the second part of the essay as well, in which, after presenting the thesis above, Simmel brilliantly overwhelms it with its antithesis: that personality, insofar as it is "socially sustained" within a rural *Gemeinschaft,* is jammed into a stifling system of established roles, constricted and crushed into a stereotype; and that only by breaking the bonds of community, and floating freely in the fluid anonymity of urban life, can individuality find the room it needs to breathe and to grow. This latter possibility seems never even to cross Williams' mind—yet it is the fundamental principle of modern liberalism, a liberalism which socialism claims not to abolish but to fulfill.

Again, as the litany of urban alienations runs on, we are told that "it is not only the 'ballast of familiar life' [Wordsworth's phrase] that is lost, but also all that makes one's own self human and known: the acting, thinking and speaking of man at once himself and in society." Williams' language here is depressingly loose; but if his terms "human" and "himself" and "in society" are not tautologies, the only meaning I can wring out of them is *precisely* "the ballast of familiar life": the definition of oneself in terms of some role in the stable, static, perpetually "familiar" community. In an urban milieu, this possibility indeed tends to get lost (though not at all as fast, or as inexorably, as social thinkers used to think: neighborhoods, it has recently been noticed, live on). And yet, on the other hand, since the French and Industrial revolutions, a more open, mobile, urban social life has generated new modes of self-definition, of "making one's own self human and known": by cutting loose

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from the ballast of one's life, by soaring adventurously into the unfamiliar —in other words, by asserting one's *freedom*. Blake, the most radical of Romantics and the most "modern," demanded a total, anarchic freedom in aesthetic and political, sexual and moral life. Wordsworth, though politically conservative and authoritarian, nevertheless recognized and exalted this new freedom within a limited sphere: for the "highest minds," in the realm of the poetic imagination. Whether Williams, with his expressed preference for an art nourished by communal impulse and suffused with communal culture and tradition, would concede even this much—or how, by his own standards, he would justify any sort of concession—is not at all clear.

In saying all this I do not mean to cast aspersions on Raymond Williams' personal devotion to liberty, which I know is exemplary. But it is distressing to see where his sentimental need to enfold radicalism in the communal cosiness of a Great Tradition has led him. Because he has resisted making sharp conceptual distinctions between the conflicting values which any broad cultural tradition must contain, Williams has managed to avoid a clear moral choice. He has thus been drawn —unconsciously, perhaps, but steadily —into a style of social thought whose mixed indifference and hostility toward personal freedom have far less in common with socialism than with that populist mystique of "blood and soil" which has expressed itself in such sinister forms in our day.

"The sense of menace is an indication of the new temper of the civil rights movement. Victory over white racism is assured. The Dixiecrat inspires *indignation* but no longer fear. Assured of triumph, the victors need fear only one another: animosity and strain begin to show in the phalanx of the movement for brotherhood and equality." (from the current issue)

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BOOKS

Stephan Thernstrom

A Major Work in Radical History

THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS, by E. P. Thompson. New York: Pantheon Books, 1964. 848 pp. $15.00.

Industrial society was born in Great Britain in the years between 1780 and 1832; E. P. Thompson's brilliant new work is the best single account of the effects of that remarkable transformation on the common people of England. Thompson writes in opposition to a host of prevailing orthodoxies—the orthodoxy of empirical economic historians who reject the very notion that a cataclysmic social transformation occurred during these years on the grounds that the statistical indices fail to register it, the Fabian orthodoxy which sees only peaceful evolutionary change under the far-sighted guidance of respectable trade unionists, the "Pilgrim's Progress" orthodoxy "in which the period is sacked for forerunners—pioneers of the Welfare State, progenitors of a Socialist Commonwealth," early exemplars of rational industrial relations or whatever. He seeks rather to write history from the point of view of the victims—vigorously and heroically protesting victims in this case, but victims nonetheless. As a dramatist of the struggles and suffering of the working people of England in those bitter years Thompson has no peer. He has done prodigious research in the sources; he has a sure instinct for the important detail; he writes with furious eloquence.

So fresh and ambitious a work as this, of course, is likely to raise as many questions as it answers. Only a few of the points on which I find *The Making of the English Working Class* unsatisfactory can be suggested here, with the caveat that this is a book to read rather than merely to read about, a book which raises a host of issues of interest to every DISSENT reader.

One important defect of Thompson's study is the somewhat idyllic image it projects of pre-industrial England. Though the author considers himself a Marxist, in this he stands closer to the Tory Radical William Cobbett than to Marx. This perspective has its advantages—Thompson is less bourgeois than Marx, and he writes vividly of the Brechtian virtues that flourished (he believes) among the common people of an older England. His discussion of the changes in the pace and rhythm of work that took place during the years of the Industrial Revolution—the abolition of "Saint Monday," the growth of an

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inner compulsion (as well as severe external compulsions) to work, the uses of religion as an instrument of work discipline—is superb. But certain of his arguments seem tortured. That the potato was increasingly substituted for wheat in working class diets during this period, for instance, is not very persuasive evidence of the horrors of the new way of life, Cobbett (and presumably the workers) to the contrary notwithstanding. A case might be made against the potato as a source of nutrition, but Thompson is less interested in this "objective" question than in subjective feelings about the potato. History from the point of view of the victims, in this instance and others, can too easily become a restatement of popular prejudices and mythologies. Nor is it very clear just how popular the sentiments Thompson attributes to "the working class" actually were. That Cobbett and certain other leaders of the early nineteenth century saw the old society (or their nostalgic image of the old society) as infinitely preferable to the new is beyond dispute; that most ordinary English workmen judged the social and economic changes of the period so negatively has yet to be shown. So powerful is Thompson's animus against industrial civilization, indeed, that one comes to long for some hint of the old-fashioned —Thompson would say vulgar—Marxist appreciation of the liberating aspects of the Industrial Revolution. This is not to charge that the book is simplistically nostalgic in the fashion of so much American social criticism; it is to suggest that a fairer balance sheet of the losses and gains of the working people of England during these years might have been drawn up by either a liberal or a more conventionally Marxist historian.

About half of this massive volume is devoted to a chronicle of radical political protest from the French Revolution to the Reform Bill of 1832, and it is here that some of Thompson's most original contributions but also some of his shakiest interpretations are to be found. Certainly his emphasis on the *political* context in which the Industrial Revolution took place is an advance over the traditional treatment; Thompson argues vigorously that the French Revolution triggered a counter-revolutionary panic that gave the English *ancien regime* a new lease on life for forty years, and that it was the coincidence of intensified economic exploitation and political oppression that was the key to the catastrophic character of the period for ordinary Englishmen. Thompson's analysis of "uneven development" pursues some of the clues first advanced by Marx and Engels in *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* and developed by Trotsky, and his book is probably the most stimulating source for comparative Marxist analysis published since Trotsky.

Nevertheless, Thompson's enormously detailed account of the "secret history" of working class protest in the period is very uneven. To have rescued this tradition from the undeserved obscurity—or in the case of the Luddites, from the undeserved notoriety—to which it was consigned by Fabian and Whiggish historians was an important service, as was Thompson's demonstration that Home Office fears of an imminent revolutionary uprising were based on something

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more than wild fantasy. But too much space is devoted to the reconstruction of the trivial activities of tiny conspiratorial sects; here Thompson is overly indulgent and persistently inclined to exaggerate the extent of their working class support. Excesses of this kind, however, do not call into question Thompson's great achievement. This is a magnificent book, a book that will be read for many generations to come.

The Church and the State

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND NAZI GERMANY, by Guenter Lewy. New York; McGraw-Hill, 1964. 416 pp. $7.50.

Both irony and justice attend the world-wide public trial which the Papacy and the German Catholic Church are now undergoing for their conduct during the Third Reich. Irony because during the occupation and Adenauer years, the German Church profited from its supposed resistance record. To a considerable extent this record is now shown to be a product of imagination intermingled with elements of misrepresentation. And irony again because it is the German playwright Hochhuth who has directed universal attention to Pius XII's reticence to condemn publicly Hitler's policy of Jewish extermination.

It is only justice, furthermore, that a descendant of German Jews should be the first to present a detailed record of the Catholic hierarchy's relations with the Nazi regime. To be sure, the American Catholic, Gordon Zahn, made a courageous beginning in *German Catholics and Hitler's War* (1962), analyzing the German bishops' support of the Nazi military effort. But to date all discussion has had to base itself on piecemeal evidence. Now, thanks to Lewy's painstaking work, the full record of the German hierarchy's activity under the Third Reich lies open. Of course there are materials, including the Papal archives, not accessible to Lewy which might shed more light on the motivations of particular dignitaries. These could do little, however, to change the picture of the German Church which Lewy has constructed from his close study of nine episcopal archives, the German diplomatic correspondence, the abundant printed record, and the official German government documents both in Washington and in the Koblenz Federal archives.

These sources show that while the German Church worked to prevent the Nazis from coming to power, a policy of accommodation was promulgated almost from the very beginning of their take-over. In return for buttressing the prestige of the new regime, the Church received guarantees for

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the continued functioning of ancillary Church organizations under attack by Nazi fanatics; further, this agreement became a lever with which the Church achieved its long-coveted goal of establishing denominational elementary schools throughout Germany.

To fulfill its side of the bargain, the Church abandoned the Center Party to its fate and instructed the clergy to withdraw from opposition politics. Quick to fall in step with its new masters, the Church stressed its anti-Bolshevist record and gave full approval to the burgeoning nationalism. If the Church had reservations about the racist aspects of Nazi ideology, it advanced them in a decidedly minor key. The Nazi leaders, in turn, responded with soothing statements and false promises, while all the time permitting their storm troopers to show by word and deed their basic contempt for the Church and, indeed, their commitment to its ultimate eradication.

By 1934 it had become abundantly clear that the Church was up against a totalitarian regime. Yet the more brutally the state demanded total submission, the more desperately the Church insisted that it was loyal to it. The German Church was eager to support national policies, first against the Bolsheviks, later against the Allies. While the Hitler regime was willing to grant a degree of tolerance—because it needed Church support to regain the Saar territories, or, after 1940, to obtain full participation in the war effort—the fate which would befall the Church once victory was won became an open secret. And yet the Church persevered in its "co-existence" policy, even turning its back on priests and Catholic laymen who offered resistance and became martyrs. Acts of racial and religious persecution were protested circumspectly, through official channels, but never taken up as public issues. Even the shipping of people to the death camps was protested only in terms of injustices done to certain individuals related to Church members. Only on one issue did the Catholic Church take a stand: it absolutely refused to collaborate in the extermination of mental defectives cared for in Catholic institutions. The Church carried this one case to the public—and its resistance was successfully maintained. But if the idea that Nazi policies had to be accepted or rejected as a whole ever occurred to the Church leaders, they did not show it by their public behavior.

The motivations of Church leaders are not difficult to understand. In pushing for the Concordat the Church was, after all, not much different from German business or the army. Just as the army was anxious to exclude the new storm troopers from military power, so the Church was fearful of its position vis-à-vis new social and political institutions. And when the Church successfully achieved its denominational schools, it must have felt, if only fleetingly, as did the German tycoons at the smashing of the labor unions. The price to be paid for such privileges seemed outside the departmentalized concerns of the groups who momentarily enjoyed them.

The Church, moreover, may well have had a long-range objective. Even if Hitler did not fulfill the terms of the Concordat, a more civilized suc-

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cessor could be expected to acknowledge a legal obligation. In fact, most post-war German state administrations did indeed fulfill the educational commitments the Nazi regime had made to the Church. But what may have started as an all-too-normal advancement of vested interests rapidly lost meaning in a state where law was replaced by terror and fear. The Church policy of mutually beneficial relations with established states, regardless of their politics, was quickly reduced to a strategy for mere survival.

Lewy tries to account for Church policy by relating it to the concerns and emotions of the German Catholic public. He describes in detail, how the hierarchy was able to solidify lay opinion in its successful stand against Nazi eugenic policies. On the other hand Lewy points to a mild anti-semitism as a conditioning factor in the popular Catholic acceptance of Nazi racial policies and thus an explanation of the hierarchy's failure to oppose "the final solution of the Jewish question." Yet this reviewer doubts that Catholic anti-semitism, found mostly among the rural population, survived for very long the tribulations suffered by the Church under the Nazi regime. Surely a common bond of suffering, especially after 1941, militated against the flourishing of anti-Semitism. Moreover, Catholic anti-Semitism, with its historical mythology, was not necessarily responsive to the Nazi brand of racist anti-Semitism. Perhaps the Church had lost influence over many urban Catholics, who were then open to Nazi recruitment. But it is hard to believe that such speculation was strong in the minds of Church leaders. If the Church made only limited appeals to Catholic loyalty, it was—as Lewy partly suggests—for other reasons.

By the violent reaction which greeted the accusation that Pius XII was passive in face of the extermination of the six million, we learn that the Church considers itself a moral institution which must "testify for the truth." The defenders of the Church do not say that the Jewish question was outside its jurisdiction, but that the Church did all it could under the circumstances. We must then ask why the German and Italian hierarchies conceived of the possibilities so narrowly, especially in comparison to their French brethren. The answer is that the German Church, like the Italian, is a state institution whose dignitaries are screened by the state before their appointment and who, like any other officials, swear allegiance to the state. Lewy reminds us that even when the Church was most severely persecuted under the Third Reich, the upkeep of Church officials was still paid in full by the regime. Is it likely that such Church officials would be capable of developing independent positions and entering into open battle against the hand that had fed them for so long? After the defeat of 1945 things were different; *then* the bishops could assume public leadership at infinitely smaller risk and with the certainty of enhancing their prestige.

By contrast, the French Catholic Church, relieved for over half a century of political obligations, encourages and even conducts experiments in new forms of community organizations. Decentralizing decision-making, it pre-

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pares the individual conscience to meet, if need be, extreme situations without explicit guidance. The German Church recoils from such disorder and risk. Even after the experience of the Third Reich, it still shows no desire for the moral and intellectual freedom which a separation from state power would bring.

In Germany the church-state alliance has a long and fluctuating history. It proceeded smoothly under the Weimar regime, protected by constitutional safeguards and the support of a crucial political faction. The alliance became a disaster when state power was seized by the brutal representatives of a hostile counter-ideology. But now the alliance is once again profitable in terms of money, educational privileges, and Church influence on state policy.

The question remains: when the German Church faltered under the challenge of the Third Reich, why did its extra-territorial head, the Pope in Rome, do so little to rectify its course? To reply that the Pope's absolute power brought absolute corruption is to rely on a worn-out cliché. The truth is that if the Pope, or to be more precise, the Bishop of Rome, exercises an imperium, it is only in Italy. In other countries he may make an occasional far-reaching decision, mainly regarding *internal* Church organization —such as the banning of the French worker priest movement—but primarily he must permit the national hierarchy of each country to work out its own political solutions. Lewy shows that Pius XII had his doubts about certain aspects of the Concordat—but in the end he gave in. As head of the Church, the Pope must respect the national foundation of its various branches; and the expediency of this policy is most sharply illustrated by the case of international war.

Thus the Pope's reticence to castigate openly the Nazi extermination—as the Allies asked him to—was due to the fact that such a pronouncement would violate the international neutrality of the Church. A more recent diplomatic publication reveals that Pius XII also argued that he could not properly condemn the Nazis without simultaneously condemning the Soviets. Such statements serve to remind us that all Popes in recent history have ascended to high office after a long diplomatic career. It would seem that, except in John XXIII, the

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"DON'T BE HALF-SAFE, USE..."

"Irving Gilman, president of the Institute of Analytical Research, launches his thesis by asking 'When is a political candidate like an automobile?'

"Without implied irony or dismay, Mr. Gilman opines that today, political candidates must be 'marketed' like a Chevrolet. In fact, he hails the new 'scientific' political huckstering as a step in the 'right direction' and exhorts the social scientists to achieve greater 'scope and accuracy' to 'develop the marketing potential of a candidate,' just as the physical sciences are used to develop appealing and marketable corn flakes or corn plasters."—

—Oh, for the simple days of personal, unscientific craftsmanship!!!—from an item titled, "The Marketing of a Political Candidate," *Printer's Ink.*

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practice of diplomacy has created a professional deformation which seriously impairs the Papal ability to fill the high office of guardian of the moral law.

But here we are back at the question so clearly suggested by the attitude of the Catholic Church toward Mussolini and Hitler. Of what use is a church tied up with the self-same power center at which our political and ethical troubles are likely to originate? If ever there was any doubt as to the wisdom of separation of church and state, the story of the German Catholic Church under Hitler, as unfolded by Guenter Lewy, should finally clinch the case. OTTO KIRCHHEIMER

On American Labor "Scholarship"

DEMOCRACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, by Mark Perlman. Wiley. 113 pp. 1962.

This little piece of work was commissioned by the Trade Union Study of the Fund for the Republic; and it is depressing to think that with the Fund imprint, it may become an "authoritative" work on the IAM.

The IAM regime today is not the most anti-democratic in the labor movement but it can rightfully claim status as the most hypocritical, with the greatest gap between the professions of its President and the realities of its internal life.

The process of suppression inside the IAM has been recorded in detail in the publication *Union Democracy in Action* over the years. Mr. Perlman's view is quite different. "The IAM," he concludes, "faces several crucial problems in this its eighth decade. For the most part, democracy, as such, is not one of them." This is America and he is entitled to his opinion. Only it remains perplexing how he reached it.

Mr. Perlman is a kind of IAM expert. In 1961, Harvard University published his *The Machinists, a New Study in American Trade Unionism,* part of a series steeped in scholarship and research. Six years before, the Executive Council of the IAM donated a lot of money to Harvard's labor-management history project.

This reviewer asked Professor John T. Dunlop, in charge of the series, for information on the precise amount turned over by IAM officials. The reply, "The size of the financial contribution of any one of the dozen or more donors . . . is not a matter of public record nor would it be conventional in scholarly undertakings to list the amount of each contribution. I see no appropriate reason for a reply to your more specific inquiry." It is

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impossible, therefore, to say how much the IAM paid; obviously, however, it got its money's worth.

In another connection, Professor Dunlop wrote, ". . . full access to all records and files and magnanimous cooperation in answering questions was granted by every organization making a contribution." Did the IAM make all its records available? If so, did Mr. Perlman use them in his latest effort? We wonder. Take, for example, the case of Joseph Addison. Joseph Addison was a member of IAM District Lodge 727 in California. After trial by a Special Trial Committee appointed by IAM President Al Hayes, Addison was expelled in May, 1961. His crime? He had protested against the mishandling of funds by the officers of his District Lodge 727.

The Addison case is an arrant example of how trial procedure degenerates into simple persecution. On March 2, 1959, John L. Fry, official union auditor, performing his normal functions for the IAM national office, concluded a two-year investigation of finances in District Lodge 727 and submitted "personal and confidential" findings to General Secretary Treasurer, Eric Peterson. It made depressing charges, revealing that nearly $90,000 had been misappropriated from District funds. Auditor Fry recommended that two District officials be compelled to make personal restitution. "It is your auditor's opinion," Fry wrote confidentially, "that in such instances these two individuals (the District President and a Business Representative) have used their positions as District officials and/or Grand Lodge Deputy to profit personally and/or to knowingly defraud the District and/or suspended Lodge 758. It is your Auditor's further opinion that such acts violate the standards of ethics required of IAM officials as set forth in our laws and policies."

The situation was awkward; for the two accused District officers were firm Hayes' supporters in the territory of Vice President Roy Brown, who is not quite so firm a supporter of Hayes. They had to be protected. (In December, 1961, when the District President was defeated for reelection, he was promptly awarded a spot on the International payroll.) Hayes set out to "correct" the embarrassing record.

He assigned three colleagues, top International officials, to reinvestigate the investigation. Within a few quick weeks they reviewed the mountain of documents that had occupied the auditor for more than two years. But it was time enough to announce that the whole thing, in their view, was exaggerated and that the two District officials, their own caucus henchmen, were not guilty of anything worth fussing over. Nevertheless, they suggested that the District President be compelled to restore $1,800 to the treasury, a sum that had been taken, euphemistically speaking, irregularly. Having replaced the missing $1,800, he remained in office undisturbed by the International Executive Council until defeated for reelection by the membership. Among "Brown rebels," the three-man report won instantaneous fame as the great "whitewash." The "whitewash" remained available only for reading at the union office, not for circulation. The Fry report remained secret, suppressed. (A copy is in my files—H. B.)

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Meanwhile, Joe Addison, who had run unsuccessfully for District President in November 1959, got wind of the "whitewash" report, read it, put two and two together, and preferred charges against the two District officials: John Snider, President; and Hal Shean, Business Representative.

It was simple for Hayes to brush aside this annoyance to two close supporters. Snider and Shean merely preferred countercharges of "slander" against Addison. Hayes summoned a Special Trial Committee to perform the predictable service. It exonerated Snider and Shean of Addison's charges; and, with a sense of symmetry, found Addison guilty of their charges. This is the kind of prompt efficiency for which Hayes has become noted. Hayes expelled Addison and later put Snider on the International payroll. Not one flaw in the monolithic process.

But how differently our scholar tells it!

"The other mote or type of criticism [of the IAM] during the Hayes administration involved a rebellion in his own staff which grew out of a case concerning one John Snyder, an important business agent in General Vice President Roy Brown's area (the Southwest). There is reason to believe that Snyder enjoyed a more cordial relationship with Hayes than Brown would have preferred. Ultimately, Snyder was charged with mishandling his lodge's funds, charges most probably brought with Roy Brown's agreement. The grand lodge then sent in its own investigators who agreed that Snyder's handling of accounts was poor, but who also concluded that there was more evidence of carelessness than of a desire to embezzle or defraud. Thus, the grand lodge 'cleared' Snyder. [The man's name is *Snider,* not *Snyder;* and he was District President, not Business Agent. But that's our scholar handling a delicate point.]

"The next step found Snyder bringing charges against those who had criticized him; after a trial they were found guilty of publicly airing IAM business and were expelled from the IAM. Naturally, they appealed to International President Hayes who confirmed the verdict and penalty."

Now, note the following:

1. The original accusations against Snider were made by an official IAM auditor who was simply doing his routine job. The auditor did not prefer formal charges but presented the documented facts in a long report which was confidential and which the IAM kept secret. Was this report among the records to which Mr. Perlman had "full access"? If so it is odd that he makes no reference whatsoever to it. If he did not get to see it, I will be happy to make the full text available to the Fund for the Republic at the cost of reproduction.

2. There was no "they" to bring charges against Snider. Formal charges were filed by one man, Joseph Addison, and he based himself not on the official auditor's report which remained secret and suppressed but on what had leaked out. "They" were not expelled; Addison was.

3. Addison was tried by a Special Trial Committee, personally chosen by Mr. Hayes. Perlman sees no need ever to mention this unique institution of Hayes' "democracy."

In 1955–56 Irwin Rappaport and Marion Ciepley led a reform move-

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ment in IAM Tool and Diemakers Lodge 113, Chicago, that ousted local officials guilty of shady financial practices. To win that fight, they organized a caucus, distributed handbills, and rallied members to meetings. Hayes expressed distaste for these methods of active democracy. Before the reformers could elect the new local administration, he forestalled them by putting the local under a Trusteeship that remained for three years and was removed in 1959 only under pressure of the new labor law that went into effect that year.

After Hayes imposed the Trusteeship, Ciepley and Rappaport led a strong movement for the restoration of autonomy. As delegates to a convention of the Illinois AFL-CIO, the two men introduced a resolution for the principle of Public Review, modelled on the UAW Public Review Board. They were quickly brought up on charges prepared by one of Hayes attorneys; they were tried by a Special Trial Committee appointed by Hayes.

It is not an easy task, on the basis of these facts, to portray Hayes as a genial leader; but our scholar strains at it. Perlman rewrites the record to say simply that Hayes refused to reinstate the two men. Our author puts it this way, "Once again, Hayes refused to set aside a local lodge verdict," implying, of course, that it was the local that expelled the two men. Not true! Hayes expelled them on his own personal order.

1. The two men were not tried by a local board but by one of Mr. Hayes' own selected Special Trial Committees. But Mr. Perlman simply will not notice this protrusive institution.

2. There is evidence that even this Special Trial Committee *did not recommend expulsion.* Hayes refused to give the defendants a copy of the Committee's report and to this day it remains secret. Did Mr. Perlman have "full access" to this suppressed document? If so he might render a public service by revealing it for the first time.

3. As a matter of fact, Hayes explicitly set aside the finding of his own Special Trial Committee and personally ordered the two men expelled.

But with such selected research, Mr. Perlman can view the state of IAM democracy with equanimity, confident that Mr. Hayes is a man who can "deal gently with critics."

To retail purchasers, *caveat emptor.*

HERMAN BENSON

THE BUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION
The Rise of the Stalinist State
by
MAX SHACHTMAN
360 pages $2.95
at bookstores, or order from:
Donald Press, 188 West 4th St.
New York 14, N. Y.

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Comprehending the Incomprehensible

BLOOD FROM THE SKY, by Piotr Rawicz, translated by Peter Hays. Harcourt, Brace & World. 315 pp., $4.95.

THE JOURNEY AND THE PITY, by Pawel Mayewski. Charles Scribner's Sons. 178 pp., $1.65 (paper).

The furor aroused by the publication of Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* may be evidence that the slaughter of the Jews during the course of Hitler's Final Solution cannot be justly treated by the present generation of writers. Regardless of whether the description is sociological and philosophical, as in Miss Arendt's case, or a fusion of fact and fantasy in a climate of other-worldliness, as in *Blood from the Sky,* the event itself is still touched with so much horror, despair, and guilt that any treatment seems ultimately inadequate.

Piotr Rawicz, a Ukrainian Jew who survived three years at Auschwitz and two other concentration camps, and who now lives in France, has written a novel which deals with the Nazi-dominated world as a surrealist hell. The major section of the book describes a few months in a small Russian (or Polish) town during which a Nazi garrison rounded up Jews for shipment to the gas chambers on the basis of contradictory orders carried out with random cruelty. The whimsical decisions, the frenzy of the victims seeking to avoid deportation, the madness of the leading Jew selected to make the original choices of those marked for death—these vignettes sum up a period of unprecedented horror.

Into this catalog of terror, Rawicz introduces bits of poetry and segments of philosophical musings—the book is written in the form of a memoir left with an anonymous "I" who comments on its contents. The effect is to emphasize the intensity of the nightmare by describing the inconsequential elements that contributed to it. Thus, the indifferent hero is saved for meaningless life by the circumstances which helped send thousands of his fellows to mindless death.

A gifted writer who has been a student of philosophy and religion, Rawicz tries to lend cosmic significance to the holocaust, but in the end the most powerful sections are those which add still another glimpse into the pit of Nazism.

A somewhat cooler effort to penetrate the totalitarian world is made in Pawel Mayewski's novel, which describes the death of a dog, and the repercussions this event evokes among the inmates of an isolated labor camp. There is a tremor of apprehension which shakes every layer of bureaucracy as this episode, which may or may not have been innocent, is weighed for malign implications and its possible threat to the hierarchy of the establishment, woebegone as it is.

The writing is appropriately terse

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and severe, and the sense of semi-hysteria which pervades the camp is fully realized. However, the characters tend to become interchangeable, and there is a flattening of impact which detracts from the attempt to picture the abstract facade of a totalitarian community that is, at bottom, based on fear and insecurity.

It may be that the totalitarian experience, introduced into a civilization whose moral pretensions seemed to assert that such a possibility was unthinkable, has created a disjunction of values which renders contemporary analysis always short of final effectiveness. Conceivably, the uniqueness of the period resists description in any existing vocabulary. Succeeding generations of writers may be able to deal with the phenomenon more adequately, assuming that it is ever possible to comprehend the incomprehensible.

HERMAN SINGER

BRIEFER NOTICE

Hack Work

THE RISE OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE, by Jan Librach. Praeger University Series. 380 pp., paper $2.50.

The following statement appears on page 77 of this book: "It is possible that the Kremlin, fearing the adverse effect a Communist rule in Spain would have in France and England, did not press for the establishment of a Soviet Republic. In 1934 Moscow appeared to limit itself to 'guiding' the weak left-wing government, not openly dominated by Communists. This was the time of the Communist popular front line . . ." Any elementary textbook would tell the author that in 1934 Spain had a right-wing government which suppressed an uprising of the miners in Asturias and of Catalan regionalists; that the Soviet Union did not even have diplomatic relations with Spain before 1936 and had no means of "guiding" any Spanish government until well after the outbreak of the civil war; that the popular front tactics were adopted by the Seventh World Congress in August 1935.

There would be no reason to review this utterly worthless, confused and poorly written compilation, had not the publisher established a certain reputation in the field of Soviet studies. On the strength of earlier publications for which he has earned the thanks of the scholars, he now is selling books of diminishing value; yet he raises for this fabrication the claim that "no comparable over-all study of Soviet foreign policy has been attempted."

The reading list of any introductory course in the field will provide him with at least three titles; on the other hand, the present study is in such a hurry to be "over-all" that it devotes to the China policy of Lenin and Stalin up to 1928 altogether 3 (three) lines. Yet the China policy was the subject of a major debate in the Comintern and in the Russian party. By contrast we are treated to detailed accounts of border clashes after the conclusion of peace with Finland in 1921

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or of Colonel Beck's thoughts in 1934. It is hard to imagine a book more out of focus, and moreover, its attitude and style betray the ranting anti-Bolshevism which by now should be banished from serious debate. The author, who allegedly was a Polish diplomat, writes with moral indignation about diplomatic maneuvers which all countries and all statesmen have used at all times but which apparently are not allowed to the Soviet Union, particularly in dealing with Poland.

PETER GREENEBAUM

Scholarship With Wry

RADICAL PERIODICALS IN AMERICA, 1890–1950. A BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH BRIEF NOTES, by Walter Goldwater. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. 51 pp. n.p.

This bibliography, listing and annotating radical periodicals known and unknown, is a work of meticulous scholarship enlivened by occasional touches of wry comment. The whole history of American radicalism can be found, in alphabetical order, in these notes. Librarians will find this work indispensable; others may be struck by the way the idealism and corruption of the immediate past can break through even a bibliography. My own favorite entry is that for "Workers Challenge," a paper issued in 1922: "Weekly organ of the United Toilers, a split from the Communist Party, edited by Harry M. Wicks. It is described as 'the most vituperative paper ever issued.' " And it was.

I. H.

LETTERS

More on Peace Research

Editor:

May I say a word in reply to Arthur Waskow's criticism of my criticism of the prevailing trends in peace research?

Mr. Waskow tilts at a straw man. The instances he cites in no way rebut my basic criticism of peace research as being *in the main* unconcerned with the dynamics of political and social change.

I didn't say peace research is unnecessary. To the contrary, I share Waskow's concern that since we do not *know* which of a series of alternative hypotheses as to the nature of international conflict is true, we should indeed work hard to find out. Unfortunately that is what most peace research today avoids doing because it is already wedded to one set of approaches, namely a consensus model of domestic and international relations which does not require us to investigate fundamental social change.

Waskow seems to feel that if you proceed on the basis of more radical assumptions, then you "already know all the answers," hence "peace research is unnecessary." But if you proceed on the basis of the dominant assumptions in peace research today, then you're truly open-minded and doing real research.

What we should be discussing is not whether it is permissible to begin with assumptions—all researchers have assumptions when they set out, otherwise chaos would result—but rather which set of assumptions is more likely to lead to sound predictions, or to more consistent theoretical frameworks, or to the development of better tools for changing things in a desired direction, etc. The crux of the issue is not which of us thinks the other has a closed mind, but rather which set of assumptions is more likely to be fruitful in the process of "learning how actually to move in a direction one wants to take."

It happens that some sets of assumptions are more congenial to the Establishment than others—which may in part account for the way research funds are distributed. This does not make recipients

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Richard Lowenthal

THE PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISTIC COMMUNISM

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Introduction

The history of World Communism, conceived as a united movement with a common doctrine and strategy formulated from a single center, is at an end. One hundred years after the foundation of the First International and fifty years after Lenin proclaimed the need to form the Third in order to replace the Second, the doctrinal and organizational unity of the "world party" created by him have been finally broken by the rival claims to leadership of the two Communist Great Powers, and the resulting schism has opened up new possibilities of independent development to many nonruling and even some ruling Communist parties. International Communism has no longer a single worldwide organization, a single center of authority, or a single "orthodox" doctrine.

But if the history of "World Communism" is at an end, the history of Communism in the world is not. Now, as before the schism, a nuclear world power, the Soviet Union, is ruled by a Communist party; it exerts its regional hegemony over a number of East European countries (as well as over Outer Mongolia) partly by its ties to the Communist parties ruling them; and it seeks to retain, and in part revive, its guiding influence on the majority of other Communist parties, including the ruling party of Cuba. The greatest regional power in Asia, the Chinese People's Republic, is governed by its own form of Communism, controls the Communist regimes of North Korea and North Vietnam and is actively engaged in laying the doctrinal and organizational foundations of a new revolutionary International with its center of gravity in the underdeveloped continents. In this effort, it already enjoys the support of some of the leading Communist parties of Asia as well as of considerable sections in Latin America. Further, a number of the nonruling Communist parties, regardless of their allegiance to either side, and often in proportion to their growing independence, continue to play a major political role in their countries, and a few at least must be considered as serious potential contenders for national power; while elements of the Communist ideology exert a substantial influence on the political and intellectual elites of underdeveloped countries even where no effective Communist organization exists at all.

This contrast between the dramatic breakup of the Communist "monolith" and the continued importance, and in part vitality, of the pieces raises a fundamental question concerning the significance of the whole event. Are we simply confronted with a new plurality of Communist states and parties of a familiar type, each pursuing its own separate interests in power politics but each retaining the same structural characteristics and ideological goals? Is it conceivable that Communism should have ceased to be truly international, i.e., world-wide and single-centered, without otherwise changing its nature? Or must the schism be viewed as both an effect and an additional cause of di-

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vergent trends of development in different parts of the Communist world, so that we are dealing with increasingly different types of Communist regime and increasingly different versions of the Communist doctrine, exerting their attraction in correspondingly different social and cultural conditions? In other words, will the terms "Communist party" and "Communist regime" continue to have a clearly definable basic meaning despite the inevitable national variations of detail, or will they eventually become as ambiguous as the term "socialism" has become following the break between Communists and Social Democrats after the First World War?

Clearly, it is not possible to evaluate the prospects for the various Moscow-oriented, Peking-oriented, or independent forms of Communism without reference to the prospects for the further internal transformation of each of them. A first approach to an answer may emerge if we ask what factors have been decisive for preventing continued all-inclusive cooperation among independent Communist states, and for causing their differences to assume the form of a doctrinal schism.

I. *The Inevitability of Divergence*

The Causes of the Schism

Any enquiry into the nature of the schism must begin by recalling the "Caesaropapist" character of modern totalitarianism with its inseparable unity of state power and ideology. In any totalitarian Communist regime, the rulers must justify their rule in doctrinal terms, while for the subjects loyalty to the faith and obedience to the state coincide. Accordingly, the unity of the Communist World Party, such as we knew it for more than three decades, was built around the existence of a unique center of both political power and doctrinal authority—the Soviet Union.

This uniqueness was ended and the foundations of world-wide Communist unity undermined by two events: the rise of a second Communist Great Power in China, and the blow inflicted on Soviet authority by Khruschev's "secret speech." The emergence of a plurality of sovereign Communist states, with different national interests and internal problems resulting in differences of ideological outlook, was bound to put an end to the centralism of the Communist secular church, as was first proved when Communist Yugoslavia established its sovereignty in conflict with Stalin. With the rise of Communist China, the unique position of the Soviet Union as a command center for all Communist parties became definitely a thing of the past, and this was recognized implicitly in Stalin's dealings with China and explicitly by his heirs.

At first, both Soviet and non-Soviet Communists hoped that they would be able to preserve unity of policy without a unique center of power, and respect for Soviet doctrinal authority without subordination

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to Soviet organizational discipline. They might have succeeded for a time because of the historical role of the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik party as the original model for Communists everywhere; but the chances of such success were critically impaired when Khrushchev, setting out to destroy the myth of Stalin's infallibility, destroyed forever the belief in the infallibility of the Soviet Communist party and thus precluded himself from inheriting Stalin's worldwide prestige. The shock of "de-stalinization" was the direct cause of the East European crisis of October, 1956; and though the Chinese Communists then rendered active help in restoring the Soviet leadership—in the hope of decisively influencing its future use—they never forgot that it rested henceforth on borrowed authority. The "secret speech" was certainly not the original cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict, as the Chinese have later claimed; yet by damaging the traditional prestige of the Soviet Communist party beyond repair, it created the precondition for Peking's challenge to Moscow's worldwide leadership which was to turn that conflict into a schism.

The emergence of a plurality of sovereign Communist powers, and the vacancy of international authority created by destalinization, were thus basic for making the disintegration of the organization and doctrine of world Communism possible: given these two conditions, any major differences of national interest and internal ideological needs between the two principal Communist powers might lead to open political and doctrinal conflict between them—for each would now decide its policies independently and seek to justify them in ideological terms. The one way to maintain a measure of unity despite this new pluralistic constellation would have been a common effort to tolerate the inevitable political and doctrinal differences—to develop a looser form of international cooperation based on pragmatic compromise and ideological nonaggression. This would have required that neither Moscow nor Peking should henceforth claim a position of world leadership based on a monopoly of orthodoxy for its own interpretation of the doctrine; for such claims, being no longer based on unique power or unquestioned tradition, could now be made with equal justification by either side, and could only lead to mutual accusations of heresy. But once such accusations were publicly raised in the forum of the international Communist movement, not only the international influence of the Soviet and Chinese leaders, but even the legitimacy of their rule in their own empires would be at stake in the factional struggle thus opened—and this would make retreat and compromise impossible and organizational and doctrinal schism inevitable.

An awareness of these dangers seems indeed to have been the basis for the compromise reached by the Soviet and Chinese leaders in early 1959, at the time of the 21st congress of the CPSU, when they temporarily agreed to keep their different views about the "People's Com-

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munes" without further polemics; and when the Soviets responded to the Chinese ideological attacks throughout 1960 not only by rebutting them, but by declaring their willingness to renounce their worldwide "leading role," they were probably groping for a return to such a solution. It may indeed be said that while the Soviets have never abandoned the claim to be in the orthodox Leninist tradition, they have in recent years been more interested in remaining immune from outside ideological criticism than in enforcing worldwide ideological conformity: provided they were left a free hand in developing their domestic, imperial, and worldwide policies, they have been increasingly willing to tolerate a measure of political and even doctrinal variety among their allies and comrades.

Conversely, it has been the Chinese who have consistently proclaimed the need for complete ideological unity based on a single doctrinal authority, first seeking to maintain the Soviets in that role and later challenging them to ideological debate; and when the Soviets formally abandoned the "leading role" during the Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties in order to end the debate, the Chinese regarded this new compromise as a mere stage in a continuing ideological struggle to impose their own views on the world Communist movement, including the Soviet Union. It was this Chinese determination to replace the discredited authority of the "revisionists" in Moscow not by toleration of differences, but by assuming themselves the role of sole fountainhead of Leninist orthodoxy, that led to the collapse of the compromise during the 22nd congress of the CPSU in 1961 and, foiling all later attempts at an ideological truce, made it impossible to preserve a looser form of worldwide Communist unity on a pluralistic basis.

This contrast between the willingness of the Soviet leaders to adjust their policy, even though inconsistently and with many hesitations, to the new pluralism of Communist power, and the Chinese insistence on restoring complete doctrinal unity under single-centered leadership, has been crucial for the growth of the schism and may be expected largely to determine its future course. In part, it is obviously to be explained by the disproportion of material power between China and the Soviet Union—the dependence of the former on the economic, military, and diplomatic aid of the latter, and her inevitable dissatisfaction with the extent of that aid. The Soviets, sure that in any compromise reached by quiet diplomacy among allies their superior power would normally prevail, were clearly interested in keeping relations on this pragmatic level and avoiding the embarrassment of ideological disputes; the Chinese, frustrated in their more discreet efforts to influence Soviet policies, were increasingly tempted to try and put pressure on their powerful ally by ideological attacks—by questioning the orthodoxy of Soviet behavior in the forum of the international Communist movement. There is indeed no need here to recount in

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detail the frustrations Peking suffered in 1958/9—the disappointment of Chinese hopes in Soviet capital aid, the lack of Soviet regard for Chinese prestige in the Lebanon crisis, the limitation of Soviet military support for the attack on Quemoy, the Soviet refusal to help China become an atomic power, the critical neutrality towards China's frontier conflict with India, the Soviet efforts to establish a basis for a dialogue with the United States—and to retrace their translation into ideological terms. Yet in the course of 1960, the Chinese Communists found that their ideological attacks were not leading to an increase of Soviet aid, but to its total cessation. If nevertheless they decided to continue the struggle even after the compromise of the Moscow declaration, this cannot be explained by pure considerations of power politics; by 1961, Mao must have come to be convinced that Khrushchev's outlook had become incurably "revisionist"—that they differed not only about particular policies, but about the basic tasks of a Communist party regime in the building of "socialism" at home and in fostering the advance of the world revolution.

In fact, these different concepts concerning the central issues of Communist doctrine and strategy have been made more and more explicit in the programmatic documents published by both sides since the 22nd congress of the CPSU. Of course, this recent elaboration of increasingly complete rival interpretations of the "Marxist-Leninist" doctrine has been largely a result of the factional struggle for control of the world Communist movement; yet it would be superficial to see these competing systems as mere ideological superstructures erected to justify a personal or national rivalry for world leadership. For while the rival systems are new in their present form, they have been built around differences of outlook that existed before the schism and indeed were largely responsible for causing it by leading Moscow and Peking to hold different ideas about the possible forms of international unity. Nor can these differences of outlook be understood as merely reflecting differences of national interest in the field of foreign policy: they are as much an expression of different internal needs resulting from the different roads travelled and the different stages reached by the two leading Communist regimes in their "construction of socialism."

The Dynamics of "De-Stalinization"

The full importance of these different internal needs of the Communist regimes will become clear once we recall that it was primarily for internal reasons that Khrushchev embarked on the difficult and dangerous path of destalinization. The central domestic task facing Stalin's Russian heirs, and more particularly Khrushchev as the exponent of the efforts to restore the primacy of the party over all other power machines, was to adapt the rule of the CPSU to the needs of a growing industrial society. Khrushchev had understood at an early stage that

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Soviet society could not develop further without a drastic change in the methods of governing it—a renunciation of mass terrorism involving a major reduction in the role of police coercion in daily life and a major increase in the role of material incentives for the ordinary worker and peasant; and he quickly found that the bureaucrats trained by Stalin could not be induced to change their methods unless the legend of Stalin's infallibility was destroyed first. The very fact that Khrushchev wanted to accomplish the change in the name of an ideological party forced him to justify it by an ideological break.

But the unforeseen consequences of destalinization did not remain confined to the damage to Russia's international authority. Internally, too, the renunciation of mass terrorism and the new emphasis on encouraging a steady growth of productivity were bound to lead to further changes in the dynamics of Soviet development.

Under Stalin, the creation of the material skeleton of an industrial society had been accompanied by periodic violent transformations of the social structure, "revolutions from above" intended in theory to get nearer to the goal of a classless society and serving in practice to prevent any consolidation of the body social that might weaken the power of the totalitarian state. Toward the end of his life, Stalin had proclaimed that the achievement of true communism would require, apart from quantitative advances in productivity and corresponding increases of real income and reductions of working time, one more major structural change—the transformation of collective farm property into all-national property, ending the distinction between collective peasants and state workers.

As late as the 21st party congress in 1959, Khrushchev, in outlining his own program for the building of Communism, accepted the disappearance of the distinction between collective farms and state farms as a precondition for reaching the goal, and announced a catalogue of measures aimed at bringing about this structural change. Yet while Stalin had envisaged an abolition of all monetary exchanges between the collective farms and the state, and their replacement by barter contracts as the crucial step in this transformation, Khrushchev's reforms had tended for years to raise agricultural productivity by making all costs and prices comparable in monetary terms; and he showed himself anxious to accomplish the new structural changes without a setback in productivity, hence without violent upheaval. In short, Khrushchev was seeking to combine the dynamics of ever new structural change, required by Communist doctrine, with the dynamics of economic rationality, imposed by competition with the non-Communist world at the stage of development reached by Soviet society; and experience soon showed that the two were in conflict—that every local advance in structural change promptly resulted in losses in agricultural output.

By the time of the 22nd congress in 1961, economic rationality had

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won. In the new party program, structural change was no longer demanded as a precondition for the transition to Communism, merely anticipated as a by-product of the long-term rise in productivity. For the first time, the effort to build Communism was now defined purely in terms of quantitative economic improvement, no longer in terms of the deliberate use of state power as an agent of social transformation. Correspondingly, the Soviet state was no longer described as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" exercised by its vanguard, the Communist party, but as a "state of the whole people" led by that party. The significant revision here was not the admission that state and party had ceased to be "proletarian"—that had been clearly implied already in the Stalin constitution of 1936 and the party statute of 1939—but the claim that the party regime had ceased to be a dictatorship: it was intended to emphasize the change of political climate brought about by the end of mass terrorism, and to assure the Soviet people that while one-party rule would continue indefinitely, the era of violent social upheavals staged in the name of the party's goals was over for good. The new formula thus expressed the conviction of the Soviet leaders (both before and after the fall of Khrushchev, whose successors have promptly reaffirmed their loyalty to the party program and the decisions of the 20th and 22nd congresses) that, at the present stage of development, their rule could better be justified by disguising than by emphasizing its dictatorial character—that henceforth the stability of their regime and the growth of its material power would be better served by a somewhat relaxed form of autocratic rule than by the extreme of totalitarian tension.

Finally, the Soviet thesis that world war is not "fatalistically inevitable" and may even be "eliminated from the life of mankind" before the end of imperialism, and the increased verbal stress on "peaceful coexistence" even during highly critical phases in East-West relations, have, apart from their truth content and their role in foreign policy, also a function in this domestic context. A regime seeking to impose bitter sacrifices in a climate of internal tension tends to project the cause of this tension into the outside world and to justify its domestic harshness by a sense of imminent external danger. A regime seeking to appeal to the self-interest of its subjects in order to achieve a steady growth of productivity wishes to encourage a sense of security among them, and that means security not only from police persecution but also from imminent war. Of course, this requirement may at times conflict with the need to justify special efforts and sacrifices for the armament race; yet on the whole it is remarkable to what extent the Soviet leaders have in recent years tried to reassure their people that peace can and will be preserved.

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The Dynamics of "Uninterrupted Revolution"

By contrast, the entire recent development of Communist China has been dominated by Mao's conviction that his rule could only be maintained if ideological militancy was kept up in an atmosphere of the besieged fortress. It would be an oversimplification to attribute this conviction directly to the comparative "youth" of the Chinese revolution, or to the lower level of China's economic development; for it should not be forgotten that China had been an active and successful pioneer of the coexistence campaign in Asia for several years beginning in 1954, and that in 1956 and early 1957 Mao had experimented with permitting intellectual criticism of his regime in the "Hundred Flowers" campaign and even tolerating the expression of popular grievances as a safety valve for "nonantagonistic contradictions" in Chinese society. Students of Communist China seem to agree that it was the shock at the flood of domestic opposition which those experiments brought to light, even more than the shock of the Hungarian revolution, that caused Mao to turn, from June 1957 onward, to a policy of deliberately keeping up a climate of internal tension and irreconcilable ideological struggle.

From that moment, he seems never to have looked back. The second session of the eighth party congress of the CPC in the spring of 1958 brought the "great leap forward"—the attempt to achieve fantastic simultaneous increases in agricultural and industrial production mainly by mobilizing "mass initiative," and the preparations for the "People's Communes"; and by the end of the summer, the total transformation of rural life by driving the entire peasantry into Communes within a few months, in conditions where long hours and poor rewards were enforced by militarization of labor and egalitarian propaganda, was proclaimed as the next step of an "uninterrupted revolution" that was to lead to full Communism within a short time. Mao's insistence on branding "revisionism" as the main danger in the international Communist movement during the Moscow conference of November 1957 must be largely seen in this domestic Chinese context. The fact that the Chinese delegation at this conference, when it sought not yet a quarrel but the closest possible cooperation with the Soviet leaders, expressed serious doctrinaire qualms behind the scenes about Khrushchev's 1956 formula of the "peaceful" or "parliamentary" road to socialism, indicates the Chinese fear of any theory which might even remotely appear to blur the picture of an irreconcilable worldwide struggle. Clearly, the Chinese felt that any such appearance might interfere with their determination to maintain the atmosphere of the besieged fortress at home; and that same determination must have been an important contributing factor in causing them to engage in various national conflicts with their Asian neighbors in the following years.

It is particularly significant that even after the catastrophic eco-

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nomic results of the "Great Leap Forward" and the "People's Communes" forced the Chinese Communist leaders to revise their expectations and correct their immediate policies, they refused to change the general climate of their internal development. Under the whip of hunger, the attempt to achieve a massive increase in heavy industrial production, without corresponding capital investment, by means of country-built furnaces was abandoned, and agriculture given priority. The internal organization of the "People's Communes" was greatly loosened, turning them into units of administration rather than of actual production. The belief that by means of those communes full communism could be reached in less than a generation was dropped and the fact stressed that the way ahead was long and arduous.

Yet at the same time, and despite the demands for a more far-reaching reversal of the line raised by a "right-wing" minority in the leadership in 1959, Mao and his supporters have continued to insist on such basic features of their "general line" as the need to develop China by its own strength, the rejection of any attempt to reward scarce technical cadres by increased income differentiation during the main period of industrial construction, the preservation of the Communes as a "germ" for higher Communist forms, and the preference for militarization of labor over any consistent policy of material incentives. To the outsider, such policies seem unlikely to solve China's tremendous economic problems; but to Mao and his team, they have the merit of preserving the atmosphere of intransigent ideological struggle against all dangers of *embourgeoisement.* It is indeed remarkable that the same insistence on extreme egalitarianism and uninterrupted revolution which in 1958 was justified by the promise of a rapid transition to full communism has now come to be based on the opposite argument—i.e., that the danger of a new privileged class attempting a "capitalist restoration" will persist during the entire long transition period of "five to ten generations" or "one or several centuries," and can only be held at bay if the regime continues the most vigilant class struggle throughout that time.

In the ninth and latest Chinese official commentary on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU of July 14, 1963, which reads like a political testament of Mao Tse-tung, this argument is used to attack the "revisionist" outlook of the 1961 CPSU program, and above all the thesis that after the destruction of the former exploiting classes, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" can be replaced by a "state of all the people." Indeed, while in a Soviet context that thesis serves the rulers' need to give their subjects an increased sense of security from further violent upheavals, the implied promise of such security must appear to the Chinese rulers in *their* context as dangerous encouragement for opposition to their own harsh regime. In the framework of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, renunciation of dictatorship can be

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justified only by the ending of the class struggle following the final disappearance of "antagonistic classes." Conversely, the defense of permanent dictatorship requires proof that the class struggle must still continue, and the Chinese provide it by claiming that new capitalist elements will rise again and again pending the final achievement of Communism, and that the struggle against them may enter particularly acute phases at any time during that long period.

This gets Mao Tse-tung close to Stalin's notorious thesis—developed in his 1937 speech to the Central Committee as a justification for his blood purge, and specifically denounced in Khrushchev's secret speech 19 years later—that the class struggle must become more acute with the progress of socialist construction. The internal Chinese meaning of the argument becomes transparent in the concluding section of this "testament of Mao," which urges the Chinese party to train in time loyal successors to the first generation of revolutionaries—lest revisionist careerists should gain power and, by relaxing the struggle against the neo-capitalist elements, turn the country away from the true socialist path.

Once again, it is this internal need for unrelenting struggle that gives Chinese opposition to Khrushchev's propaganda of "peaceful coexistence" and of the "peaceful road" to Communist power its peculiar dogmatic character. Stalin, after all, was also concerned to limit his foreign policy risks and to avoid world war—and there is no evidence whatever that the Chinese are seriously bent on provoking a nuclear holocaust. But Stalin did not *talk* so much about "reasonable" imperialists understanding the need for peace, and just this talk of Khrushchev's appears particularly objectionable to Mao because of its effect on the ideological climate within the Soviet Union and the bloc. Similarly, Stalin did in fact experiment with the "peaceful road" to power in the first postwar years, both in authorizing the use of "parliamentary" forms for the consolidation of Communist rule in the "People's Democracies," and in encouraging the West European Communist leaders to see how far they could imitate the example without the presence of the Russian army. But Stalin did not make the successful example of the Prague coup d'état of February 1948 the basis of a general *formula* about the possibility of a peaceful conquest of power, as Khrushchev did in his report to the 20th congress of the CPSU—and Mao fears that such a formula might make the task ahead appear easier and the struggle less bitter to Communists in underdeveloped countries with revolutionary possibilities and to those in the Communist countries themselves. In the international as in the domestic field, Mao's central charge against the "revisionists" is that their slogans lead to the ideological disarmament of the Communist ranks.

What all this amounts to is that a different concept of the domestic tasks and nature of a Communist regime entails a different concept of

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the "world revolution" and of its own role in it. The classical justification of totalitarian Communist rule is the need for permanent social revolution at home and permanent irreconcilable conflict with the non-Communist world, both of which are interpreted as aspects of the class struggle: because the stakes in that struggle are survival or death, it is bound to assume violent forms at crucial moments and can only be conducted effectively by a ruthless dictatorship acting as its international High Command. But if the class struggle is ended at home and domestic social revolution is beginning to give way to peaceful economic evolution, the domestic effort can no longer be presented as merely a sector of a single worldwide struggle, and the link to the international Communist movement is loosened—even ideologically. This change has made it easier for the Soviets to accept the facts of Communist pluralism and renounce their traditional "leading role." But by the same token, the Chinese Communists' continuing commitment to unceasing revolutionary struggle at home maintains their need for seeing themselves as part of a worldwide revolutionary front; and when this front appeared to be threatened with disintegration because its former commanders had left their post, the Chinese were willing to assume their role.

II. *The Prospects for a "Maoist" International*

The Will to Lead

It has taken years of successive disillusionments for the Chinese leaders to become aware of the full implications of their sense of mission. In 1956/7, they had begun to feel ideologically superior to Stalin's heirs, but had still wished to keep them in the "leading role" and to guide them quietly behind the scenes. In 1959, following a series of disappointments over Soviet policies, they had begun to criticize their allies in the forum of the international Communist movement, hoping to bring effective pressure to bear on them. Meeting unexpectedly stubborn resistance, they had by late 1960 come to think in terms of a protracted factional struggle which, after repeated compromises, would eventually enable them to become the recognized leaders of the world movement; but they probably still thought that a split could be avoided. It seems likely that it was only the 22nd congress of the CPSU—the clash with the Soviet leaders over the Albanian issue and the memory of Stalin, and the adoption of the Soviet party's new programme—that finally convinced Mao and his team that the Soviet leaders were incurable "revisionists," and that it was the Leninist duty of the Chinese party to prepare for a split and the creation of a new, truly revolutionary International. At any rate, both the ideological output and the organizational tactics of the Chinese changed after this event: ideologically, they broadened the area of the dispute to defend Stalin's

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memory and attack Khrushchev's domestic policies; organizationally, they began to prepare positions for an impending break rather than for a long-term internal debate and openly strove to discredit the Soviets among the nationalists of the underdeveloped countries.

While thus looking towards a split, the Chinese leaders were still trying to avoid the onus of the initiative and also to delay the date: the longer they could work with a separate factional platform and organization inside a formally united movement, as the Bolsheviks had worked inside the Russian Social Democracy until 1913, the better, they felt, would be their chances to extend their influence—provided they did not make any more ideological concessions for unity's sake. But when the double crisis of the autumn of 1962—over the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the Sino-Indian frontier war—showed that the alliance between the two main Communist powers had been eroded to vanishing point, the course of five European Communist party congresses in the following months made it clear that the Soviets, too, now regarded a split as inevitable and would hasten it if they could. In the circumstances, the bilateral talks held in Moscow in June/July 1963 were viewed by both sides not as a last chance for reconciliation, but as a final confrontation before the break*; the Chinese published their "Proposal for the General Line of the Communist Movement," with its all-out attack on the "revisionist" CPSU program, on the eve of the talks, and the Soviets replied one month later with their "Open Letter" which contained among other charges the specific accusation that the Chinese were supporting splitting activities in various Communist parties. Expulsions and counterexpulsions had in fact begun in a number of countries, and the time had come to justify the organizational schism on grounds of principle. After the Sino-Soviet talks had failed and the Soviets had signed the nuclear test ban agreement with the United States and Britain in late July, the Chinese were ready for it: they called the agreement a betrayal, they began to disclose parts of the secret prehistory of the conflict, and they built up the case for splitting Communist parties that had fallen into the hands of "revisionist traitors."

By the beginning of September 1963, the Chinese Communist press began to publish approving reports about the formation of anti-revisionist splinter groups in various countries; at the same time, the first clearly Peking-financed organs of Communist dissidence made their appearance outside China, after French and Spanish editions of the *Peking Review* had prepared the way several months before. Later that month, the Indonesian party leader D. N. Aidit, reporting on a two months' journey through the leading Communist capitals, on his return pro-

* As the underlying factors have not been changed by the fall of Khrushchev, it is the writer's view that any new bilateral meeting following this event would have a similar, purely tactical character.

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claimed the principle that true Marxist-Leninists, if expelled by a revisionist party leadership, were entitled to form a new Communist party, and that such "circles, magazines and new parties," if found to be truly Marxist-Leninist, deserved the support and solidarity of established parties under Marxist-Leninist leadership. On October 26, the deputy head of the Chinese party's propaganda department, Chou Yang, declared in a speech in Peking the splitting of revisionist-led parties by Marxist-Leninists to be an "inexorable law"—for the surprising dialectical reason that the Communist movement, like everything else, "tends to divide in two." The speech was published two months later and, more important, its principal arguments recurred in early February 1964 in the seventh of the Chinese party's official commentaries on the Soviet "Open Letter," entitled "The Leaders of the CPSU are the Greatest Splitters of All Time"; with the full authority of the Chinese party, this document took the line that in any split between "Revisionists" and "Marxist-Leninists," regardless of the factual circumstances, the political guilt rests with the revisionists—in other words, that a pro-Chinese minority cannot do wrong when it splits a pro-Soviet Communist party. During the same period, finally, the Soviet and Chinese parties had also changed roles with regard to the project of another Communist world conference: in 1962 the Chinese had urged and the Soviets evaded it, but from October 1963 it was the Soviets who sought a showdown conference to achieve a clear majority vote against the Chinese views, and the Chinese who worked to prevent it while they were building up their own new International.

The Chinese were not, in fact, explicitly speaking of the need for a new international organization; on the contrary, in their polemics against the Soviet leaders they kept stressing the independence and equality of all Communist parties, denying the right of even the most powerful outside party to interfere in any party's internal affairs and asserting that there could be no return to the times of the Comintern with its single command center. In practice, however, they behaved exactly as the Soviet leaders had behaved in the formative years of the Comintern. They used their authority to redefine the principles of revolutionary doctrine and strategy, and to decide which party or splinter group was "truly" revolutionary in accordance with those principles. They used their diplomatic missions and publishing offices in various countries to make contact with dissident revolutionary groups, to subsidize their activists by employing them, and to finance their publications.

They also indicated their willingness to combine fission with fusion: just as Lenin, in his effort to rally all militant revolutionaries, had appealed to revolutionary syndicalists even if they had no Marxist traditions and had rebuked the "intellectual arrogance" of those old-line Marxists who wished to reject them on those grounds, so the

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Chinese were now saying that the Algerian FLN had proved itself a more revolutionary force than the Algerian Communist party, and Castro a better revolutionary leader than the old Cuban Communists. For the new International in its initial stage, what mattered most was clearly to attract the most militant revolutionary elements of any country, regardless whether they came from inside or outside its established Communist party. This was most clearly shown in the one directly international organ that was created, also in September 1963, on the Chinese line and with Chinese money—the monthly *Revolution,* published in several languages from Paris as a magazine for Africa, Latin America and Asia: for it based its appeal on no narrower doctrine than that of violent anticolonialism. In fact, the Chinese leaders are convinced that this must also be the main basis of the appeal of the new International as a whole.

The Primacy of the Underdeveloped Regions

Long before the factional struggle began, the Chinese had considered that their main chances of international influence lay in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As early as the end of 1939, Mao had first expressed the view that the revolution in all colonial and semicolonial countries would follow the same "laws" as in China; and on the morrow of final victory in the civil war, Liu Shao-chi had proclaimed the Chinese revolution as a model for all those countries at the Peking conference of Asian and Australasian trade unionists. During the years that followed, China's authority among the Asian Communists had grown, apparently with toleration from Stalin; and after Stalin's death the Bandung conference had greatly increased China's prestige among Afro-Asian governments, and the formation of the "Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee" had given her access to a useful machinery for influencing the most militant revolutionary elements of both continents.

By the time the factional struggle with the Soviets opened in 1959/60, colonial "wars of national liberation" had become, in Peking's concept, a vital means for diverting the strength of the imperialists —above all the main enemy, the United States—and wearing them down; now they also became a useful lever for disrupting the Soviet diplomacy of "peaceful coexistence," i.e., for interfering with any plans for a Soviet-American dialogue. In the Chinese April documents of 1960, which constituted their first coherent factional platform, the need to support anti-imperialist uprisings without regard to the risk of escalation or to the consequences for overall diplomatic relations with the enemy became one of the central theses. When the Soviets advised the Algerian FLN to negotiate with de Gaulle, they could be accused of opportunism; when they supported Cuba with economic aid and demagogic threats against the United States, they could be em-

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broiled with the Americans; when they got involved in the Congo troubles, both lines could be pursued by Peking in turn. In any violent colonial conflict, Chinese interest was clearly on the side of militancy, while Soviet interest was divided between the wish to inflict defeat on the imperialists and the need to control the risk; and the Chinese missed no chance for pointing out the difference to the Communists and sympathizers from the countries concerned. It is hardly surprising that both at the 1960 Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties and at the meetings of the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Peace Movement, the Chinese line found a sympathetic echo chiefly among some of the delegates from the underdeveloped continents, and that support for it proved much stronger in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization than in any other international "front."

It is true that some of the revolutionary movements which thus received Chinese support were by no means Communist-controlled and could be described as corresponding to the "Chinese model" only in that they were anti-imperialist, peasant-based, and above all violent. But as the bulk of the Communist parties of the advanced industrial countries took sides against China in the factional struggle, it became increasingly obvious to Peking that all the chances for revolutions, be it under Communist or non-Communist leadership, were concentrated in the colonial, ex-colonial or semicolonial countries, while in the advanced countries, however large their Communist parties, there seemed to exist no immediate potential for revolutionary struggle at all. In Western Europe and North America, the Communist parties had welcomed Khrushchev's "revisionist" thesis of the "peaceful road" to power except for insignificant minorities. But the Communists of Vietnam and Laos were fighting a civil war under Chinese guidance. The Cuban Communists had, however reluctantly, joined Fidel Castro's revolution, and the Venezuelan and various other Latin American Communists were trying to imitate its partisan strategy. Strong factional opposition to the "peaceful road" strategy had developed—originally, it seems, independent of any Chinese stimulation—among the Brazilian Communists since 1957 and among the Indian Communists since 1958; while the Japanese Communists were expelling a "revisionist" group at the very moment of the 22nd congress of the CPSU. Both the early struggle for national liberation in countries where the Communist parties were weak or non-existent as in Africa, and the later Communist-led struggle against the continuing influence of the "imperialists" in formally independent countries thus seemed to offer the scene of irreconcilable, violent conflict that was required by the Chinese vision—and with it corresponding chances for Chinese leadership.

Once the Chinese had determined on preparing for a new, truly revolutionary International, it was natural that they should recognize this geographical shift in the main theatre of the world revolution.

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They did so by adopting, in early 1963, the formula that the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America now constitute "the main focus of global contradictions" and "the storm center of the world revolution," and that the struggle of their peoples would be "decisive" also for the ultimate victory of the proletariat of the advanced industrial countries; and they have since stuck to this formula in the face of all Soviet charges of "racialism" and of all warnings against weakening the colonial liberation struggle by "isolating" it from the cause of the advanced "socialist" countries and from the movement of the Western industrial proletariat. This thesis is basic for the possibility of a new, Sino-centric International in that it denies to the conflict between the Soviet-centered "socialist world system" and the imperialist powers its role as the main axis of the international class struggle. But it also constitutes the germ of a new doctrine that is incompatible with the teachings of either Marx or Lenin.

For Karl Marx, it was axiomatic that the victory of socialism would be brought about by the industrial proletariat of the most advanced countries on the basis of the highest level of economic development that capitalism could achieve. Lenin broke with this concept by seizing power in backward Russia on the ground that Russia constituted "the weakest link" in the imperialist chain, and by proclaiming the alliance between the revolutionary proletariat of the industrial West and the nationalist revolution of the colonial East; but he never left any doubt that he regarded the class struggle of the proletariat as the decisive force, compared with which the nationalist movements of the colonial and semi-colonial countries would be mere auxiliaries. The new Chinese doctrine reverses this relationship, treating in fact the working class of the advanced countries as mere auxiliaries of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries, and unreliable auxiliaries at that; it thus adopts a position that was explicitly criticized by Lenin and Stalin in the early years of the Comintern, when similar views had been expressed by Sultan Galiev and for a time also by the Indian Communist M. N. Roy. Nor can the Leninist orthodoxy of the new Chinese position be rescued by the fiction that the leading role of the proletariat in the new International will be assured by the leadership of the Chinese Communists: though Lenin himself evolved a similar fiction to justify the possibility of Soviet regimes in Asian territories without an industrial working class, he never regarded such territories as the central part of the international revolutionary front. Moreover, the Bolshevik party in Lenin's time, though in fact independent of working class interests thanks to its centralist organization, was at least based on a predominantly proletarian membership and allied with important sections of the West European proletariat, whereas in the case of Mao's party today the claim to represent the industrial proletariat has become wholly fictitious: it rests neither on its history, its composition nor its international influence, only on

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the vestigial notion that whoever conducts a militant revolutionary struggle against imperialist monopoly capitalism expresses *ipso facto* the true class consciousness of the proletariat.

Yet just in its conflict with both Marxism and Leninism, Mao's new doctrine is based on some of the decisive historical facts of our time. In the 40 years since Lenin died, the workers of the advanced industrial countries have become less and less revolutionary, with the result that in no such country have the Communists been able to lead a victorious revolutionary movement. By contrast, it is in the underdeveloped countries that huge masses of people, living in extreme insecurity on the edge of starvation, can be said to have "nothing to lose but their chains," and their despair has offered opportunities for a number of victorious revolutions, including Communist revolutions. The course of contemporary history has thus made it impossible for the Communist leaders to be faithful to Lenin's Marxist belief in the industrial working class and to Lenin's passion for revolutionary struggle at the same time, though they have tried hard not to admit the fact to themselves. Under the pressure of their conflict with the Soviets, the Chinese leaders, whose links to European Marxism and to the industrial proletariat have always been tenuous, have at last made a choice: their new International will be wholly revolutionary, but only marginally proletarian.

The Chances of "Chinese-Type" Revolutions

What, then, are the chances that further revolutions of the underprivileged peoples will in fact lead to the victory of totalitarian parties committed to permanent, irreconcilable struggle against the "imperialists," and that the Chinese Communists will be able to guide the development of these new totalitarian regimes for any length of time?

In trying to answer the first part of the question, it may be useful to group the bewildering variety of pre-revolutionary crisis situations in these countries into a few main types. First, there are the few African populations still struggling against direct colonial rule or formal white supremacy. Second, there is the much larger number of politically sovereign, "semicolonial" countries whose problems of economic and social development, difficult enough in themselves, are complicated by the existence of foreign capitalist combines holding key positions in the national economy—combines that often have no positive interest in the overall development of the country concerned and sometimes are directly opposed to it. Third, there are the newly independent countries whose regimes, quite apart from any influence of foreign capital, are proving for various reasons unable to create a functioning administration and a sense of national loyalty, yet are continuing to enjoy Western "imperialist" support simply because they are in power and often appear as the only available alternatives to Communist victory.

In the first type of situation, Communist leadership has hitherto

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been exceptional: only in the Vietnamese uprising against French rule did the Communists lead from the start. The Chinese Communists themselves emphatically recognize that such a contingency, however desirable, should not be a condition for their support of an anti-imperialist revolt: for years they have gone out of their way to extol the Algerian FLN, despite its non-Communist ideology and leadership, as a model for other oppressed nations; and while hoping for stronger Communist influence among the underground movements in South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, they will similarly support them in any case. Yet the FLN in power has shown no desire to continue militant conflict with the West for conflict's sake; whether it will eventually return to such conflict will neither depend on the memories of its heroic period nor on Chinese advice, but on the obstacles it encounters in trying to develop its country and on the ability of its leaders to cope with them. Generally speaking, the "first phase" of the anticolonial revolution—the struggle for political independence—is unlikely to result in Communist regimes of any kind.

The second type of prerevolutionary situation is widespread both in Latin America and in the Middle East, and examples occur in all underdeveloped regions. The histories of Mossadegh's rule in Persia and of Kassem's Iraqi revolution as well as of Nasser's Egypt, and of Peron's Argentina as well as of the Bolivian and Venezuelan revolutions, offer examples of the political explosions that may result if independent national development has to be achieved against the joint resistance of native oligarchies and foreign capitalist interests. So far, Fidel Castro's Cuban revolution has been the only one of this type that has actually issued in Communist rule, yet it seems to have greater potentialities as a model than that of Ho Chi Minh among the first type; for while non-Communist movements for political independence have almost universally succeeded, many of the non-Communist revolts against "semicolonial" dependence have failed. Now regardless of Castro's cautious maneuvering in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the close affinities between the "Fidelist" guerrilla strategy as taught by Guevara and Mao's type of partisan warfare are notorious, and throughout Latin America today the influence of the Fidelist and the Chinese model tend to merge. On the whole, the prospects that further revolutions against "semicolonial" dependence may turn Communist are serious, because here the link between nationalism and anti-capitalism is inherent in the situation; they can be reduced only if the Western powers, and particularly the United States, go out of their way to dissociate themselves from the vested interests of Western private corporations in those countries.

Yet there are indications that the "classical" chances for Chinese-inspired Communist revolutions arise in the third type of crisis: the one that occurs where the leaders of a newly independent country fail, for whatever reason, to create a viable state and, *a fortoriari,* to solve the problems of economic development—particularly if those leaders, after

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successfully conducting the original struggle for independence, have meanwhile been accepted by the West. After all, Mao's original conquest of China was the victory of such a "second wave" revolution, due to the failure of the once revolutionary Kuomintang to cope with the immense difficulties of Chinese unification and modernization after decades of war and civil war. Today, comparable failures are offering opportunities for a variety of promising strategies to Chinese-oriented Communist parties in several South East Asian countries. The Indonesian Communists are seeking to profit from the administrative and economic ineffectiveness of Sukarno's "guided democracy" by first collaborating with him, involving him in conflict with the West, infiltrating his machinery of government and finally inheriting his power; the Vietnamese Communists have profited from the different, but equally marked ineffectiveness of the bureaucratic-military regime in South Vietnam to expand their guerrilla warfare in the teeth of all American support for their opponents. These "second wave" opportunities are not identical with the "second phase" of the anticolonial revolution foreseen by Leninist theory: just as in China in the 40s, they arise not from the class struggle of the proletariat against the rule of the "national bourgeoisie," but from mass despair in a climate of general political decay. (The Chinese do not even hesitate to exploit the weakness of some of the new states by promoting purely tribal revolts, as now in the Congo!) But as China's own case has shown, the chances of the "second wave" revolution are none the less real for not fitting into the traditional Leninist schema.

The Limits of Chinese Control

We must thus reckon with the prospect that further totalitarian revolutions of a more or less "Chinese" type may be victorious in various parts of the underdeveloped world, and we can be sure that Mao's China will give them any aid and encouragement of which it is capable. But it does not follow that the regimes emerging from such totalitarian movements, or even the movements themselves before the seizure of power, will be willing to submit to Chinese leadership in the way in which all Communists submitted to Soviet leadership for several decades. There are, in fact, at least three major obstacles to this. First, the revolutionary movements on which the Chinese tend to lean are much more strongly nationalist than those with which Lenin built the Third International: after all, the Comintern arose from a reaction to the "betrayal of internationalism" by the official socialist parties in World War I, whereas the new "Sinintern" is to be largely based on the "betrayal of the national liberation struggle" by the Soviets. Second, for many of the movements in question, China is not the only available, nor even a sufficient, source of support: Castro may well regard China as more reliable than Russia—but he has to rely on Russia nevertheless, because the Soviets

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can offer him so much more of what he needs. Third, Russia was the unique model for all Communists until at least 1949. Now Russia has lost her uniqueness—but that does not mean that China has automatically gained it, even in the eyes of those Communist parties and governments that incline to her side of the schism.

The Chinese Communists themselves are sufficiently aware of these limitations to disclaim any thought of returning to a "world party" with the rigid, single-centered discipline of the Comintern. They may in fact exert close organizational control over the pro-Chinese splinter groups in the West that depend on them for funds and publicity, and over such traditionally dependent Communist underground parties as those of Malaya and Thailand, most of whose members are Chinese. Their influence may be dominant in helping the left wing of the Indian and, of course, the Nepalese Communists to organize their separate parties, and traditionally strong with the Communist party of Japan; but they could not afford to interfere in the least with the autonomy of the powerful Communist party of Indonesia, which made a point of taking its time and listening to both sides before it officially joined the "Chinese camp." Again, North Korea may have become some kind of a Chinese satellite, but the Communist rulers of Albania have joined the Chinese cause by their free decision and have made an independent contribution to the dispute, and North Vietnam, for all her dependence on Chinese backing in her military struggle in the South, could not simply be ordered to take the Chinese position but had to be slowly won over.

But while the Chinese Communists can and do renounce any claim to disciplinary subordination in their new International, they cannot renounce the claim to ideological leadership: they have always believed that no united international movement is possible without a recognized ideological authority, and as we have seen, the schism means to them that they have now to play this role. The logic of this claim to ideological leadership has not only driven them to elaborate their version of the Communist doctrine more and more thoroughly, just as the Leninist version of Marxism was thoroughly elaborated only in the context of the worldwide break with the democratic Socialists; it has also compelled them to find a doctrinal justification for their own claim to uniqueness —as the only great power actually engaged in building socialism and eventually Communism.

It is in that context that Mao's latest charges about the "restoration of capitalism" not only in Yugoslavia, but also in Russia itself, acquire their true international significance. They serve not only to denounce the "Khrushchev clique" and to explain to the Chinese Communists that they must in the future stand alone without counting on the Soviet alliance, but also to "prove" to the Communists and revolutionary nationalists of the underdeveloped regions whom China wants to lead that there is no alternative. If Russia is going capitalist again thanks to the alliance

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between the re-emerging private businessmen and kulaks, the corrupt bureaucrats and grafters and the "revisionist traitors" at the top who tolerate and protect them; if Russia's new spirit of less visible controls and increased emphasis on material incentives and comforts is a capitalist spirit, as Mao's latest document maintains, then the schism is not merely about questions of strategy and tactics, not even merely about orthodoxy versus heresy: it is a conflict between a socialist and a capitalist power. The Soviet Union is not merely an unreliable ally—it is ruled by traitors who have joined the enemy camp. To China, as the only great power still following the true path of socialism, has fallen the task to carry the banner; henceforth, to struggle for socialism means to accept China's leadership.

The Repercussions on China

Yet this argument for the uniqueness of China contains both dangers to her own development and weaknesses from the viewpoint of her international attraction; for it depends on a rigidly egalitarian and military concept of the road to socialism that rejects all privileges for scarce technical, economic, and administrative cadres and deprecates any belief in material incentives in favor of a cult of collective enthusiasm and heroic poverty. Unless this dogma is radically revised (which might conceivably occur after Mao's death), it will add to the many objective difficulties of China's economic development a self-made obstacle that may well prove insurmountable; indeed, one is tempted to wonder whether it does not really express a half-conscious tendency of the Chinese leaders to give up the near-hopeless struggle for industrializing China without major foreign aid and to seek instead to conserve their political order on the present low economic level by glorifying its social justice and collective discipline.

But such a "socialism" of "highminded but hungry people sitting around an empty table in complete equality," as Khrushchev once expressed it, would lack one of the main attractions hitherto exerted by the Communist bloc on the intelligentsia of the underdeveloped countries—the attraction of a model for quick modernization. Indeed, the passion to catch up with Western productivity and power implies at least a partial acceptance of Western values; conversely, Mao's increasingly complete rejection of those values is incompatible with that obsession with material productivity which the Bolsheviks took over from their Western teacher Karl Marx, and the new nations from their former imperialist rulers. It is, of course, conceivable that the Chinese reversal of the order of priorities will appeal to some political elites in Asia and Africa, particularly in countries where the problems of economic development appear increasingly insoluble; Communism of the Chinese type would then become not a model for development, but a model for accepting its failure and reacting by a final extrusion of the influence

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of Western civilization. But short of either such a generalized withdrawal from the present fascination with economic development, or a radical change in Chinese economic and social doctrine, it would appear that Communist China's chances of being accepted as a guide for "building socialism" in developing countries are much poorer than its chances of serving as a guide for the revolutionary seizure of power.

If this is true, it limits severely the prospects of maintaining Chinese authority in a new International. For it means that while revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped world will gladly accept Chinese ideological guidance along with other forms of support, successful revolutionary governments will, unless physically dependent on China, tend to keep their own counsel and refuse to recognize Peking's "leading role." Whenever possible, they will continue to accept support from both Russia and China, as Cuba is doing and Vietnam would have wished to do; and if forced to make a choice, those who are not in China's physical power sphere may well prefer the protector that demands least ideological conformity and offers most material help. This means that Castro's Cuba, despite its interest in guerrilla revolutions, is unlikely to join a Chinese-led International. It also means that though the Indonesian Communists may be expected to become one of the most important founder members of such an International, a Communist-governed Indonesia would hardly submit to China's ideological authority for long. The Chinese effort to build up a new International may have an important stimulating effect on Communist and semi-Communist revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped world, but the new body itself will be unstable, and may decay much more rapidly than its parent.

III. *The Transformation of the Soviet Camp*

We may assume that the Soviet decision to take measures against the Chinese faction even at the risk of an open break dates from the clash at the 22nd congress—just like the Chinese decision to prepare actively for the split. The diplomatic rupture with Albania and the quiet expulsion of the leaders of the "anti-party-group"—Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich—showed a new realization of the urgent need to deprive Mao's factional allies of any influence in the European-Soviet bloc, though in both cases there were also hesitations and inconsistencies indicating a sense of the political risks involved and perhaps a disagreement about tactics within the Soviet leadership. With the issuing of a number of documents and reports on the dispute by the French, Italian, and Belgian Communists in early 1962, a more active campaign was also set in motion among pro-Soviet Communist parties outside the bloc. Finally, the Soviet leaders' resolve to make no further concessions for the sake of compromise became visible in the open voting down of a Chinese-sponsored resolution at the Stockholm session of the World

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Peace Council, in December 1961, and in the refusal to entertain the Chinese-supported "neutral" proposals of the following spring for an early Communist world conference unless all participants would pledge themselves to abide by majority decisions.

Nevertheless, the Soviets, throughout most of 1962, were not attacking their principal opponents by name in their own press: like the Chinese, they were maneuvering to avoid responsibility for the break even while accepting its inevitability. Only after the public Chinese attacks on their own conduct of the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of that year did the Soviets encourage explicit criticism of the Chinese at the congresses of European Communist parties and join in it; and only after the Chinese had, in the summer of 1963, come out with their root and branch condemnation of Soviet domestic policy and of the CPSU program, and had at the same time weakened their own propagandist appeal by opposing the ban on nuclear tests, did the Soviets conclude that it was now in their interest to complete the formal and final split, and therefore to call a world conference.

The Soviet decisions first to risk, then to promote, and finally to hasten the split thus took place in interaction with two other major developments in Soviet policy: the climax and final failure of Khrushchev's attempt at a world political breakthrough, followed by the turn to a new effort at Russo-American detente; and the growing preoccupation of the Soviet leaders with the need to improve the performance of the Soviet and East European economies—including their performance in the satisfaction of consumers' wants. The Soviet leaders' concept of the form that relations among the "loyal" Communist parties should take after the break with the Chinese has been shaped by this new situation, and by the somewhat contradictory needs arising from it, as well as by the growing awareness of their irrecoverable loss of authority and by the difficulty of rallying parties for an International that was no longer all-inclusive.

Towards a "Letter-Box" International?

On the whole, both the collapse of Khrushchev's worldwide offensive and the bitterness of the conflict with Peking seem to have inclined the Soviet leaders to make their links with other Communist parties less rigid than at any time since 1920—to seek a loose and broad fraternal alliance rather than unity on a strict and narrow doctrinal basis. After the Cuban crisis, a decisive advance of the "world revolution" appears far more distant than Khrushchev believed in the preceding years; after the schism, the relevance to Soviet greatness of further Communist revolutions, even where they are possible, appears far more doubtful than before. Now that experience has shown that the Soviet Union may not be able to control the policy of other revolutionary powers, the Soviet leaders must be increasingly concerned that other powers should not attempt to control their own by forcing on them ideological arguments in

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an international framework; and that means that they must now favor a form of international association founded on broadly defined common objectives and mutual ideological non-aggression rather than on the search for precise doctrinal unity. Finally, the greater the toleration for differences of opinion in such an alliance, the broader support the Soviets may hope to rally for it in the face of Chinese obstruction.

By its very nature, such a broad fraternal alliance would exclude any return to a formal claim for Soviet leadership based on doctrinal authority, let alone organizational discipline: in some ways, it would be little more than what Lenin contemptuously called the Second International—a "letter-box." Yet as it would in fact be grouped around the Soviet Union, it would still be a channel through which the latter, thanks to the prestige of its military and economic power, could exert considerable influence on important movements in many countries; and it would enable the Soviet leaders to tell their own people that though Moscow has ceased to be the headquarters of an embattled army of the world revolution, their country is still the beloved and admired stronghold of the great majority of the world's progressive forces. Such an arrangement would therefore be in harmony with an internal situation in which the Soviet leaders, while trying to legitimate their rule increasingly by their domestic economic achievement, still feel the need for an international legitimation as well.

This is, of course, a "revisionist" concept of what the links between a Communist power and the international movement ought to be like; it corresponds closely to what the Yugoslavs, with growing support from the Italian Communists, have advocated in recent years. In fact, the first indications that the Soviets were moving towards that sort of concept were furnished by their demonstrative rapprochement with Tito's regime since 1962 and by their defense of it against Chinese attacks—on the grounds that fraternal solidarity was possible without complete ideological agreement. Since then, the Soviets have further developed this argument by insisting that Yugoslavia, despite some "errors," was still a "socialist" country, and that the same applied to Albania on the opposite pole—thus making clear their own willingness to remain in a common international association with both "revisionist" and "dogmatist" parties and governments, provided only that all would refrain from hostile polemics against the Soviet Union. Finally, since the late months of 1963 Soviet writers have begun to underpin the tactical efforts for closer relations with some of the ruling parties of ex-colonial countries by admitting the possibility—also first put forward by the Yugoslav revisionists—that some of these countries, having embarked on the "non-capitalist road of development" thanks to the sincere anti-imperialist and prosocialist orientation of their ruling parties, might actually advance towards "socialism" without the leadership (or even the legal existence!) of a Communist party; and their views were given solemn official

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sanction when Ben Bella was hailed as the head of a socialist government during his visit to the Soviet Union in the spring of 1964.

This suggests that the Soviets may seriously hope to get some of these ruling left-wing nationalist parties—parties that have never accepted a commitment to "Marxism-Leninism" but feel that they share their anti-imperialist and "socialist" outlook with the Communists—to join a reconstructed International, particularly if the entry of Yugoslavia proved this could be done without joining a Soviet-commanded military bloc at the same time. The calculation that what would be lost in ideological conformity would thus be more than regained in breadth of influence may also help to explain the comparative readiness of the Soviets, in the discussions and correspondence with other Communist parties concerning the preparation of a new world conference, to accept the demand for pledges that this should not be a conference of "excommunication," and that no attempt should be made to establish a supra-national discipline or to impose a new dogma that would interfere with the autonomy and equality of the attending parties. Yet for the first two years of this period of preparation, the described tendency of the Soviet leaders to put their international party relations on a looser but broader basis had to contend with the simultaneous Soviet desire to tighten the ties of control in the region where interparty relations matter most—the area of the Soviet bloc proper in Eastern Europe.

"De-Satellitization" in Eastern Europe

Both the Sino-Soviet conflict and the growing Soviet emphasis on economic performance have contributed to this countertrend. The need to eliminate pro-Chinese factions in the Soviets' own power sphere has led to demands that all the East European states should follow the Soviet rupture with Albania, to fairly open pressure for the removal of Chervenkov and his followers at the time of the Bulgarian party congress in late 1962, and to more discreet urgings to make destalinization belatedly effective in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the Soviet leaders reacted to the—for them—surprising success of the West European Common Market by pressing for speedier progress toward a rational "socialist division of labor" within the Comecon: by 1962, Khrushchev had come to realize that the complete independence of the national planning machineries of the member states was in fact favoring autarchic nationalist tendencies to the detriment of the bloc. Thus when, at a meeting held in Moscow in July 1962, he called for the creation of a new Executive Committee of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid consisting of party leaders as well as for the forming of a number of supranational economic organs, he was not simply looking for the best institutional forms of blocwide rationalization, but was seeking to enlist the loyalty of the party leaders in the struggle to overcome the vested interests of the national planning bureaucracies. As soon as one of these

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leaders, the Rumanian Gheorghiu-Dej, refused to cooperate in sacrificing his country's heavy industrial projects to a Soviet-sponsored supra-national plan, the Soviets thus found that in this region at least, they were still in need of their traditional "leading role." But they also found, much to their surprise, that the decay of their authority had gone so far that they could no longer enforce it even on a recalcitrant "satellite" by any means short of physical power—and this they were now unwilling to use.

The surprise of the Soviets was not unnatural. They had accepted the fact that they could not control sovereign Communist states that had arisen from independent revolutions; that had been proved not only by the conflict with China, but by Yugoslavia's defiance of Stalin and Albania's challenge to Khrushchev. But they had never regarded the East European Communist regimes that owed their existence to Soviet military domination of that region as sovereign states; it was, after all, the obvious fact that these regimes depended on Soviet external protection for maintaining their domestic rule that had earned them the Western label of "satellites." When after Stalin's death Khrushchev had introduced a number of reforms in this empire, ending its brutal exploitation, reducing detailed Soviet supervision and even granting the local Communist leaders some representation in collective organs of military and economic coordination, he had meant to modernize the form, but not to abandon the substance of Soviet control; and he had still stuck to this concept when he restored the unity of the bloc after the October events of 1956.

In fact, of course, those events had shown the first serious weakening of Soviet control in this area, caused by the crisis of Soviet authority that followed destalinization. The Polish Communists' change of leadership amounted to a first step of emancipation from satellite status. Yet the Hungarian uprising proved once again to all the East European Communist regimes that their very survival would be in danger without Soviet protection. On the basis of these experiences, the 1957 reconstruction of the bloc granted the satellites greater domestic autonomy than Khrushchev had originally intended, but at the price of strict subordination to Soviet foreign policy and ideological authority. At the same time, the Soviets had begun to work for a more differentiated division of labor not only for economic reasons, but also as a means to strengthen the ties of self-interest that would bind each member state to the bloc.

This settlement worked well enough at first: during the next five years, nothing dramatic happened in Eastern Europe, if we leave the Albanian issue on one side. Yet it would appear in retrospect that it was just this period of quiet consolidation that prepared the ground for the "de-satellitization" of Eastern Europe. As most of the Communist rulers used their autonomy to make life more tolerable for their sub-

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jects, while the Hungarian experience caused a general loss of hope for an overthrow of Communist rule, the growing resignation of the peoples led to a loss of fear and a growing self-assurance among the Communist leaders that reduced their sense of dependence on Soviet protection. Conversely, as some of those leaders got bolder in standing up to the Soviets on behalf of national interests, they came to be accepted by growing sections of their own people, with however many reservations, as national spokesmen, and their need to hold down their subjects by force was correspondingly lessened.

The pace of the process and the mixture of its ingredients have, of course, differed from country to country, according to the history of each regime, its assets for trade relations outside the bloc, and the degree of its continuing sense of danger from the West. In Hungary, the shock of 1956 has made the leaders probably more inclined to make concessions to their people but less inclined to quarrel with the Soviets than any of their neighbors. In Poland, fear of German "revanchism" has contributed both to close cooperation with the Soviets and to a renewed "hardening" of the regime. Economic dependence on the bloc is a formidable tie for Bulgaria, while Rumania's resources give her possibilities for extra-bloc trade that combine with the total absence of threats from the West to encourage her independence. But nowhere has the simple satellite relationship to the Soviets survived—with the one exception of Eastern Germany: there, the magnetism of a free and prosperous state comprising three quarters of the German people makes impossible any national identification of the forcibly separated fourth quarter with its Soviet-imposed rulers.

The Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe thus had already moved a considerable distance away from the old type of subordination to Soviet leadership in the direction of a classical alliance, centered around the military and economic preponderance of a leading power but limited by various national interests, when the open Chinese challenge to Soviet authority and the threat of a split accelerated the change and forced it into the consciousness of the participants. Outside Albania, none of the East European regimes showed any inclination to side with China on the issues in dispute, the wistful hankerings of some bureaucratic cliques for the Stalinist past notwithstanding. But nearly all of them felt that if they decided to reject the Chinese views, this was their own free decision made in the light of their own experience and interests, not the result of an automatic loyalty to Soviet authority, and that it was also their own affair when and how they wished to give expression to this decision. Hence there has been considerable differentiation both in the handling of state relations with Albania and in the form and timing of public polemics with China by the East European Communists, and considerable reluctance to endorse the Soviet call for another world conference without an assurance of Chinese participation: the East Euro-

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pean Communist leaders realized that Sino-Soviet rivalry *within* a factionally divided movement gave them increased freedom to maneuver in relation to the Soviets, and they were unwilling to sanction a formal and final split so long as there was danger that this might lead to a revival of Soviet claims for doctrinal authority—at least for their own area.

The issue was brought to a test by the Rumanian resistance to Soviet plans for blocwide economic integration. The Rumanian objections to these plans, being due to Rumania's special economic interests as an industrially underdeveloped country whose chances for independent industrialization were favored by highly saleable raw material resources, were not shared by the other East European states; in fact, the plans in question were largely based on Polish proposals. But the Rumanians raised the question of principle whether a sovereign Communist government could be forced to submit to supra-national planning against its will; and the fact that the Chinese publicly supported their stand for the economic sovereignty of any "socialist" state made it impossible for the Soviets to use physical pressure against them as this might have driven many wavering parties to the Chinese side. The Soviets' loss of their former uncontested authority, skillfully exploited by the Rumanians in their "objective" presentation of both the Soviet and Chinese points of view and their attempts at "mediation," thus hampered Khrushchev even in using the weight of Russian economic and military power against a rebellious ex-satellite; and when Khrushchev tried to achieve a change of leadership in the Rumanian party during a "private" visit, he failed utterly. It was after this that the Rumanian Central Committee, in its resolution of April 1964, while siding with the Soviets on the main issues of the conflict with China, haughtily criticized the conduct of both sides and also took the occasion to erect the rejection of any form of supra-national planning into an "ideological principle"; it also followed up the resolution with a campaign of information meetings for party cadres with strong anti-Soviet and anti-Khrushchev undertones, and with the demonstrative sending of high-level delegations to Washington and Paris. When the Soviets decided after brief hesitation to swallow their pride, stop all polemics with the Rumanians and in fact drop the idea of majority decisions on supra-national planning, this meant that their hope for restoring a more tightly-knit control in Eastern Europe had been abandoned: the Rumanians, by using Khrushchev's need to compete with Mao, had not only won their own battle for economic independence, but had ensured that in any Soviet plans for future international cooperation the "broad and loose" concept would prevail—without exceptions for Eastern Europe.

Communism in Eastern Europe is thus likely to survive the schism with a structure that is no longer based on either totalitarian doctrinal unity or one-way imperial control, but on an alliance of differentiated

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and independent but broadly "like-minded" states accepting a limited measure of leadership from the hegemonic power. Within this region, the growth of pluralism and its reluctant acceptance by the Soviet Union will prove compatible with the preservation of unity to the extent that the ruling parties share common interests. But whenever the constellation of interests should change—for instance by the growth of new chances of extra-bloc trade following internal economic reforms in some of those states, or by the disappearance of some of the fears underlying the alliance—such a structure would have little reserves against further centrifugal tendencies. Moreover, the lack of a universally recognized model will leave the impulse for further internal revolutionary transformation—the characteristic dynamism of totalitarian regimes—seriously weakened in all of them, and will strengthen the receptivity for "revisionist" economic reforms aimed at improved performance in most of them—particularly if such reforms should first be adopted by the Soviet Union.

The Growth of Soviet "Revisionism"

It has been suggested above that the increasing preoccupation of the Soviet leaders with economic improvement rather than permanent revolution at home has made it easier for them to accept the facts of Communist pluralism abroad and to seek a looser form of association with the international revolutionary struggle. It is equally true that the irretrievable loss of the Soviet Communists' "leading role" in a single, worldwide movement, and the fading of the grandiose visions of a speedy, worldwide revolutionary advance under Soviet leadership, have favored the tendency to shift the ruling party's primary legitimation to its role as the architect of domestic economic progress.

The first major step in that direction was taken within a few weeks of the Cuban missile crisis that ended Khrushchev's hopes of a speedy overturn of the world balance of power, and while Chinese taunts about a "Munich" were still reverberating in his ears. At a plenary session of the Central Committee in November 1962, Khrushchev took a recently rediscovered draft of Lenin's, dealing with the primacy of economic tasks after the seizure of power, as his text, or rather his pretext, in order to justify a sudden and radical reorganization of the entire party machine into parallel industrial and agricultural sectors: henceforth, the primary duty of the heads of party organizations on all levels was to consist in raising output in their area of responsibility. Technically, the plan was an improvisation of doubtful value; politically, it hurt many vested interests; and ideologically, it had a distinctly revisionist flavor, tending as it did to turn the party's main attention away from the needs of ideological struggle at home and abroad. It is thus hardly surprising that the winter of 1962/3 seems to have brought more resistance to Khrushchev's new "line" in high

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places than had been noticeable at any time since his 1957 victory over the "anti-party group"—resistance carried on in the name of the primacy of politics over economics and of the importance of tightening the party's control on the ideological front. Yet Khrushchev rode out that storm, and after the Chinese attack on the party program was able to go ahead with his policy; and by the time of the Central Committee meeting of February 1964, it was Suslov, the party's leading doctrinaire, who declared that the *international* duty of the Communists of the "socialist countries" consisted in building up the new society at home so that it should become an attractive example for the masses elsewhere.

Suslov put forward that discovery in his report on the conflict with the Chinese Communist leaders—as part of his rebuttal of their attempts to declare the underdeveloped continents as the new "storm center of the world revolution" and to deny to the conflict between the advanced countries in the "Socialist camp," above all the Soviet Union, and the imperialists its role as the main contradiction of the present epoch. Yet in order to defend his thesis of the central role of this conflict despite the inglorious end of Khrushchev's offensive, and despite the evident absence of revolutionary chances in the advanced Western countries, Suslov had to reinterpret the conflict as being fought out mainly in terms of economic competition. This interpretation had, of course, been used often before in propagandist speeches and interviews addressed to Western audiences; but never had it been given the dignity of a serious doctrinal statement before the leading organ of the party. With that, it became indeed a commitment to a new international "economism" that is as far removed from Lenin's concept of the "world revolution" as is the Chinese vision of a revolutionary front centered on the underdeveloped nations. Thus under the pressure of the need to systematize the doctrinal justifications for the divergent development of the two powers, the disintegration of Leninism proceeds in both directions: to China's final rejection of its Marxist elements—the link between the revolution and the industrial working class of the advanced countries—corresponds a Soviet emphasis on the importance of economic superiority for the victory of socialism that often sounds like an echo of the Marxist arguments once used against Lenin by his Menshevik critics.

At the same time, the Soviets' growing concentration on economic results—and results of a kind that are to benefit the consumer—creates a materialist spirit that is bound to weaken the pressure for tight ideological control of all spheres of life, and to strengthen the argument for reforms that are in conflict with received dogma but in accord with practical experience. Before the November plenum of 1962, the Libermann proposals for reducing detailed bureaucratic planning and giving industrial managers freedom and incentive to reduce costs and

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improve quality in response to market indicators had been eagerly discussed, and an experiment was authorized even then; during the months of the counterattack of the doctrinaires, nothing more was heard of the matter. Yet by 1964 the counterattack had petered out, and the Libermann discussion was resumed with increased boldness and evident official support; practical measures in this direction have even been speeded up since Khrushchev's fall. The trend is clearly in the direction of a "Titoist" type of market economy in a planned framework—though the changeover must be infinitely more difficult in Russia after decades of detailed bureaucratic planning on a gigantic scale.

With all due allowances for the differences in scale and power, it may thus be predicted that a Soviet Union whose international ties have been loosened by the schism and the growth of pluralistic Communism, and whose ruling party is increasingly thrown back on the need for justifying its rule by achievements of value to its own people, will evolve in the same revisionist direction in which the Yugoslav Communists evolved when Stalin had cut them off from the world Communist movement and when their survival depended on broadening their domestic support. This evolution still takes place under the imperative of the self-preservation of the party regime; indeed, the overthrow of Khrushchev and the subsequent cancellation of the 1962 reorganization of the party can best be understood as an attempt to ensure its survival. But self-preservation now requires that this regime should change both in its justification and in its methods. The totalitarian regime, once characterized by permanent revolution carried out by mass terrorism and guided by ideological goals, is being eroded into an evolutionary authoritarianism in which the party still wields a monopoly of political power, but is reluctantly yielding sectors of economic and intellectual life to autonomous social activity. As the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union in the East European bloc has survived the doctrinaire authority of the Soviet Communists over the former satellite parties, so the institutional power of the Soviet party at home survives the erosion of its ideology. Yet in the long run, it is not very plausible that the monopolistic power of an ideological party should be required for so unideological a purpose as the promotion of peaceful economic progress; hence its preservation may become more difficult in each new crisis of succession. The Chinese may well be right in wondering how long a theocracy can hold on to power after the disintegration of its faith.

Will Communism Survive in the West?

The changes in the international outlook of the Soviet leaders we have described could be summed up in the thesis that Khrushchev's attempt at a revival of the Leninist faith in "world revolution" has collapsed under the impact of his dual failure to achieve a breakthrough in world politics or to maintain the unity of world commu-

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nism, and that the Soviet Union is now returning to a concentration on "Communism in one bloc" recalling Stalin's "Socialism in one country." But just as Stalin's skepticism concerning the progress of world revolution did not prevent him from using the foreign Communist parties as instruments of his policy, so the present and future Soviet leaders will wish to use the largest possible number of international party links as channels for Soviet influence—so long as the Soviet Union itself is governed by a party regime. In the circumstances, the Soviet leaders themselves cannot expect to compete successfully with the Chinese for the allegiance of totalitarian revolutionary parties involved in a serious bid for power in the underdeveloped areas of the world. But they start with the support of the overwhelming majority of the Communists in the advanced countries of the West; and they clearly wish to maintain alliances with the largest possible number of already *ruling* revolutionary parties in the underdeveloped countries—whether these be nominally Communist as in Cuba or nominally non-Communist as in Algeria.

Yet it is just the Communist parties in the advanced Western countries that find themselves most seriously adrift owing to the decay of Soviet authority and the disintegration of the Leninist faith. For decades, these parties have stubbornly clung to a totalitarian revolutionary doctrine and corresponding forms of organization in a situation offering no revolutionary chances, keeping their faith alive by hitching it to a foreign model; how are they to survive the admission that neither the doctrine nor the model have universal validity?

Faced with this threat to their ideological foundations, many of the smaller Communist parties in the West have at first reacted by trying to ignore the schism, pretending as long as possible that there was still a single Communist world movement under Soviet leadership —and then by pleading with the protagonists to restore unity at any price and not to force them to make a choice. But these are short-term evasions, likely to be followed by a further sectarian splintering of the Communist splinter parties and by their progressive disappearance from the arena of effective political activity.

It is different, of course, with the Communist mass parties of France and Italy. They do not work in conditions of a pre-revolutionary crisis either, at any rate not since the end of the post-war upheavals; and even during that critical period the task assigned them by Stalin was not to attempt the revolutionary seizure of power, but to influence national policy and entrench themselves in the state machine by joining in "coalitions of liberation." But they benefit from the fact that important sections in both nations, including the majority of their industrial working class, are traditionally disaffected—not in the sense of being ready for revolutionary action, but of refusing to feel themselves as part of the democratic state. This mass attitude, which has its

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roots in past history rather than in present economic and social conditions, was revived when the Communists, and in Italy also the Nenni Socialists, were pushed back into opposition in 1947; and the Communist parties have been skillful in exploiting it, satisfying at the same time the ideological needs of those disaffected masses by their revolutionary phraseology, and their practical needs, particularly in Italy, by a militant reformist policy in the trade unions, cooperatives and municipalities (in a manner recalling the similar dual role of the "revolutionary" Social Democrats of Germany until 1914, of Italy until the victory of Fascism and of Austria until the Dollfuss coup of 1934). But just because this kind of pseudorevolutionary mass disaffection is a historical hangover rather than a reflection of present conditions in the Western world, both parties have largely depended on the Soviet myth for maintaining it.

Yet the inner atmosphere of both parties and the view taken by their leaders of their own role has been as different as their history. The French CP had emerged from Stalin's continuous purges with a thoroughly Stalinist and thoroughly mediocre leadership, apt to maintain the members' hatred of the "bourgeois state" and their loyalty to the Soviet Union with unswerving conviction and to combine the comfortable role of an entrenched permanent opposition with the smug certainty that they were thereby rendering an important service to the "socialist fatherland." The Italian CP, whose old cadres had been shielded from some of Stalin's excesses by their underground existence and by Togliatti's tactical skill, and whose younger elements have been newly recruited since liberation, had never become equally fossilized; and its able leaders were both too ambitious and too conscious of the contribution made to the rise of Fascism by the purely negative opposition of the "maximalist" Socialists to feel happy in a similar policy. Much more than their French colleagues, they had seen their early government participation as a possible road to the "legal" conquest of power; much more, too, they chafed under the domestic isolation to which the Cold War and Italy's NATO membership condemned an avowedly pro-Soviet party.

This difference of background made it inevitable that the two parties should react very differently to the series of shocks beginning with destalinization and leading up to the present disintegration of world Communism. To the French leaders, any weakening of Soviet authority is a net loss, because their vested interest in the Soviet myth is overwhelming. They reluctantly accepted destalinization because they would not oppose the incumbent Soviet leaders, but they dwelt as little as possible on the critique of the past. Similarly, they accepted Khrushchev's 1956 doctrine of the "peaceful" or "parliamentary" road to power; but though the Soviet leader had obviously proclaimed it at least partly in order to make his French and Italian comrades once

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again eligible for government participation, the PCF made no serious efforts to overcome the barriers maintaining its domestic isolation. They rejected Togliatti's suggestion of a "polycentric" future for Communism and insisted on Soviet leadership; they praised Soviet intervention against the Hungarian "counterrevolution"; they willingly endorsed the second excommunication of the Yugoslavs. Finally, when the conflict with the Chinese developed, they again "followed the baton" and took the Soviet side all the way; and while they no doubt deplore the split, they became the first major party unconditionally to support the Soviet proposal for a new world conference.

The Italian Communists, on the other hand, while sensitive to the blow inflicted by destalinization on the Soviet myth, have from the start also grasped the chance of greater "polycentric" autonomy implied in the weakening of Soviet authority; and they welcomed it all the more eagerly because they hoped that visible proof of their independence would remove the principal obstacle to winning a share of power along the "peaceful road." If they did not succeed, it was not due to lack of domestic flexibility—only to the fact that they proved not to be independent enough to disavow the Soviet intervention in Hungary. They did indeed adopt the Yugoslav version, defending the final intervention without claiming that the uprising had been "counterrevolutionary" from the start; but this nuance did not even convince Nenni and his Socialist party. In fact, the shock of Hungary, following so closely on the shock of destalinization, was probably decisive for Nenni's evolution towards an autonomous, democratic policy, culminating in his joining a government coalition without the Communists.

Yet it seems in retrospect that ever since then, the leaders of the PCI have been waiting for their chance to become *really* independent. They did not break relations with the Yugoslav "revisionists" after their second excommunication in 1958. They objected behind the scenes to the concessions made to the Chinese at the Moscow world conference of 1960. They were ahead of the Soviets in recognizing the success of the West European Common Market, which their trade union leaders experienced in its favorable effect on Italian wages, and in calling for a realistic, i.e., reformist, adjustment to it. They developed the doctrine of the "parliamentary road" to the point of specifically promising that not only "other parties," but "opposition parties" could continue to function after a hypothetical Communist victory. Without actually quarrelling with the Soviets, they thus went consistently ahead of them in promoting "revisionist" ideas inside the fold, and were rewarded in becoming the main target of open Chinese attacks after the Yugoslav "outsiders" and before the Soviets were attacked by name.

Since the end of serious attempts at a Sino-Soviet compromise, the Italian Communists clearly consider that the hour of real independence has come—and this, to them, means the hour when the Soviets can

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frankly be treated as a respected but no longer infallible ally. During the municipal elections of the spring of 1963, the Italian Communists openly criticized the then current Soviet campaign to restore ideological discipline among writers and artists. More important, when the Soviets began to call for a new world conference, the Italians, in open agreement with the Yugoslavs and in confidential consultation with the Poles, expressed misgivings about its usefulness and finally agreed to participate only on conditions: there should be no formal excommunication of the Chinese, there should be no attempt to impose a general line on the parties attending but a frank discussion and toleration of differences, and the conference should be devoted to a constructive examination of recent international developments rather than to a factional settling of accounts. The Italians have thus been an important factor in pushing the Soviets towards the "letter-box" type of International; and by their posthumous publication of Togliatti's last memorandum to Khrushchev, they have served notice that they intend to remain an important factor in filling this revisionist form with equally revisionist content.

The Italian example seems to illustrate two of the conditions which any Communist party will have to fulfill if it is to survive as an important force in the West. It will have to accept the disappearance of Soviet doctrinaire authority, and to convince both its followers and its opponents that its support of Soviet policies is not unconditional—that its traditional Soviet sympathies no longer imply subordination. And it will have to adapt its program and policy to the political, economic, and social situation in the advanced Western democracies, and to convince its potential partners that its program is meant to be carried out in the institutional framework of Western democracy under the rule of law. In short, it will have to be independent, and it will have to be thoroughly revisionist: in the second half of the 60's, to be unconditionally pro-Soviet and to wait for Moscow's doctrinal pronouncements is no longer enough for a great party—not even in France.

Yet it is doubtful whether even the fulfillment of these two conditions will suffice to assure an effective role for Communist parties in the West—so long as by "Communist parties" we mean parties with centralistic, undemocratic internal structure originally imposed by the Comintern on all its sections. Next to their dependence on a foreign center and to their refusal to be bound by constitutional rules, this totalitarian form of organization has always been a basic objection to the acceptance of the Communists as possible partners by other political forces, and hence an obstacle to their full participation in the democratic political game; yet it is such participation that they must crave if they no longer look for salvation from beyond the frontiers. On the other hand, the centralistic form of organization was originally justified by the need to forge an instrument for the revolutionary conquest

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of power, and to ensure disciplined obedience to the world headquarters in Moscow: if the political reasons are really gone, why not the organizational corollary? Already the question is beginning to be asked not only from outside, but from inside the parties concerned: among the Italian Communists, the avowedly revisionist group around Amendola and Alicata has advocated the principle of "majority and minority platforms" ever since the 22nd congress of the CPSU—and to advocate such a principle for more than two years without being silenced by organizational measures goes quite a distance towards achieving it in practice. Even the French Communists have lately had to tolerate, for the first time in many years, a kind of opposition from their students' organization, whose leaders are frankly looking to the "revisionists" in Rome.

Of course, we must expect resistance against organizational change to be tougher than on any other issue: here, not only the vested interests of the party machines are at stake, but ultimately the distinctive character of the Communist parties itself—their "being" as distinct from their "consciousness." If they renounced that, they would turn into some kind of militant democratic-socialist parties, and might well find that their only remaining reasons for separate existence are of a historical, not to say sentimental kind. Yet the open question is precisely whether parties with the distinctive characteristics once transferred to Western Europe by the Bolsheviks will be able, in a non-revolutionary situation and in the long run, to survive the fading of the belief in the unique salvational mission of the Soviet Union.

Soviet Communism and the Third World

What of the prospects for Soviet influence on the Communist or leftwing-nationalist one-party regimes of ex-colonial countries, and for their further political evolution under that influence? At the moment, it seems improbable that the ruling parties of either Cuba or Algeria, Mali, Guinea, etc., would be ready to join a Soviet-sponsored International: they all wish to be formally neutral as between the Soviets and the Chinese, and some of them also between the Soviets and the West. Whether these objections will retain their force depends on many unforeseeable factors—on China's economic successes or failures and the degree of her involvement in warlike conflicts in the first case, on Western development aid and the degree of its detachment from private vested interests in the second.

Yet formal participation in international conferences, or even in a new kind of international association, is not the only form in which influence may be exercised by means of "inter-party relations"; in some cases, such relations may be very effective without being exclusive or even formalized. Kemal Ataturk's Republican People's Party never dreamt of affiliating with the Comintern, and the episode of the

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Kuomintang's admission to it as a "sympathizing party" came near the end of its real cooperation with the Communists; yet for a time, an important formative influence was exercised by the Bolshevik model in both cases. For years, the Yugoslavs have maintained informal party relations both with the Russians and with some of the new ruling parties in Africa, above all the Algerian FLN. The Soviets receive from time to time fraternal delegations from Ghana, Guinea and Mali, but the Chinese may do the same. Castro will certainly maintain party relationships with both Moscow and Peking as long as possible. In short, pluralistic Communism means not only the decay of the old International and the extremely difficult efforts to form two rival new Internationals of very different types; it will also mean a profusion of bilateral and multilateral criss-cross contacts, not all of them visible to the naked eye.

In fact, just in the case of the new ruling parties of ex-colonial countries, we have to bear one more type of relationship in mind—what may be called "licensed infiltration" or "the party within the party." The Communists in Cuba who merged their organization with that of the victorious Castro were regarded as poor revolutionaries, but they quickly gained influence by having a rather more precise program than their new companions; and some of their leaders probably still feel a basic loyalty to Moscow. The Algerian Communist Party has been banned, but its newspaper, with unchanged editors, continues to appear as an organ of the FLN, and Communists boast of having substantially influenced the FLN's new program when they attended the drafting convention as representatives of affiliated "mass organizations." Soviet specialists on these countries now state in their theoretical articles that a non-Communist one-party regime need not be reactionary—provided its internal structure permits the "conscious proletarian elements" to exert a growing influence on its policy.

Once more, we are reminded of the Kuomintang in the early twenties, when Soviet aid and advice was combined with the "bloc within" tactics of the Chinese Communists; but the present experiment takes place *after* the victory of the national revolution, and its purpose may be different. It seems at least doubtful whether Moscow looks on the Communists in these countries as future leaders of an independent mass movement and aspirants to power in their own name, or whether it does not simply regard the exertion of influence on the ruling groups by this channel as a preferable alternative to the development of rival parties in conflict with them. Nor should it be taken for granted that the ambitions of the Communist cadres in these countries are more far-reaching: their training has given them a sense of superior "scientific" insight that is valuable in their present role, but they might find it very difficult to fight the nationalist-socialist myth of the established leaders with a myth of their own. Indeed, the weakening of Soviet

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authority will be a far less serious handicap for such backroom advisers than for would-be political leaders: the latter could no longer point to Russia as the unique model of true socialism—but the former may still point to it as an impressive model of economic development.

In the era of pluralistic Communism, the prospects for Soviet influence on the postrevolutionary regimes of underdeveloped countries may thus be improved precisely to the extent that the Soviets may be less committed to replace them ultimately by Communist party regimes —that they come to adopt the attitude of the Yugoslav revisionists towards these countries. In what direction, then, may we expect that influence to be exercised? Internally, it will favor the "noncapitalist road"—the expropriation of foreign firms, the building up of the nationalized sector, radical land reforms; but the Soviets may be cautious about recommending either agricultural collectivization or their own type of detailed administrative planning. Internationally, it will use the slogans of anti-imperialist solidarity but also those of peace and disarmament; it will aim at winning diplomatic support of these countries, in the United Nations and elsewhere, but be cautious about pushing them into armed conflicts with the West which they could not sustain alone and in which the Soviets would not wish to be involved. Generally, it will try step by step to replace Western political, economic and cultural influence in these countries, while respecting their military neutrality and ideological independence. To most of the countries concerned, this policy of a "Cold War with muffled drums" may prove more attractive than the more militant policy of the Chinese.

Some Conclusions

In trying to sum up the results of our analysis, the first and most definite conclusion that seems to emerge is the answer to our initial question. The Sino-Soviet schism is *not* a mere phenomenon of power conflicts within a basically unchanged Communist world; it does both reflect and promote divergent trends of development in the Soviet Union and China, leading to essential changes of policy and doctrine on both sides. Hence there will also be less and less of an unambiguous meaning to the concept of a "Communist" party or regime. Even today, it is no longer possible to define them by Leninist doctrine, for Leninist orthodoxy, polemically claimed by either side, has in fact been abandoned by both of them: neither the Chinese attempt to transfer the revolutionary mission of the industrial proletariat to what Toynbee has called the "external proletariat" of Western civilization, nor the Soviet thesis that socialism will ultimately defeat imperialism by economic competition can in truth be described as Leninist.

Our second conclusion concerns the new international alignment

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resulting from the schism. The trend is not toward a simple split into two clearcut and stable Internationals. The Chinese will indeed try to form a new International of actively revolutionary parties based on their own model and doctrinal authority, and may have substantial initial success in countries whose internal situation offers chances for new totalitarian revolutions; but such an International is likely to be unstable owing to the strength of nationalist motives in each participating movement and to the limited attraction of the Chinese model of economic development. The Soviets are aware that their only chance to rally broad international support is to form a loose alliance without a very precise doctrinal platform and possibly even without clearly defined membership. One result of this is to make it doubtful how long an "orthodox" Soviet interpretation of the Communist doctrine will survive at all as an effective influence on Communist thought outside the Soviet Union. Another result is that a number of Communist parties, like the Cuban and perhaps even the Rumanian party, may stay outside both "camps" at least for a time, or may choose a form of association with the Soviets that carries no obligations whatever, and that a number of bilateral criss-cross contacts between parties inside either or outside both camps may continue for a considerable time.

A third conclusion is that in this world of uncertainty and flux, the comparatively most stable inter-Communist relations will be those within the immediate power sphere of each of the protagonists—in other words, hegemonic relations of military and economic cooperation in Eastern Europe, and of military, economic and subversive cooperation in East and Southeast Asia. Even though the East European Communist regimes, except for East Germany, can no longer be described as Soviet satellites and have acquired a measure of real independence, the ties of interest underlying the regional alliance continue to be more real than any other ties among Communist parties are likely to remain.

A fourth tentative conclusion is that, contrary to a widespread impression, the schism does not tend to a clearcut division of spheres of influence, with the Soviets guiding the Communists of the West and the Chinese those of the underdeveloped world. While the prospects of any form of Communism in the West appear increasingly doubtful, both Moscow and Peking regard the underdeveloped world as the chief arena of their competition, and both compete for influence on revolutionary nationalist as well as on Communist movements there. In that competition, the Chinese are likely to have more attraction for totalitarian revolutionary movements still fighting for power, but the Soviets may have an advantage with ruling revolutionary parties, as they can offer them more and demand less risks.

One final question which is perhaps not strictly within the scope

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of this paper has been touched upon all the time by implication: I mean the future of the conflict between the Soviets and the Western powers. If the "world revolution" no longer has a clearly defined meaning from the viewpoint of Soviet interest; if its promotion ceases to be an objective that is directly and actively pursued; if even its importance as a legitimation of the party dictatorship becomes secondary; if Soviet internal development seems to require a climate of security rather than of permanent tension—what becomes of the need for maintaining a state of permanent conflict with the non-Communist world as such, over and above the pursuit of Russian national interests? A totalitarian ideological dictatorship needs that conflict; a thoroughly de-ideologized, authoritarian regime would no longer need it. The long-term trend of Russian internal development seems clearly to go in the direction from the former to the latter, and the breakup of world Communism has certainly strengthened that trend. It would be foolish for the West not to notice, and welcome, the tendency towards such a change. But it would be equally foolish, and far more dangerous, to regard the change as accomplished before there are direct and unmistakable proofs of it.

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LETTERS *(continued from page 102)*

"whores of the Establishment" any more than it makes people who point this congeniality out sloganeers or "know-it-alls." The real issue, which I wish Waskow had discussed, is how to go about equalizing the ability of alternative assumption-holders to receive funds from a one-sided, assumption-bound Establishment.

I am fairly sure that the debate between social scientists who emphasize the static and the functional, and those who emphasize the dynamic and the historical will mount in intensity as the fundamental crises of our time deepen. The dispute on the nature of peace research is only one facet of this more general debate. I do not "know" it for sure, but my reading of history leads me to the working hypothesis that people's assumptions about the world change with their own experiences. In which case the balance of forces in social science may change for the better.

MARTIN OPPENHEIMER

In Need of Symptahy

Editors:

I agree with most of what Irving Howe says about Goldwater [DISSENT, Fall, 1964], but I am troubled by his apparent belief that Goldwater is making a cynical appeal to racist emotions when he talks of "our daughters, our wives . . . unsafe on the streets." This is a stupid cliche that like any cliche prevents thought and therefore has pernicious effects. But stupidity is not "filth," and not everyone who spouts cliches is wicked. Goldwater speaks with good motives, as Truman dropped the bomb on Hiroshima with good motives. He really thinks the South is "conservative"; his idea that the rural whites who voted for him have anything to conserve except their conceit of racial superiority is wrong, but not evil. Forty per cent of the people voted for Goldwater. Do we have to write them all off as subject to the appeal of "filth" and "not nice"? This is worse than oppressing the ten per cent who are Negro. After all, this is not Germany, 1933. We need not despair.

Mr. Howe talks of desperate juveniles in Harlem and unmolested murderers in Mississippi. He ought to extend his compassion to those murderers too; they are just as desperate as the residents of Harlem, probably more so, since the Negroes, or some of them, now know what they want, while the rural whites in the South are still daydreaming in black and white. Those murderers are not "unmolested" even if they are not convicted. They are as much oppressed by circumstances as criminals in Harlem, and they are an even harder social problem. It is a mistake to write of "primitive" racial phobias, echoing the racists' own language. Are these phobias any more "primitive" or "racial" than what leads Negroes in Harlem to commit crimes of violence? Criminals in Harlem, criminals in Mississippi, are entangled in the same mess. The ones in Mississippi, to whom it is hardest to give any sympathy, may even need it more.

Cambridge, Mass. JAMES BAKALEY

Poverty

Editors:

Paul Jacobs' case (DISSENT, Autumn 1964) for the "committed individual" in the war against poverty is sound and admirably put, but I do not think President Johnson's program, even with many more billions and a great deal more commitment than are now remotely possible, can eradicate poverty any more than did Franklin Delano Roosevelt with the palliatives of the New Deal which Johnson's remedies so closely resemble.

The kind of deprivation which millions suffer in the United States is built into the capitalist-free-enterprise system as logically and as firmly as are the riches of Rockefeller, Getty, Dupont and Ford. . . .

What Mr. Johnson should be tinkering with is not poverty, but an obsolescent machine that was never designed to operate effectively. . . . The poverty which is its inevitable by-product cannot be eliminated so long as one man is permitted by the conventional ethic to extract a profit from the necessities of another. When enough people understand this fully, and commit themselves to bringing it about, poverty will disappear.

TAYLOR ADAMS

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